The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank
320
The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank
320eBook
Available on Compatible NOOK devices, the free NOOK App and in My Digital Library.
Related collections and offers
Overview
There was only one point in the Second World War when Nazi Germany had a chance of winning. That point was October 1941, when most of the Red Army’s forces before Moscow had been smashed or encircled, and no reserves were available to defend the capital. All that stood in Hitler’s way were a handful of Soviet rifle divisions, tank brigades, and hastily assembled militia.
According to German accounts, their spearheads were stopped by the mud—but a close examination of German records shows this was not so. Instead, it is clear that it was the resistance of the Red Army, and bad, arrogant planning, that halted the Wehrmacht. This is the dramatic story that Jack Radey and Charles Sharp tell in this compelling study of a previously unknown part of the Battle of Moscow. Using archival records from both sides, they reveal how the Soviets inflicted a stunning defeat on a German plan to encircle six Soviet armies in the middle of October 1941.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781783408979 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Pen & Sword Books Limited |
| Publication date: | 02/20/2019 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 320 |
| File size: | 2 MB |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
Background
Barbarossa
When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941, the cutting edge of its attack comprised four panzer groups, numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4. These were army-sized organizations made up of motorized corps (often referred to as panzer corps, but this designation did not come into official use until 1942), each consisting of one or two panzer divisions and one or two motorized infantry divisions plus supporting artillery, engineers, antiaircraft and other elements. Army Group South deployed Panzer Group 1 in southern Poland and would attack south of the Pripet Marshes towards Kiev.
Army Group Center contained two of the panzer groups: Panzer Group 2 under General Heinz Guderian that attacked just north of the Pripet Marshes, and Panzer Group 3 led by General Hermann Hoth that struck north of and parallel to Guderian's group, acting as the northern pincer to Guderian's southern one. Jointly the two groups pinched off first the Soviet salient in the Bialystok area, then a larger bag at Minsk, and subsequently attempted to do the same at Smolensk in mid-July of 1941. This latter effort was only partly successful, being brought to a halt by stubborn Soviet resistance and ferocious counterattacks and large-scale counterstrokes. It also proved impossible to continue offensive operations after a 450 mile advance without adequate logistical support.
The northernmost panzer group, General Hoepner's Panzer Group 4¸ was the smallest of the four. It was deployed in East Prussia to strike through the Baltic States and Pskov towards Leningrad. Like the other groups it overcame initial Soviet resistance near the border, smashed up the counterattacking Soviet mechanized corps, and exploited at speed until roughly mid-July. It then ran into the same counterattacks and logistics trouble that slowed and stopped the rest of the German advance.
With Army Group Center fought to a standstill around Smolensk, Guderian's Panzer Group 2 was ordered south, where it and von Kleist's Panzer Group 1 successfully encircled the Soviet Southwest Front in the Kiev area in September. At the same time, part of Hoth's Panzer Group 3 was diverted north, along with General von Richthofen's VIII Air Corps, to reinforce Army Group North's drive on Leningrad. This reinforcement allowed Army Group North to break through to Lake Ladoga, cutting off Leningrad, and to reach the Volkhov River.
In September the Germans shuffled their panzer 'deck' preparing for the drive on Moscow called Operation Typhoon. Hoepner's Panzer Group 4's headquarters was transferred from Army Group North to Army Group Center, and put into the line south of Smolensk, taking command of XXXXVI, LVII and the newly formed XXXX Motorized Corps. Panzer Group 3 now controlled the XXXXI and LVI Motorized Corps that had previously been under Panzer Group 4. Hoepner now had five panzer divisions (two of them fresh from Germany), while Hoth would have only three: the powerful 1st, and the 6th and 7th which were armed primarily with Czech tanks.
Operation Typhoon
The Battle of Kalinin took place in the context of Operation Typhoon, the offensive the Wehrmacht launched in late September and early October of 1941. The operation is usually understood to be a plan for seizing Moscow, but in fact its actual wording only went as far as directing an encirclement of the Soviet forces in front of Moscow, and their destruction. It was intended that further efforts towards Moscow would be directed once the initial objective was achieved. Three German panzer groups (Guderian's Panzer Group 2 had been dubbed 2nd Panzer Army) were to strike towards Moscow. Panzer Group 3 and Panzer Group 4 were to strike out from the northwest and west, respectively, on October 2nd, and Panzer Army Guderian was to strike from the southwest a few days earlier. Within days of unleashing their assaults, all three groups broke cleanly through the Soviet front line. By October 7th Panzer Groups 3 and 4 had surrounded most of the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts' forces in a pocket west of Vyazma, while Guderian's forces cut up and partially surrounded those of the Bryansk Front further to the south.
