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Overview
Familiar to philosophy students through the centuries, The Critique of Pure Reason is in many ways Kant’s magnum opus. First published in 1781, it seeks to define what can be known by reason alone without evidence from experience. Kant begins by defining a posteriori knowledge, which is gained through the senses, versus a priori knowledge, or self-evident truths understood without the benefit of experience. He then examines these two types of knowledge in the context of analytic and synthetic judgments, using the relationship between them to conclude that through reason alone, humans are capable of reaching deep universal truths. Kant then demonstrates how—even as much of the world around us can never be truly known—the laws of the universe are in fact made possible by the human capacity for reason itself.
Sparking intense and lasting discussion, The Critique of Pure Reason remains essential reading for anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the ideas that, since their initial publication, have gone on to shape much of Western philosophy.
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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781504004626 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Philosophical Library/Open Road |
| Publication date: | 02/24/2015 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 784 |
| Sales rank: | 129,043 |
| File size: | 2 MB |
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Read an Excerpt
The Critique of Pure Reason
By Immanuel Kant
OPEN ROAD INTEGRATED MEDIA
Copyright © 2015 Immanuel KantAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-5040-0462-6
CHAPTER 1
Of the Transcendental Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Conceptions of the Understanding.
SS 3. Introductory.
WHEN WE CALL INTO play a faculty of cognition, different conceptions manifest themselves according to the different circumstances, and make known this faculty, and assemble themselves into a more or less extensive collection, according to the time or penetration that has been applied to the consideration of them. Where this process, conducted as it is mechanically, so to speak, will end, cannot be determined with certainty. Besides, the conceptions which we discover in this haphazard manner present themselves by no means in order and systematic unity, but are at last coupled together only according to resemblances to each other, and arranged in series, according to the quantity of their content, from the simpler to the more complex — series which are anything but systematic, though not altogether without a certain kind of method in their construction.
Transcendental philosophy has the advantage, and moreover the duty, of searching for its conceptions according to a principle; because these conceptions spring pure and unmixed out of the understanding as an absolute unity, and therefore must be connected with each other according to one conception or idea. A connection of this kind, however, furnishes us with a ready prepared rule, by which its proper place may be assigned to every pure conception of the understanding, and the completeness of the system of all be determined a priori — both which would otherwise have been dependent on mere choice or chance.
SS 4. SECTION 1. Of defined above Use of understanding in General.
The understanding was defined above only negatively, as a non-sensuous faculty of cognition. Now, independently of sensibility, we cannot possibly have any intuition; consequently, the understanding is no faculty of intuition. But besides intuition there is no other mode of cognition, except through conceptions; consequently, the cognition of every, at least of every human, understanding is a cognition through conceptions — not intuitive, but discursive. All intuitions, as sensuous, depend on affections; conceptions, therefore, upon functions. By the word function I understand the unity of the act of arranging diverse representations under one common representation. Conceptions, then, are based on the spontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. As no representation, except an intuition, relates immediately to its object, a conception never relates immediately to an object, but only to some other representation thereof, be that an intuition or itself a conception. A judgement, therefore, is the mediate cognition of an object, consequently the representation of a representation of it. In every judgement there is a conception which applies to, and is valid for many other conceptions, and which among these comprehends also a given representation, this last being immediately connected with an object. For example, in the judgement — "All bodies are divisible," our conception of divisible applies to various other conceptions; among these, however, it is here particularly applied to the conception of body, and this conception of body relates to certain phenomena which occur to us. These objects, therefore, are mediately represented by the conception of divisibility. All judgements, accordingly, are functions of unity in our representations, inasmuch as, instead of an immediate, a higher representation, which comprises this and various others, is used for our cognition of the object, and thereby many possible cognitions are collected into one. But we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgements, so that understanding may be represented as the faculty of judging. For it is, according to what has been said above, a faculty of thought. Now thought is cognition by means of conceptions. But conceptions, as predicates of possible judgements, relate to some representation of a yet undetermined object. Thus the conception of body indicates something — for example, metal — which can be cognized by means of that conception. It is therefore a conception, for the reason alone that other representations are contained under it, by means of which it can relate to objects. It is therefore the predicate to a possible judgement; for example: "Every metal is a body." All the functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements. And that this may be effected very easily, the following section will show.
SS 5. SECTION II. Of the Logical Function of the Understanding in Judgements.
