Publishers Weekly
10/20/2014
Zelizer (Governing America), a professor of history and public affairs at Princeton University, turns his attention to the short, politically turbulent period in American politics from November 1963 to November 1966 when President Lyndon Johnson forged what has become known as the Great Society, which paved the path for many of today’s essential social programs. Zelizer paints Johnson as a flawed—opportunistic, domineering, ambitious—yet impressive leader, who took advantage of a perfect storm of legislative and governmental conditions to push through an unprecedented number of projects and achievements; a president who gambled greatly while his party and a liberal majority were in ascendancy and won accordingly. As Zelizer explains, “The political acumen Johnson and his colleagues on Capitol Hill possessed was essential, but what made the difference were the forces that temporarily reshaped Congress and broke the hold of conservatives on that notoriously inertial institution.” His focus on the conflict between conservative and liberal factions is even more timely in today’s climate. Zelizer writes with an expert’s deep understanding of the subject, but the dry tone and painstaking attention to detail make this a scholarly resource more than a casual item. Agent: Andrew Wylie, Wylie Agency. (Jan.)
From the Publisher
Kirkus:
A sort-of-liberal president faces an intransigent, obstructionist Congress: We mean Lyndon Johnson, of course, and the class of 1966. Zelizer, a lucid writer, doesn't need to cherry-pick to line up parallels with today…A smart, provocative study.”
Publishers Weekly:
“Zelizer paints Johnson as a flawed—opportunistic, domineering, ambitious—yet impressive leader, who took advantage of a perfect storm of legislative and governmental conditions to push through an unprecedented number of projects and achievements; a president who gambled greatly while his party and a liberal majority were in ascendancy and won accordingly…His focus on the conflict between conservative and liberal factions is even more timely in today’s climate. Zelizer writes with an expert’s deep understanding of the subject.
Library Journal
02/01/2015
In 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson named his domestic program for civil rights and reform—in the areas of voting, housing, health care, and education—the "Great Society"; Zelizer (history and public affairs, Princeton Univ.) refers to it as our second New Deal. At the same time, the author argues that a shift in the mood of Congress offered a temporary opening for this epic run of lawmaking. By early 1965, with Congress reverted to its more usual position, it was all over. While Johnson had the political skill to take advantage of this brief window, Zelizer argues that our view of the Great Society is too "Johnson-centric" and the role of Congress is underplayed. He challenges implicitly our view as being too "Caro-centric" as well, since the latest volume in Robert Caro's Johnson biography, The Passage of Power (2012), is the historical script for most readers today. Zelizer, a regular commentator on CNN and elsewhere, is also an accomplished political historian, with books such as Governing America. VERDICT The author will engage academic readers with the nuance of his argument. While general readers will not find the grandeur of Robert Caro here, they will appreciate the clarity of Zelizer's writing and the brevity of his account. All readers will take note of his apt references to current Congressional dynamics and will discover in this book a fine complement to Caro's work. [See Prepub Alert, 7/21/14.]—Robert Nardini, Niagara Falls, NY
Kirkus Reviews
2014-10-22
A sort-of-liberal president faces an intransigent, obstructionist Congress: We mean Lyndon Johnson, of course, and the class of 1966.Zelizer (History and Public Affairs/Princeton Univ.; Governing America: The Revival of Political History, 2012, etc.), a lucid writer, doesn't need to cherry-pick to line up parallels with today. We—and many historians, he writes—tend to think of LBJ's Great Society initiatives as programs that sailed through the legislature and, as if by magic, bettered lives through various pieces of civil rights reforms and new institutions such as the Job Corps—which "caused more controversy," Zelizer writes, "than any other program in the [Equal Opportunity Act]." But why did the Job Corps cause such controversy? Because southerners, conservatives and state's rights stalwarts in Congress opposed any federal program that challenged homegrown traditions such as segregation. "While some southerners grumbled about any distribution of funds to African Americans," writes the author, "they were happy to see federal money go to the poor whites who were their constituent base." As Zelizer notes, considerable energy in Washington went to calumny over liberalism and conservative purity and pieties, the right wing having regained considerable ground in the 1950s after the years of exile during the New Deal era. The author writes carefully of how the filibuster was exercised to quash Johnson's programs by keeping them from coming up for a vote and of the "deadlocked democracy" that resulted. Johnson may have beaten Goldwater in 1964, but the right wing came rushing at him in the election of 1966, and of course, Richard Nixon followed two years later. The resulting opposition was fierce, and Johnson was defeated or stymied at many turns, including in his efforts to implement fair housing regulations, a nonstarter in the South—but, surprisingly, also in places like Chicago and Boston. It wasn't all the same, though: The Republicans had a moderate wing in those days. As with all Zelizer's books, this is a smart, provocative study.