The Evolution of Cyber War: International Norms for Emerging-Technology Weapons
336
The Evolution of Cyber War: International Norms for Emerging-Technology Weapons
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Overview
Former secretary of defense Leon Panetta once described cyber warfare as “the most serious threat in the twenty-first century,” capable of destroying our entire infrastructure and crippling the nation.
Already, major cyber attacks have affected countries around the world: Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, Iran in 2010, and most recently the United States. As with other methods of war, cyber technology can be used not only against military forces and facilities but also against civilian targets. Information technology has enabled a new method of warfare that is proving extremely difficult to combat, let alone defeat.
And yet cyber warfare is still in its infancy, with innumerable possibilities and contingencies for how such conflicts may play out in the coming decades. Brian M. Mazanec examines the worldwide development of constraining norms for cyber war and predicts how those norms will unfold in the future. Employing case studies of other emerging-technology weapons—chemical and biological, strategic bombing, and nuclear weaponry—Mazanec expands previous understandings of norm-evolution theory, offering recommendations for U.S. policymakers and citizens alike as they grapple with the reality of cyber terrorism in our own backyard.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781612347745 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Potomac Books |
| Publication date: | 11/01/2015 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 336 |
| File size: | 743 KB |
About the Author
Brian M. Mazanec is an assistant director for defense capabilities and management with the U.S. government and an adjunct professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University. He is the coauthor of Deterring Cyber Warfare: Bolstering Strategic Stability in Cyberspace, and his work has appeared in Strategic Studies Quarterly, the National Cybersecurity Institute Journal, Comparative Strategy, Politics and the Life Sciences, and the Journal of International Security Affairs.
Read an Excerpt
The Evolution of Cyber War
International Norms for Emerging Technology Weapons
By Brian M. Mazanec
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA PRESS
Copyright © 2015 Board of Regents of the University of NebraskaAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-61234-774-5
CHAPTER 1
General Norm Evolution Theory
One resists the invasion of armies; one does not resist the invasion of ideas.
Victor Hugo, The History of a Crime
Cyber warfare poses significant challenges to U.S. national security. As one response to these challenges, the United States issued an "International Strategy for Cyberspace" in May 2011. This strategy identifies the need to achieve stability and address cyber threats through the development of international norms. So, what are international norms? This chapter attempts to answer this question and provide a theoretical underpinning for how norms emerge, spread, and ultimately impact state behavior. First, norms are introduced, with a discussion of how they are considered in the context of various international relations theories. Norm evolution theory and the norm life cycle are also discussed. The chapter then applies norm evolution theory to identify the specific hypotheses concerning each phase of the norm life cycle. Norm evolution theory — grounded in extensive literature from fields such as international relations, sociology, economics, evolutionary biology, organizational theory, and other disciplines — will provide the foundation for later chapters' discussions of norms regarding emerging-technology weapons, such as chemical and biological weapons, strategic bombing, nuclear weapons, and, of course, cyber warfare.
Norms are standards of right and wrong that form a prescription or proscription for behavior. Norms are considered one component of regimes, which are "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area" and thus constrain some actor behaviors. In other words, norms — which are nonbinding — are shared expectations or "standards of appropriateness" and can exist at various levels and apply to different actors. At their most basic, norms exist at the community level, where they apply to the behavior of individuals. For example, community norms governing sexual behavior, such as the expectation that sexual intercourse is appropriate only between married couples, have a constraining impact on individuals in the community where the norms reside. A community norm may not be held by all individuals, but its existence influences everyone's behavior and raises the risks and benefits associated with engaging in behavior discouraged (in this case, premarital sexual intercourse) or encouraged by the norm. A community may be a small subset of a regional population, such as a particular religious or ethnic group, or may consist of the entire regional population. In addition to the community level, norms can influence organizations, including governments, at the national level as well as state behavior overall at the international level. At the national level, norms can have a structural impact on internal domestic behavior. As a perhaps extreme example, in Saudi Arabia the strong Islamic culture and resulting norms support the existence and acceptance of a religious "morality" police force, officially referred to as the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which, among other things, enforces religious norms requiring a separation of the sexes in public. Beyond the national level, these nonbinding shared expectations can, to some degree, constrain and regulate behavior of international actors and, in that sense, have a structural impact on the international system as a whole. Often international norms emerge from national norms. Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein look at the development of international norms through what they call "sociological institutionalism." This essentially means that norms, as part of a global political culture, impact our national security environment by actively shaping views regarding issues such as national sovereignty, international law, and diplomacy. This dynamic of constantly changing norms influences the character of states and acceptable state behavior. For example, norms regarding nuclear weapons have had a pronounced impact on state behavior. Early in the age of nuclear weapons, Lt. Gen. James Gavin expressed the contemporary wisdom when he said, "Nuclear weapons will become conventional for several reasons, among them cost, effectiveness against enemy weapons, and ease of handling." However, as the nuclear era advanced, a constraining norm developed that made states more reluctant to possess or use nuclear weapons, thus helping prevent their "conventionalization." Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling noted that this rapid emergence of norms against the use of nuclear weapons was so effective in constraining action that President Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles spoke of the need to remove the "taboo" from the use of nuclear weapons so that they could be used. This norm was so strong that President Truman did not use nuclear weapons against Chinese troops during the Korean War, President Nixon did not use them in Vietnam, the Soviet Union did not use them in Afghanistan, and Israel did not use them in the 1973 war with Egypt — all circumstances where the opponent lacked such weapons and their use made some degree of utilitarian sense. This normative tradition against the use of nuclear weapons was developed and influenced by the "logic of consequences," a realist and rationalist argument regarding self-interest and the negative outcomes nuclear weapon users would experience, and the "logic of appropriateness," which reflects the fact that the nuclear norm itself actually influenced states' identity and was reinforced and deemed appropriate through iteration over time. While both pure realists and constructivist advocates of the role of nonmaterial normative factors in international relations have difficulty quantifying the comparative explanatory power of norms, the example of norms for nuclear weapons demonstrates that they have some impact. International norms similar to this nuclear norm have emerged regarding other forms of unconventional weapons, such as biological and chemical weapons and strategic bombing.
In addition to categorizing norms as applying to various levels (community, national, and international), norms can generally fall into two broad categories: constitutive and regulative norms. Constitutive norms "create new actors, interests, or categories of action" and do not create any particular duty or permission. In contrast to constitutive norms, regulative norms (sometimes also referred to as deontic norms) "order and constrain behavior" and actually have some kind of overt prescriptive quality. An example of a constitutive norm is the institution of marriage wherein men and women form a particular type of bond. Another example is the emergence of a national symbol such as a song becoming a national anthem, changing the very meaning of singing that song. An example of a regulative norm is the view in the 1920s and 1930s that submarine attacks against merchant ships were heinous and immoral. Another example is the norm against the employment of nuclear weapons. Constitutive norms can also enable regulative norms. For example, the institution of marriage must exist before an expectation of being married under certain conditions or before engaging in certain behaviors can emerge. This book is focused on regulative norms rather than constitutive norms since those are the types of norms that most directly influence conflict between states and apply to particular weapons, including novel and unconventional weapons such as cyber weapons. Regulative norms can be constraining or permissive and can also apply to a nearly limitless range of behaviors. For emerging-technology weapons, a constraining norm would be one that indicated that doing something with a weapon (possessing it, using it, etc.) was not acceptable, while a permissive norm would obviously indicate the inverse. In addition to being constraining or permissive, norms for weapons and warfare generally affect four general activities or functions: weapon development or possession, testing, use, and transfer or proliferation facilitation. These "flavors" of norms are depicted in table 1.
In this book, which is largely focused on the evolution of constraining rather than permissive norms, multiple norms focused on some or all of these particular activities or functions for a given weapon type (for example, nuclear weapons) are bundled together and considered collectively as an overall set of norms for that weapon type. For example, when referring to the constraining "nuclear norm" or "norm for nuclear weapons" in chapter 5, unless otherwise specified this reference is to the comprehensive set of specific norms affecting these four activities or functions for the weapon.
Norms and International Relations Theory
Scholars view norms differently depending on the international relations theory they espouse. Realists and liberal internationalists place less emphasis on normative factors over material state-power calculations, while Grotian internationalists and constructivists lend more credence to the role of norms.
Realists and Norms
The concept and role of norms in broader international relations theory have been the subject of debate for some time. Adherents to the Hobbesian or realist conception of international relations are focused on matériel power considerations and not necessarily ethical or normative concerns, and they may be inclined to discount or dismiss the role of norms in governing international relations. Realists generally view the international system as anarchic and in a constant state of zero-sum competition and see states as the only meaningful actor. Historically realists do not pay much attention to norms. After all, if one believes that, as Thucydides said, "the strong do what they will, the weak accept what they must," there appears to be little room for norms to constrain or influence the strong. Realists often view norms as peripheral reflections of the dominant states seeking to maximize their interest. The hegemonic stability theory also explains this view when it argues that states are forced to adhere to norms or adopt norm-based regimes because of coercion from a hegemonic state. However, some strains of realism, such as neoclassical realism, have begun to allow room for normative factors. In the narrowest sense, neoclassical realists allow for ethical and normative arguments regarding how states may define their interests (based on domestic culture, obligations, notions of right and wrong, and so on). Some of these neoclassical realists have begun to acknowledge that some (but not all) statesmen follow ethical norms and that in the anarchic and competitive international system powerful states may be self-constrained from doing what they can (for example, acquiring WMD, antipersonnel land mines, or possibly conducting cyber warfare) in order to comply with a normative construct that provides a net benefit by also constraining adversaries and weaker powers.