If we abstract all the content of a judgement, and consider only the intellectual form thereof, we find that the function of thought in a judgement can be brought under four heads, of which each contains three momenta. These may be conveniently represented in the following table:
1
Quantity of judgements
Universal
Particular
Singular
2
Quality
Affirmative
Negative
Infinite
3
Relation
Categorical
Hypothetical
Disjunctive
4
Modality
Problematical
Assertorical
Apodeictical
As this division appears to differ in some, though not essential points, from the usual technique of logicians, the following observations, for the prevention of otherwise possible misunderstanding, will not be without their use.
1. Logicians say, with justice, that in the use of judgements in syllogisms, singular judgements may be treated like universal ones. For, precisely because a singular judgement has no extent at all, its predicate cannot refer to a part of that which is contained in the conception of the subject and be excluded from the rest. The predicate is valid for the whole conception just as if it were a general conception, and had extent, to the whole of which the predicate applied. On the other hand, let us compare a singular with a general judgement, merely as a cognition, in regard to quantity. The singular judgement relates to the general one, as unity to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different. Thus, if we estimate a singular judgement (judicium singulare) not merely according to its intrinsic validity as a judgement, but also as a cognition generally, according to its quantity in comparison with that of other cognitions, it is then entirely different from a general judgement (judicium commune), and in a complete table of the momenta of thought deserves a separate place — though, indeed, this would not be necessary in a logic limited merely to the consideration of the use of judgements in reference to each other.
2. In like manner, in transcendental logic, infinite must be distinguished from affirmative judgements, although in general logic they are rightly enough classed under affirmative. General logic abstracts all content of the predicate (though it be negative), and only considers whether the said predicate be affirmed or denied of the subject. But transcendental logic considers also the worth or content of this logical affirmation — an affirmation by means of a merely negative predicate, and inquires how much the sum total of our cognition gains by this affirmation. For example, if I say of the soul, "It is not mortal" — by this negative judgement I should at least ward off error. Now, by the proposition, "The soul is not mortal," I have, in respect of the logical form, really affirmed, inasmuch as I thereby place the soul in the unlimited sphere of immortal beings. Now, because of the whole sphere of possible existences, the mortal occupies one part, and the immortal the other, neither more nor less is affirmed by the proposition than that the soul is one among the infinite multitude of things which remain over, when I take away the whole mortal part. But by this proceeding we accomplish only this much, that the infinite sphere of all possible existences is in so far limited that the mortal is excluded from it, and the soul is placed in the remaining part of the extent of this sphere. But this part remains, notwithstanding this exception, infinite, and more and more parts may be taken away from the whole sphere, without in the slightest degree thereby augmenting or affirmatively determining our conception of the soul. These judgements, therefore, infinite in respect of their logical extent, are, in respect of the content of their cognition, merely limitative; and are consequently entitled to a place in our transcendental table of all the momenta of thought in judgements, because the function of the understanding exercised by them may perhaps be of importance in the field of its pure a priori cognition.
3. All relations of thought in judgements are those (a) of the predicate to the subject; (b) of the principle to its consequence; (c) of the divided cognition and all the members of the division to each other. In the first of these three classes, we consider only two conceptions; in the second, two judgements; in the third, several judgements in relation to each other. The hypothetical proposition, "If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are punished," contains properly the relation to each other of two propositions, namely, "Perfect justice exists," and "The obstinately wicked are punished." Whether these propositions are in themselves true is a question not here decided. Nothing is cogitated by means of this judgement except a certain consequence. Finally, the disjunctive judgement contains a relation of two or more propositions to each other — a relation not of consequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the one proposition excludes that of the other. But it contains at the same time a relation of community, in so far as all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the cognition. The disjunctive judgement contains, therefore, the relation of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition, since the sphere of each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the other, each contributing to form the sum total of the divided cognition. Take, for example, the proposition, "The world exists either through blind chance, or through internal necessity, or through an external cause." Each of these propositions embraces a part of the sphere of our possible cognition as to the existence of a world; all of them taken together, the whole sphere. To take the cognition out of one of these spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of the others; and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent to taking it out of the rest. There is, therefore, in a disjunctive judgement a certain community of cognitions, which consists in this, that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby determine, as a whole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken together, they make up the complete content of a particular given cognition. And this is all that I find necessary, for the sake of what follows, to remark in this place.