Worse yet, it was days before the Soviet command even became fully aware of the penetrations. It was not until October 5th that the full magnitude of the disaster dawned on Moscow. At that point, not only were the overwhelming bulk of the Soviet forces defending Moscow nearly surrounded, but long German motorized columns had been spotted heading east. And there were no reserve armies available to stop them–only a small handful of divisions.
The most dramatic moment in the Second World War had arrived. Speculation and 'what if' scenarios are useless; as the famed historian S. L. A. Marshall put it, 'There is no telling what would have happened if what happened hadn't happened.' However, if one assumes that the Axis powers ever had an opportunity to win the war, it was in the middle of October 1941. If Hitler was to win the war, he had to knock out his most dangerous opponent on the continent of Europe, the USSR. It is not a given that the seizure of Moscow would have produced this result, but if there was any chance of defeating the Soviets, it could hardly be done without taking Moscow. There were only a few Red Army divisions standing between the surging Germans and Moscow, there were no reserve armies in place behind them (yet), and neither the rains and mud of late October nor the snow and bitter cold of winter had arrived yet. That the Germans never reached Moscow was due to a variety of factors, but one that must be recognized is the heroic stand of those units that were called upon to hold the roads to Moscow in mid October. 316th and 18th Rifle Divisions at Volokolamsk, 32nd Rifle Division at Borodino and Mozhaisk, Podolsk Officers' Schools at Maloyaroslavets, and others gave heroic evidence that the Red Army was far from finished. They succeeded in slowing the German advance until reinforcements could arrive from the far corners of the USSR and the fall rains coming at the end of the month could bring the German drive to a halt.
The Hitler Directive (Number 35) issued on September 6th, 1941, and the Army Group Center 'implementing orders' issued on September 16th for Operation Taifun (Typhoon, the attack on Moscow) do not even mention Kalinin. According to the Operational Order, Panzer Group 3 was subordinated to 9th Army, and was supposed to break through north of the Smolensk–Vyazma–Moscow highway and, in cooperation with Panzer Group 4 to the south, to surround the enemy in the Vyazma area. Although 9th Army was to 'use every opportunity to break through ... and advance troops in the direction of Rzhev,' Torzhok (specifically) and all points north of Kalinin were north of the Army Group's area of operations.
Therefore, the German troops that would become involved in the Battle of Kalinin initially attacked as part of the main Army Group Center assault to the east. These forces were commanded by the XXXXI Motorized Corps of Panzer Group 3, which initially consisted of 1st Panzer Division, 36th Motorized Division, 6th Infantry Division and 900th 'Lehr' [Training] Brigade (Motorized). The corps had been given the assignment of protecting the northern flank of Panzer Group 3's drive. The initial German blow had torn through the Soviet 30th Army of Western Front, smashing its units and driving its headquarters, which had lost track of its troops, back to the Moscow Sea. This left two of Western Front's armies, the 22nd and 29th, north of the break-in and as a result they had not been surrounded in the Vyazma pocket.
On October 7th, the same day that the Soviet forces in and around Vyazma were encircled, the German Army's commander in chief, von Brauchitsch, met with the commander of Army Group Center (von Bock) and discussed changing the original plans. Specifically, while the Army Group advanced on Moscow with everything that could be spared from holding the encirclement ring, he proposed also advancing 9th Army and Hoth's Panzer Group 3 'in a northwestern direction' to clear the northern flank of Army Group Center. The very next day the headquarters of the German Army, OKH, made it official with a directive to send Panzer Group 3 'in a general northern direction in order to destroy the enemy in the area between Belyi and Ostashkov.' They were now directed against the flank and rear of the Soviet forces facing Army Group North's 16th Army, far outside the original direction of the attack on Moscow. Army Group Center's own directive to 9th Army followed on October 10th, sending Panzer Group 3 towards Kalinin and Staritsa.
In other words, while Panzer Group 3 and 9th Army started Operation Typhoon as part of the advance on Moscow, by the second week of October both formations were directed in an entirely new operation, to strike to the north and then northwest, into the area of Army Group North's operations south of the Valdai Hills and almost directly away from Moscow!
