The Best of Le Monde diplomatique 2012

by Wendy Kristianasen

Overview

Le Monde diplomatique is one of the most highly respected independent periodicals. Published monthly in French and English, it brings together a diverse range of high-calibre writers from across the world.

This book collects the paper's highlights from the last year. The articles have been carefully selected and are arranged around the key themes in our changing world including US imperialism, the financial crisis and the Arab Spring. Among the contributors are Slavoj Žižek, James K Galbraith and Philip S. Golub.

A perfect seasonal gift for anyone interested in global issues, The Best of Le Monde diplomatique goes beyond the news and illuminates the state of our planet.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780745331874
Publisher:	Pluto Press
Publication date:	03/08/2012
Pages:	288
Product dimensions:	5.30(w) x 8.30(h) x 0.80(d)

About the Author

Wendy Kristianasen is the editor of Le Monde diplomatique in English, and a writer and journalist on the Middle East and wider Muslim world.

Read an Excerpt

CHAPTER 1

The World in Crisis

* * *

July 2011

'Don't be ashamed to ask for the moon: we need it'

Europe's wakeup call

The dose of austerity prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and leaders of the eurozone countries to cure the problems of sovereign debt is visibly failing ordinary people. But it suits neoliberal interests nicely. This is not just a technical and financial debate, it is a political and social battle.

Serge Halimi

The economic, and democratic, crisis in Europe raises questions. Why were policies that were bound to fail adopted and applied with exceptional ferocity in Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece? Are those responsible for pursuing these policies mad, doubling the dose every time their medicine predictably fails to work? How is it that in a democratic system, the people forced to accept cuts and austerity simply replace one failed government with another just as dedicated to the same shock treatment? Is there any alternative?

The answer to the first two questions is clear, once we forget the propaganda about the 'public interest', Europe's 'shared values' and being 'all in this together'. The policies are rational and on the whole are achieving their objective. But that objective is not to end the economic and financial crisis but to reap its rich rewards. The crisis means that hundreds of thousands of civil service jobs can be cut (in Greece, nine out of ten civil servants will not be replaced on retirement), salaries and paid leave reduced, tranches of the economy sold off for the benefit of private interests, labour laws questioned, indirect taxes (the most regressive) increased, the cost of public services raised, reimbursement of health care charges reduced. The crisis is heaven-sent for neoliberals, who would have had to fight long and hard for any of these measures, and now get them all. Why should they want to see the end of a tunnel that is a fast track to paradise?

The Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC)'s directors went to Brussels on 15 June to ask the European Commission to pressure Dublin to dismantle some of Ireland's labour legislation, fast. After the meeting, Brendan McGinty, IBEC Director of Industrial Relations and Human Resources, warned: 'Ireland needs to show the world it is serious about economic reform and getting labour costs back into line. Foreign observers clearly see that our wage rules are a barrier to job creation, growth and recovery. Major reform is a key part of the programme agreed with the EU and the IMF. Now is not the time for government to shirk from the hard decisions.'

The decisions will not be hard for everyone, following a course that is already familiar: 'Pay rates for new workers in unregulated sectors have fallen by about 25 per cent in recent years. This shows the labour market is responding to an economic and unemployment crisis.' The lever of sovereign debt enables the European Union and International Monetary Fund to impose the Irish employers' dream order on Dublin.

The same view seems to apply elsewhere. On 11 June, an Economist editorial observed that 'Reform-minded Greeks see the crisis as an opportunity to set their country right. They quietly praise foreigners for turning the screws on their politicians.' The same issue analysed the EU and IMF austerity plan for Portugal: 'Business leaders are adamant that there should be no deviation from the IMF/EU plan. Pedro Ferraz da Costa, who heads a business think-tank, says no Portuguese party in the past 30 years would have put forward so radical a reform programme. He adds that Portugal cannot afford to miss this opportunity.' Long live the crisis.

CATERING ONLY TO RENTIERS

Portuguese democracy is just 30 years old. Its young leaders were showered with carnations by crowds grateful for the end of a long dictatorship and colonial wars in Africa, the promise of agrarian reform, literacy programmes and power for factory workers. Now, with reductions in the minimum wage and unemployment benefit, neoliberal reforms in pensions, health and education and privatisation, they have had a great leap backwards. The new prime minister, Pedro Passos Coelho, has promised to go even further than the EU and the IMF require. He wants to 'surprise' investors.

US economist Paul Krugman explains: 'Consciously or not, policy makers are catering almost exclusively to the interests of rentiers – those who derive lots of income from assets, who lent large sums of money in the past, often unwisely, but are now being protected from loss at everyone else's expense.' Krugman says creditor interests naturally prevail because 'this is the class that makes big campaign contributions, it's the class that has personal access to policy makers, many of whom go to work for these people when they exit government through the revolving door'. During the EU discussion on funding Greek recovery, Austrian finance minister Maria Fekter initially suggested: 'You can't leave the profits with the banks and make the taxpayers shoulder the losses.' This was short-lived. Europe hesitated for 48 hours, then the interests of rentiers prevailed, as usual.