4. The modality of judgements is a quite peculiar function, with this distinguishing characteristic, that it contributes nothing to the content of a judgement (for besides quantity, quality, and relation, there is nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgement), but concerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to thought in general. Problematical judgements are those in which the affirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible (ad libitum). In the assertorical, we regard the proposition as real (true); in the apodeictical, we look on it as necessary. Thus the two judgements (antecedens et consequens), the relation of which constitutes a hypothetical judgement, likewise those (the members of the division) in whose reciprocity the disjunctive consists, are only problematical. In the example above given the proposition, "There exists perfect justice," is not stated assertorically, but as an ad libitum judgement, which someone may choose to adopt, and the consequence alone is assertorical. Hence such judgements may be obviously false, and yet, taken problematically, be conditions of our cognition of the truth. Thus the proposition, "The world exists only by blind chance," is in the disjunctive judgement of problematical import only: that is to say, one may accept it for the moment, and it helps us (like the indication of the wrong road among all the roads that one can take) to find out the true proposition. The problematical proposition is, therefore, that which expresses only logical possibility (which is not objective); that is, it expresses a free choice to admit the validity of such a proposition — a merely arbitrary reception of it into the understanding. The assertorical speaks of logical reality or truth; as, for example, in a hypothetical syllogism, the antecedens presents itself in a problematical form in the major, in an assertorical form in the minor, and it shows that the proposition is in harmony with the laws of the understanding. The apodeictical proposition cogitates the assertorical as determined by these very laws of the understanding, consequently as affirming a priori, and in this manner it expresses logical necessity. Now because all is here gradually incorporated with the understanding — inasmuch as in the first place we judge problematically; then accept assertorically our judgement as true; lastly, affirm it as inseparably united with the understanding, that is, as necessary and apodeictical — we may safely reckon these three functions of modality as so many momenta of thought.
SS 6. SECTION III. Of the Pure Conceptions of the Understanding, or Categories.
General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstraction of all content of cognition, and expects to receive representations from some other quarter, in order, by means of analysis, to convert them into conceptions. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it the manifold content of a priori sensibility, which transcendental aesthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pure conceptions of the understanding, without which transcendental logic would have no content, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and time contain an infinite diversity of determinations of pure a priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind's receptivity, under which alone it can obtain representations of objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order afterwards to form a cognition out of it. This Process I call synthesis.
By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other and of comprehending their diversity in one cognition. This synthesis is pure when the diversity is not given empirically but a priori (as that in space and time). Our representations must be given previously to any analysis of them; and no conceptions can arise, quoad their content, analytically. But the synthesis of a diversity (be it given a priori or empirically) is the first requisite for the production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed, may be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis — still, synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge.
Synthesis, generally speaking, is, as we shall afterwards see, the mere operation of the imagination — a blind but indispensable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious. But to reduce this synthesis to conceptions is a function of the understanding, by means of which we attain to cognition, in the proper meaning of the term.
Pure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure conception of the understanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean that which rests upon a basis of a priori synthetical unity. Thus, our numeration (and this is more observable in large numbers) is a synthesis according to conceptions, because it takes place according to a common basis of unity (for example, the decade). By means of this conception, therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary.
(Continues...)
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Table of Contents
Introduction--H.Caygill * Translator's Preface * Title Page of First Edition (in replica) * Title Page of Second Edition (not in replica) * Motto * Dedication * Preface to First Edition * Preface to Second Edition * Table of Contents of First Edition * Introduction * TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS * First Part: Transcendental Aesthetic * Second Part: Transcendental Logic * First Division: Transcendental Analytic * Second Division: Transcendental Dialectic * TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF METHOD * Bibliography--G.Banham * IndexIntroduction
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) has been caricatured as a stiff German professor, whose Stoic habits were so predictable that the people of Königsberg, his hometown, could set their clocks by his daily walks. Kant's life is best described as a heroic struggle to discover order within chaos or, better, an effort to fix human thought and behavior within it proper limits. He lived and worked during the revolutionary period known as the Enlightenment, a time when political, religious, and intellectual freedom erupted across the Western world. The Critique of Pure Reason was published in the 1780s, between the American and French Revolutions. The first edition (1781) came out during the reign in Prussia of the "enlightened despot," Frederick the Great, to whom Kant dedicated hisfamous essay "What is Enlightenment?" in 1784. The second edition (1787) was issued during the reign of Frederick's reactionary heir, Frederick William II. During the 1790s Prussian censors rebuked Kant for the unorthodox implications of his philosophy of religion, which held that God was merely a moral postulate whose existence could not be proven by science. Although Kant's ideas were radical, he did not want to inspire anarchy or actual revolution. For Kant, the freedom of Enlightenment was to be directed toward wisdom, law, and order, not toward license and disorder.