Nor was this operation confined to Army Group Center. Army Group North had been preparing an attack with its one remaining mobile formation, XXXIX Motorized Corps (8th, 12th Panzer, 18th, 20th Motorized Divisions) in the direction of Tikhvin since the beginning of October. After the first week in October, this attack was split in two: 8th Panzer and 18th Motorized Divisions were now to be directed southeast, not northeast, to cooperate with Army Group Center forces. This attack would not start before 16 October, however.
On the same day that 1st Panzer Division would be fighting for Kalinin, October 14th, Army Group Center completed the chain of directives that would send 1st Panzer Division, and indeed most of Panzer Group 3, away from the Battle of Moscow. On that day the army group issued an order which started with the words, 'The enemy in front of the Army Group is defeated,' and went on to direct both 9th Army and Panzer Group 3 to the north. This move was intended to prevent the withdrawal of enemy forces facing 16th Army to the north by having Panzer Group 3 'reach the Torzhok area as soon as possible and advance without delay to Vyshniy Volochek.' This aimed to put 9th Army and Panzer Group 3 into the rear of Northwestern Front and of the 22nd and 29th Armies.
It was in response to these orders and directives, representing a concept originating at OKH and OKW and therefore with the approval of the Fuhrer, that Panzer Group 3 and elements of Army Group North were sent plunging northwest and southwest, in an attempt to destroy the last intact Soviet Front between Lake Ladoga and Rostov. The objective was nothing less than the encirclement and destruction of seven armies; 22nd and 29th Armies of Western Front and the Northwestern Front's 11th, 27th, 34th Armies and Novgorod Army Group, and the Stavka's independent 52nd Army. The result would have been another gaping hole in the Soviet front, stretching over 300 kilometers (200 miles) from Kalinin on the Volga River to south of Chudovo on the Volkhov River. In space, it would have been larger than either the Smolensk or Vyazma encirclement battles, although it would have contained fewer Soviet troops, approximately 200,000 men.
The operation failed within a week, and so has been forgotten. As a result, the Battle of Kalinin is not seen, as it should be, as the defeat of a major German operation aimed at Northwestern Front, but instead as part of the initial phase of the Battle of Moscow. At the time the Soviet command regarded it as part of the Battle of Moscow, and was always very aware of the potential threat to the capital from an attack into the northern flank of Western Front from the Kalinin area. When Kalinin Front was established on 17 October, its mission included the task to 'liquidate ... the enemy threat to encircle Moscow from the north.' Thus, although German aims were actually in a different direction, the Soviet High Command at Kalinin was primarily concerned with the defense of Moscow.
Many aspects of the battle for Kalinin reflected common features of combat during the defensive phase of the Battle of Moscow; in particular, the Red Army's desperate improvisation, the lack of adequate resources on both sides of the line, the initial German euphoria turning to frustration, and the heavy fighting. But it also was unique in some ways. At Volokolamsk, Mozhaisk, Maloyaroslavets, Kaluga and Tula, for example, the German thrusts encountered stubborn Soviet defenses, and combat became basically frontal in nature. Kalinin, on the other hand, was a wide-open battle, with hanging flanks, surprise attacks, and sudden reversals of fortune. Here the Soviets counterattacked and in fact put together a serious and partly successful counterstroke, unlike everywhere else in the desperate battles of mid October. The results should have told the Germans something they needed to know, but the evidence was discounted, and the scales would not fall from their eyes until early December, by which time it would be far too late.
The Battlefield
Red Army General Staff studies of the war provide us with the following detailed assessment of the 'Characteristics of the Region of Military Operations:'
The military operation along the Kalinin 'Direction' [axis] in 1941 took place in a region bounded by:
–to the north: the Rybinsk, Bzhetsk, Akademicheskaya Station, and the northern shore of Lake Seliger line;
–to the west: the western shore of Lake Seliger, Olenino, and Sychevka;
–to the south: Sychevka and Dmitrov;
–to the east; the Dmitrov, Rybinsk line.
The region of military operations is part of the central Russian highlands, where most of the surface area is rugged and wooded. Of greatest operational-tactical significance is the Volga River and its tributaries–the Bolshoi Kosha and Malyi Kosha Rivers, the T'ma and the Tvertsa Rivers, and the basin of the Moscow Sea (south of Kalinin) into which discharges the Shosha and Lama Rivers.