To understand the 'complex' mechanisms underlying the sovereign debt crisis, you need to know about constant innovations in financial engineering: futures, CDs (credit default swaps), etc. This level of sophistication reserves analysis for select experts who generally profit from their knowledge. They pocket the proceeds while the economically illiterate pay, as a tribute they owe to fate, or to an aspect of the modern world that is beyond them.

Let's try the simple political explanation instead. Long ago, European kings borrowed from the Doge of Venice or Florentine merchants or Genoese bankers. They were under no obligation to repay these loans and sometimes neglected to do so; a neat way of settling public debt. Many years later, the young Soviet regime announced that it would not be held accountable for money the tsars had borrowed and squandered, so generations of French savers suddenly found they had worthless Russian loans in their attics.

But there were more subtle ways of getting out of debt. In the UK, debt declined from 216 per cent of gross domestic product in 1945 to 138 per cent in 1955, and in the US it fell from 116 per cent of GDP to 66 per cent – without any austerity plan. Of course, the surge in post-war economic development automatically reduced the proportion of debt in national wealth. But that was not all. States repaid a nominal sum at the time, reduced each year by the level of inflation. If a loan subscribed at 5 per cent annual interest is repaid in currency that is depreciating at the rate of 10 per cent a year, the real interest rate becomes negative to the benefit of the debtor. Between 1945 and 1980, the real interest rate in most western countries was negative almost every year. As a result, as The Economist remarked: 'Savers deposited money in banks, which lent to governments at interest rates below the level of inflation.' Debt was cut without much trouble. In the US, negative real interest rates were worth the equivalent of 6.3 per cent of GDP per year to the Treasury, from 1945 to 1955.

Why did savers allow themselves to be cheated? They had no choice. Capital controls and the nationalisation of the banks meant that they had to lend to the state, and that is how it got its funds. Wealthy individuals did not have the option to invest on spec in Brazilian stock index linked to changes in the price of soybeans over the next three years. There was a flight of capital, suitcases of gold ingots leaving France for Switzerland the day before devaluation or an election in which the left might win. However, this was illegal.

Up to the 1980s, index-linked wage rises (sliding scales) protected most workers against the consequences of inflation, and controls on free movement of capital had forced investors to put up with negative real interest rates. After the Reagan/Thatcher years, the opposite applied.

THE SYSTEM HAS NO PITY

Sliding wage scales disappeared almost everywhere: in France, the economist Alain Cotta called this major decision, in 1982, '[Jacques] Delors' gift [to employers]'. Between 1981 and 2007, inflation was destroyed and real interest rates were almost always positive. Profiting from the liberalisation of capital movements, 'savers' (this does not mean old age pensioners with a post office account in Lisbon or carpenters in Salonika) make states compete for funds and, as François Mitterrand said, 'make money in their sleep'. Moving from sliding wage scales and negative real interest rates to a reduction in the purchasing power of labour and a meteoric increase in returns on capital completely upsets the social balance.

Apparently this is not enough. The troika (European Commission, ECB and IMF) has decided to improve the mechanisms designed to favour capital at the expense of labour, by adding coercion, blackmail and ultimatum. States bled by their over-generous efforts to rescue the banks, and begging for loans to balance their monthly accounts, are told to choose between a market-led clean-up and bankruptcy. A swathe of Europe, where the dictatorships of António de Oliveira Salazar, Francisco Franco and the Greek colonels ended, has been reduced to the rank of a protectorate run by Brussels, Frankfurt and Washington, the main aim being to defend the financial sector.

These states still have their own governments, but only to ensure that orders are carried out and to endure abuse from the people who know the system will never take pity on them, however poor they are. According to Le Figaro, 'Most Greeks see the international supervision of the budget as a new form of dictatorship, like the old days when the colonels were in charge, between 1967 and 1974.' The European ideal will not gain from being associated with a bailiff who seizes islands, beaches, national companies and public services and sells them to private investors. Since 1919 and the Treaty of Versailles, everyone knows that such public humiliation can unleash destructive nationalism – and all the more so as provocations increase. The next ECB governor, Mario Draghi, who – like his predecessor – will issue strict orders in Athens, was vice-chairman and managing director of Goldman Sachs when the bank was helping the conservative government in Greece to cook the books. The IMF, which also takes a view on the French constitution, has asked Paris to insert a 'rule to balance public finances'; Nicolas Sarkozy is already working on it.

France has let it be known that it would like the Greek political parties to follow the example of their Portuguese counterparts, 'join forces, and form an alliance'; and the prime minister, François Fillon, and European Commission president, José Barroso, have tried to persuade the Greek conservative leader, Antonis Samaras, to take this course. ECB head Jean-Claude Trichet considers that 'the European authorities could have the right to veto some national economic policy decisions'.