Kant is supposed to have written the first edition of the Critique in 1780 in a matter of months, "an accomplishment," according to Ernst Cassirer, "that is scarcely rivaled, even as a purely literary feat, in the entire history of thought." After the first Critique, Kant published two other Critiques: the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Critique of Judgment (1790). The scope of these texts is remarkable. They deal with metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Together the three works form what is known as the "critical" philosophy, the basic approach of which is methodological criticism. In general, in the critical works, Kant asks the question of what we are entitled to claim that we know. While Kant produced his three major Critiques in his 50s and 60s, he continued to write and publish well into his 70s, producing works on a wide range of topics including politics, religion, anthropology, and history.
As part of his struggle to enlighten his age, Kant issued an easier distillation of the content of the Critique of Pure Reason under the title Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783). The titles of both of these works are instructive. They indicate that Kant's project is preparatory. He is clearing the ground and criticizing reason in an effort to prepare the way for the future completion of philosophy. A critique of reason is not a system of philosophy, as such a system had been traditionally conceived. He makes this explicit in the often-overlooked second major section of the Critique, "The Transcendental Doctrine of Method." Here he indicates that the problem of the book is that reason needs "discipline," and he argues that until such discipline has been instituted, philosophy, as a finished system of knowledge will not exist. Thus the critical approach is designed to help us learn to philosophize. "In other words, we can only exercise our powers of reasoning accordance with general principles, retaining at the same time, the right of investigating the sources of these principles, of testing, and even of rejecting them." The Critique enacts this process of investigating and testing principles, while encouraging each of us to judge for ourselves using our own critical powers.
The enlightenment facilitated by the critical philosophy is connected to political enlightenment and the liberal ideal of freedom of thought. The critical method assumes that reason is an authority found in each and every human being and that each has a right to openly express objections and doubt. "This privilege forms part of the native rights of human reason, which recognizes no other judge than the universal reason of humanity; and as this reason is the source of all progress and improvement, such a privilege is to be held sacred and inviolable." Political enlightenment facilitates the completion of the philosophical task by setting us free to complete the ground-clearing project of the Critique. Likewise, reason that is improved through critique is supposed to lead to progress in all aspects of human life.
The motto of Kant's 1784 essay, "What is Enlightenment?" was sapere aude ("dare to be wise"). This motto can also serve to guide readers of the Critique. For Kant, enlightenment means that every man has the right to understand the necessary limits of human knowledge. But this right comes with the responsibility to respect those limits and admit the truth. Indeed, in his moral and political writings Kant emphasized obedience to the moral law and to political authority. The idea of obedience to the law is also seen in the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant catalogues the principles that govern the mind and encourages us to obey them. The problem to be remedied by the critical process is the tendency of those who are interested in metaphysical questions to become undisciplined as they allow themselves to transgress the limits of what the human mind can actually know. If we would dare to be wise, we must admit that there are some things the mind cannot know.
Kant thus shares the epistemological and methodological concerns of modern philosophers such as Descartes and Hume. Indeed, it is not too much to say that Kant redefines metaphysical problems as problems of epistemology. What this means is that Kant transforms questions about the existence of God, about the freedom of the will, and about the nature of time into questions about knowledge. For Kant the crucial question is what any human being could know about God, freedom, and time. Kant concludes that we cannot experience an object such as God as He would be "in Himself" because everything we know comes to us through the filters of experience. Thus God is a concept or idea that we construct out of the tendency of reason to look for absolute and unconditioned things. But, we cannot know of God as He would be outside of our experience. We cannot know, then, that God exists; but neither can we know that God does not exist. Both the dogmatic theist and the dogmatic atheist go beyond the bounds of what is knowable. At best we know that God is an idea-the idea of absolute, unconditioned Being-toward which reason pushes us. Kant more explicitly avoids atheism by claiming that there are certain "transcendental" or "regulative" ideas that we must postulate in light of our practical interests. These ideas-or moral postulates-include the ideas of God, freedom, and immortality. To be honest we must admit that we have no knowledge of these things, even while recognizing that our practical moral interests demand that we believe them. In regard to these issues, Kant clearly states his position in the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique: "I have found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith."
Kant's project can be understood in relation to the concerns of both Plato and Christian philosophers such as Augustine. Plato and Augustine both assume that there is a difference between what is real and what is merely apparent. With Plato, philosophy-rigorous methodical thinking-is supposed to lead beyond the shadow world of appearances and unfounded opinions toward the world of reality and true knowledge. Augustine and the Christians add that faith is also necessary for this ascent from appearance to reality. Kant's important conclusion is that there is no escape from the world of the mind. The things we experience are shaped by the forms and categories by which the human mind necessarily experiences anything. We cannot, then, experience "things in themselves"-whether these are Platonic Ideas or the Christian God-as they would be if the human mind were not actively working to make sense of them.