The Volga River is un-navigable between the cities of Selizharovo and Rzhev and, therefore, requires bridging to cross. In the sector from Rzhev to Kalinin, the river's width varies from 60 to 200 meters [196–656 feet], with depths of up to two meters [6.5 feet]. There are permanent bridges at Staritsa and Kalinin. The railroad bridge at Rzhev was blown up on 11 October by retreating units of 31st Army.
The maximum width of the Bolshoi Kosha River is 40 meters [131 feet] and the Malyi Kosha, no more than 15 meters [49 feet]. Although most of the T'ma River is 10–30 meters [33–100 feet] wide, from the village of Strenovo to its mouth it is 60–80 meters [196–262 feet] wide and 1–2 meters [3.3–6.5 feet] deep. The banks of the Shosha, Lob' and Lama Rivers are characterized by marsh ridden valleys and present serious tactical obstacles.
The most important terrain feature in the region is the Volga River, which describes an inverted broad, open U or V shape, flowing northeast from the Rzhev area, turning lazily east to pass through Kalinin, and then running southeast to the Moscow Sea and off to its long descent to Astrakhan on the Caspian Sea. Many smaller tributaries emptied into the Volga in the area, and there were many marshes and some peat bogs on both sides of the river.
The city of Kalinin stood at the apex of the Volga's northward curve. Named after the then President of the USSR, what had once been the Tsarist city of Tver was now a city of some 200,000 people in 1941. It sat astride the rail line from Moscow to Leningrad and contained a number of factories and the Higher Pedagogical Institute. It was also a road hub, with major roads running southeast and southwest along the Volga to Rzhev and Klin, respectively, south to Volokolamsk, and across the Volga to the northwest to Torzhok and Vyshniy Volochek and north to Bzhetsk. The Volga flowed through Kalinin from west to east, and the Tvertsa River flowed from the northwest before taking a sharp turn to the south to empty into the Volga in the northeast part of the city.
There were three airfields serving the Kalinin area in 1941. The largest, featuring two hard surfaced runways, was just west of Migalovo, five kilometers [3 miles] west of Kalinin. Besides its all-weather runways, it boasted large fuel stocks, and a number of hangars and shelters for aircraft. There were two other smaller airstrips, with grass landing fields. One lay a kilometer south of the city, just west of the rail line, and the other was six kilometers north of the city, between the Tvertsa River and the town of Sofino (which served during the battle as Konev's advanced headquarters).
German Forces
9th Army, commanded by Colonel General Adolph Strauss, was deployed on the extreme northern wing of Army Group Center. On October 2nd, the day 9th Army began its advance, Strauss's army consisted of four army (infantry) corps (XXVII, V, VIII and XXIII) with fifteen infantry divisions, including one (the very weak 161st Infantry) in army reserve. Also loosely subordinate to 9th Army was Colonel General Hermann Hoth's Panzer Group 3, with two motorized corps (XXXXI and LVI) and, the strong VI Army Corps, with a total of three panzer divisions, two motorized infantry divisions, and three infantry divisions. Depending on the situation, the panzer group could be subordinate to 9th Army, or directly under the control of Army Group Center. Each corps had its own artillery, antiaircraft, and engineer battalions and other supporting elements. In addition, Army Group Center had 900th Lehr Brigade (Motorized) in reserve, which was soon committed to XXXXI Motorized Corps.
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "The Defense of Moscow 1941"
by .
Copyright © 2012 Jack Radey and Charles Sharp.
Excerpted by permission of Pen and Sword Books Ltd.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Table of Contents
Title Page,
Copyright Page,
Foreword,
Authors' Notes,
Prologue,
Chapter 1 - Background,
Chapter 2 - Preliminaries, October 7th–9th,
Chapter 3 - The German Pursuit and Capture of Kalinin, October 10th–14th,
Chapter 4 - New Operational Plans,
Chapter 5 - The German Advance on Torzhok, October 15th–16th,
Chapter 6 - The Soviet Counterstroke Begins, October 17th,
Chapter 7 - The Battle Along the Torzhok Road, October 18th–21st,
Chapter 8 - The Battle for Kalinin City, October 22nd–24th,
Chapter 9 - Revised Plans,
Chapter 10 - Aftermath, October 25th–Early November,
Chapter 11 - Conclusions,
Acknowledgments,
Notes,
Bibliography,
Appendix 1 - German Order of Battle,
Appendix 2 - Soviet Order of Battle,
Appendix 3 - German Directives, Orders and Reports,
Appendix 4 - Soviet Directives, Orders and Reports,
Index,