Honduras has established an enterprise zone, in which national sovereignty does not apply. Europe is currently establishing a debate zone for all the economic and social issues no longer discussed by the political parties because these areas have gone beyond their control. Inter-party competition now concentrates on social matters: the burqa, the legalisation of cannabis, radar on motorways, the angry gestures or foul language of a reckless politician or intoxicated artist. This confirms a trend already noticeable 20 years ago: real political power is shifting to areas where democracy carries no weight, until the day when indignation finally boils over. Which is where we are.

But indignation is powerless without some understanding of the mechanisms that caused it. We know the alternatives – reject the monetarist, deflationist policies that deepen the crisis, cancel part of the debt if not all of it, take over the banks, get finance under control, reverse globalisation and recover the hundreds of billions of euros the state has lost by tax cuts that favour the wealthy (&8364;70 billion in France in the past ten years, more than $1 trillion in the US, especially for the top 1 per cent of income earners). And knowledge of these alternatives has been shared by people who know at least as much about economics as Trichet, but do not serve the same interests.

This is not a technical and financial debate but a political and social battle. Of course, the economic liberals will claim that what progressives demand is impossible. But what have they achieved, apart from creating a situation that is unbearable? Perhaps it is time to remember how Jean-Paul Sartre summed up Paul Nizan's advice to people who bottle up their aggression: 'Do not be ashamed to ask for the moon: we need it.'

* * *

November 2010

New economic territory

A permanent state of emergency

The explosion of anger seen on the streets of Paris, Madrid, Athens and Bucharest is a sign of people's exasperation and desire for change, with the hope that would bring. But we are in new economic territory: we do not know what we have to do, but we have to act now.

Slavoj Zizek

During this year's protests against the eurozone's austerity measures – in Greece and, on a smaller scale, Ireland, Italy and Spain – two stories have imposed themselves. The establishment story proposes a de-politicised naturalisation of the crisis: the regulatory measures are presented not as decisions grounded in political choices, but as the imperatives of a neutral financial logic – if we want our economies to stabilise, we have to swallow the bitter pill. The other story, of the protesting workers, students and pensioners, presents the austerity measures as yet another attempt by international financial capital to dismantle the last remainders of the welfare state. The International Monetary Fund appears from one perspective as a neutral agent of discipline and order: from the other, the oppressive agent of global capital.

(Continues…)

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Table of Contents

Introduction Wendy Kristianasen vii

Part I The World in Crisis

Europe's wakeup call Serge Haluvd 1

A permanent state of emergency Slavoj Zizek 6

The currency wars Laurent L. Jacque 11

The wolf pack stalks Europe James K. Galbraith 16

Iceland's loud No Robert H. Wade Silla Sigurgeirsdottir 22

Part II Us Empire

Empire as a state of being Philip S. Golub 32

Obama misses his historic moment Eric Klinenberg Jeff Manza 37

'We the people' Walter Benn Michaels 41

What happened to the US left? Rick Fantasia 46

A small town in the middle of everywhere John R. MacArthur 50

Part III A Smaller World

Cuba's new socialism Renaud Lambert 60

Brazil: we've got the power Lamia Oualalou 67

Latin America embraces Palestine Maurice Lemoine 72

A fine, and convenient, romance Nikolas Kozloff 74

Russia shouldn't work but it does Vladislav Inozemtsev 80

Can China share out the wealth? Marttne Bulard 85

China and India: united against the West Christophe Jaffrelot 90

Sudan's south secedes Gérard Prunier 95

Somaliland, an African exception Gérard Prunier 100

Part IV European Directions

Germany goes for sustainable capitalism Olivier Cyran 106

Academia's rebel alliance Pierre Rimbert 113

Communism revisited Evelyne Pieiller 120

Part V Roots of Conflict

One state, two dreams Alain Gresh 124

Afghanistan's future lies in its past Georges Lefeuvre 132

The Taliban's secret weapon Louis Imbert 141

Now that he's gone Jean-Luc Racine 146

Red line, green line Joost Hiltermann 152

Part VI Revolution: The 'arab Spring'

The Muslim Brothers in Egypt's 'orderly transition' Gilbert Achcar 158

To shoot, or not to shoot? Salam Kawakibi Bassma Kodmani 163

Follow the money Samir Aita 169

Power of the word in the Syrian intifada Zenobie 172

Yemen knows what it doesn't want Laurent Bonnefoy Marine Poirier 177

Egypt's revolution is only beginning Alain Gresh 181

How to make Libya work after Gaddafi Patrick Haimzadeh 189

Part VII The Question of Islam

The Arab world's cultural challenge Hicham Ben Abdallah El Alaoui 195

Iran can't reform itself Farhang Jahanpour 202

Islamic Republic uncensored Shervtn Ahmadi 207

The myth of Islamic conquest Patrick Haenni Samir Amghar 210

Indonesia, a democracy full stop Wendy Kristianasen 216

Part VIII On The Move: People and Cities

Africa does business in China Tristan Coloma 225

Filipino maids for export Julien Brygo 233

Greater Hanoi swallows the countryside Xavter Monthéard 241

Death of the Casbah Allan Popelard Paul Vannier 248

America's slow ground zero Allan Popelard Paul Vannier 254

The world has become a city Philip S. Golub 260

Index 267