While this sounds skeptical, Kant is only agnostic about our knowledge of metaphysical objects such as God. And, as noted above, Kant's agnosticism leads to the conclusion that we can neither affirm nor deny claims made by traditional metaphysics. But Kant is not skeptical about empirical objects and the laws that govern their appearance. Indeed, Kant's effort was explicitly directed to overcoming skepticism about empirical reality of the sort propounded by Hume. Kant famously claims in the Introduction to the Prolegomena that Hume was the philosopher who had "awakened him from his dogmatic slumbers." Hume had argued that the empirical world of experience was not governed by necessity because the laws of nature were mere generalizations constructed by us as we tried to make sense of experience. But this empirical point of view created profound skepticism about the nature of scientific law. Could it be possible, Kant wondered, that the laws of nature and even the laws of mathematics were not governed by necessity? One of Kant's goals is to show us that science is a valuable way of understanding the world of experience, precisely because science constrains itself to the world of experience and does not stray into metaphysical speculation. The necessary laws of experience are truly necessary because any experience must conform to them. In other words, it would be impossible to imagine an experience that was not constrained by the laws of experience.
Furthermore, Kant claims that the scientific method-as utilized by Galileo and Copernicus-provides a model for the way in which we should understand the process of reason. Scientists propose experiments and understand the world in terms of the answers that are received in light of specific questions and hypotheses. This shows us that the mind is active in comprehension and not passive. We approach the world with questions and actively look for answers. In the same way, Kant argues that we impose form, categories, and structures upon the sense data that we receive. Ultimately, what science discovers are the necessary ways in which the world of experience is structured.
An example might help. The first section of the book, the "Transcendental Aesthetic," argues that space and time are the necessary conditions for the possibility of any experience. Space, Kant says, is the form of outer sense, while time is the form of inner sense. We know nothing about space and time in themselves, apart from our experience. We do know, however, that they are presupposed in any possible experience. This is what Kant means when he say that time and space are "empirically real" but "transcendentally ideal": time and space are necessary components of any experience-they are empirically real, even though we know nothing about them in themselves-and they are transcendentally ideal.
An argument such as this, about the necessary conditions of experience, is what Kant calls "transcendental": it is an a priori argument about that which constitutes experience. "I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible a priori." By, a priori, Kant means anything that is not established by way of inductive generalizations based upon experience. Inductive generalizations-such as, "heavy objects tend to fall"-are, in Kant's language, a posteriori. Unlike inductive generalizations, a priori reasoning focuses on the very constitution of experience: it postulates necessary and universal features of any possible experience that cannot themselves be confirmed by experience. For example, the claim that "every change must have a cause" is a necessary assumption of any experience. In other words, it is impossible to imagine a change in experience that is not caused, just as it is impossible to imagine an experience that did not occur in space or time.
Of course, one can raise objections to Kant's theory. The most important objection focuses on a subjectivist interpretation of Kant's "transcendental idealism." For Kant, subjective conditions constitute objectivity. Although he postulates the existence of a "thing-in-itself, " Kant tells us that the thing-in-itself is a "thing = X" about which we can know nothing. This leaves us, unfortunately, divorced from the world in disquieting ways. Later philosophers respond to Kant's subjectivism either by arguing for a more complete form of idealism as Fichte and Hegel were to do, by claiming that the essence of the thing-in-itself is Will, as Schopenhauer was to do, or by explicitly affirming subjectivism as Nietzsche was to do. In the twentieth century, the subjective focus that is present in Kant's philosophy would give way to pragmatism, phenomenology, existentialism, and to Kuhnian philosophy of science.
Kant's virtue, however, is that he was not content merely to propound a solipsistic form of subjective idealism. Rather, he recognized the importance of intersubjectivity and maintained that the empirical world will be experienced by everyone according to the same laws. Indeed, he acknowledged that experience is not something we produce as if we were gods. The sensible manifold is given to us, we know not how. But this world of sense is comprehensible because it conforms to the necessary conditions of experience. Kant admits that the human mind is creative, as the Romantics and Modernists who followed Kant would emphasize. But Kant emphasizes that the mind must respect the laws which govern its own creativity. Kant's text is seminal because of his unique approach to the discipline of philosophy. It remains vital because it celebrates the power of the human mind.
Andrew Fiala is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay. He is the author of The Philosopher's Voice and articles on topics in nineteenth-century philosophy, ethics, and political philosophy.
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