Liberal Internationalists and Norms
Like realists, adherents to liberal internationalist theories of international relations have historically viewed norms only as minorvariables in the international system. Liberal internationalists also view the state as the primary actor; however, they view the international system as mostly good or capable of being good, and thus mutually beneficial international cooperation is possible. Because of this generally positive view regarding international cooperation, liberal internationalists are more inclined to believe norms matter insofar as they arise from voluntary cooperation among states. However, they view the role of norms as limited to only this voluntary (and possibly infrequent) cooperation and not as a major factor for individual state behavior or actions. The theory of complex interdependence, first introduced by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye's book Power and Interdependence: World Politics and Transition in 1977, is an offshoot of the liberal internationalist school of international theory but also incorporates some realist tendencies. Essentially, complex interdependence views the international system as anarchic but increasingly interdependent. Complex interdependence refers to "a situation among a number of countries in which multiple channels of contact connect societies (that is, states do not monopolize these contacts); there is no hierarchy of issues; and military force is not used by governments toward one another." Such a perspective allows more room for normative factors as they can be viewed as part of the connections binding societies. Complex interdependence theorists believe that, in addition to nation-states, there are a variety of subnational, international, transnational, and supranational actors who can share a variety of economic, social, and political connections, including normative (ideational) connections. According to Keohane and Nye, eventually complex interdependence leads to globalization, which will minimize the use of force. This globalism will be "a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multi-continental distances, linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances (such as acid rain or pathogens)." Such a view allows norms a greater role than that traditionally granted by realists, but it is still a relatively small variable in the theory.
Grotians, Constructivists, and Norms
It is the Grotian (also known as internationalist) and constructivist theories of international relations that grant the most emphasis to norms as a variable that can influence international behavior. Constructivists believe the way individuals look at the world affects what they see, and thus many of the structural constants perceived by realists and liberal internationalists (such as the anarchic system and primacy of state actors) are largely governed by malleable cultural assumptions. Thus constructivists believe the international system depends on "the eye of the beholder" and places ideas and identity politics in a central role. However, constructivists' rejection of a positivist view of the world and their resulting emphasis on unique aspects of each situation significantly limit their ability to offer an empirically verifiable structural theory for international relations. In contrast, the internationalist conception of the international system does not completely reject the state-focused structural theory of international relations; however, it allows much more room for the consideration of nonmaterial factors such as norms when compared to realism or liberal internationalism. Internationalists view states as primary actors but posit that they operate in a "society of states" that provides constraining norms and principles that influence state behavior. Hedley Bull explained this concept: "The particular international activity which, as the Grotian view, best typifies international activity as a whole is neither war between states, nor horizontal conflict cutting across the boundaries of states, but trade — or, more generally, economic and social intercourse between one country and another." In the context of this "social intercourse," internationalists believe that norms have a significant and independent impact on the international system and shape state behavior. They do not reject the idea that states are driven by their calculations of interest and power, only that they are also influenced by the international society (that is, the normative environment) in which they reside. In fact internationalists view norms and state calculations or interest and power as mutually conditioning.
While norms are viewed differently depending on the international relations theory employed, for the purposes of this book it does not matter if norms are viewed as major variables that can sometimes trump or constrain state-power calculations or if they play a lesser role. Even many realists now acknowledge the role of nonmaterial factors in international affairs, which demonstrates that examining norms for how various weapons develop and grow is not only a constructivist or internationalist pursuit. Rather than attempting to settle this broader theoretical debate, this book seeks to offer a theory of norm evolution for emerging-technology weapons, especially cyber warfare.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Evolution of Cyber War by Brian M. Mazanec. Copyright © 2015 Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska. Excerpted by permission of UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA PRESS.
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Table of Contents
Contents
List of Illustrations,Acknowledgments,
List of Abbreviations,
Introduction,
1. General Norm Evolution Theory,
2. Norm Evolution for Chemical and Biological Weapons,
3. Norm Evolution for Strategic Bombing,
4. Norm Evolution for Nuclear Weapons,
5. Norm Evolution Theory for Emerging-Technology Weapons,
6. Predicting Norm Evolution for Cyber Warfare,
Conclusions and Recommendations,
Appendix: Background on Cyber Warfare,
Notes,
Bibliography,
Index,