Reordering Iraq is the lynchpin of America's successful involvement in the Middle East. The challenge may be impossible. The Future of Iraq provides a primer on the history and political dynamics of this pivotal state divided by ethnic, religious, and political antagonisms, and provocatively argues that the least discussed future of Iraq might be the best: Managed partition.
Anderson and Stansfield incisively analyze the dilemmas of American policy. They suggest that even a significant American presence will not stabilize Iraq because it is an artificial state and its people have never shared a common identity. In addition the legacy of tyrannical rule and the primacy of political violence is eroded social bonds and entrenched tribal allegiances, fallow ground for democracy. They provide the basic information and the provocative analysis crucial to informed debate and decision.
Reordering Iraq is the lynchpin of America's successful involvement in the Middle East. The challenge may be impossible. The Future of Iraq provides a primer on the history and political dynamics of this pivotal state divided by ethnic, religious, and political antagonisms, and provocatively argues that the least discussed future of Iraq might be the best: Managed partition.
Anderson and Stansfield incisively analyze the dilemmas of American policy. They suggest that even a significant American presence will not stabilize Iraq because it is an artificial state and its people have never shared a common identity. In addition the legacy of tyrannical rule and the primacy of political violence is eroded social bonds and entrenched tribal allegiances, fallow ground for democracy. They provide the basic information and the provocative analysis crucial to informed debate and decision.
The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division?
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The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division?
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Overview
Reordering Iraq is the lynchpin of America's successful involvement in the Middle East. The challenge may be impossible. The Future of Iraq provides a primer on the history and political dynamics of this pivotal state divided by ethnic, religious, and political antagonisms, and provocatively argues that the least discussed future of Iraq might be the best: Managed partition.
Anderson and Stansfield incisively analyze the dilemmas of American policy. They suggest that even a significant American presence will not stabilize Iraq because it is an artificial state and its people have never shared a common identity. In addition the legacy of tyrannical rule and the primacy of political violence is eroded social bonds and entrenched tribal allegiances, fallow ground for democracy. They provide the basic information and the provocative analysis crucial to informed debate and decision.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781466886742 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | St. Martin's Publishing Group |
| Publication date: | 12/09/2014 |
| Sold by: | Macmillan |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 288 |
| File size: | 683 KB |
About the Author
Liam Anderson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio.
Gareth Stansfield is Reader in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter, and Associate Fellow of the Middle East Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.
Anderson and Stansfield are coauthors of The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?
Liam Anderson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wright State University, Dayton, Ohio. With Gareth Stansfield he is co-author of The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?
Gareth Stansfield is Reader in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter, and Associate Fellow of the Middle East Program at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. He is co-author of The Future of Iraq.
Read an Excerpt
The Future of Iraq
Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division?
By Liam Anderson, Gareth Stansfield
Palgrave Macmillan
Copyright © 2004 Liam Anderson and Gareth StansfieldAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-4668-8674-2
CHAPTER 1
IRAQ 1920–1958: THE HASHEMITE MONARCHY
INTRODUCTION
The relentless demonization of Saddam Hussein over the last decade or so imparted a deeply personal flavor to the conflict with Iraq. War with Iraq was a moral crusade to rid the world of an evil tyrant and to liberate the Iraqi people from the yoke of a murderous dictator; but the fact that successive U.S. administrations apparently had an inexhaustible reservoir of synonyms for the word "evil" to apply to the Iraqi leader does not alter the fact that his removal may well create more problems than it resolves.
Placed in historical context, the regime of Saddam Hussein appears less as an aberration, and more as a logical culmination of the pathologies embedded in the state of Iraq since its creation in 1921. Iraq was assembled according to great power (mainly British) strategic calculations rather than with a view to creating a coherent, functional, self-sustaining state. Governing this deeply fractious product of British geopolitical engineering has traditionally entailed the skillful manipulation of tribal, ethnic, and sectarian divisions (the classic "divide and rule" technique of colonial domination), supplemented periodically by the application of generous doses of violence. The removal of Saddam's regime does not alter this, it will simply require the violence to be administered by someone else: the U.S. perhaps.
THE BIRTH OF IRAQ
By the end of World War I, the once proud Ottoman Empire lay in ruins and the victorious Allied combatants—primarily France and Great Britain—were in control of large swathes of former Ottoman territory in the Middle East. The colonial carving up of Ottoman lands had already begun long before the war's end. In January 1916, a British member of Parliament and Middle East expert, Sir Mark Sykes, and a French Government representative, François Georges Picot, met in London to divide up the future spoils of war. The resulting Sykes–Picot Agreement provided for French control over Greater Lebanon and Syria, while Britain was to retain control over the former Ottoman provinces of Basra and Baghdad. The Agreement was kept secret for two years, primarily for fear of alienating Arab opinion, which was, at that time, vital in the military struggle being waged against the Ottomans. The covert establishment of mutually acceptable spheres of influence in the Middle East was accorded a fig leaf of legitimacy when the Supreme Council of the League of Nations convened in San Remo in 1920.
Article 22 of the League's founding charter (the Covenant) outlined a mandate system to deal with "those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world." The "tutelage" of such entities was to be the mandate of "advanced nations" who would "prepare" them for self-government. Idealistic (or patronizing) in intent, the mandate system was, in practice, little more than a means of ensuring continued colonial dominance over conquered territory. Anglo-French dominance of the League ensured that the spoils of war were appropriately allocated. The French were awarded the mandate for Lebanon and Syria, while Britain was assigned tutelage over the territory that became officially known as Iraq in March 1921.
To oversee its recent acquisition, Britain required a suitably pliant leader and a system of governance that would ensure British dominance without incurring unnecessary economic costs. British authorities thus turned to the Hashemite Amir Faisal. A veteran of the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans during the war, Faisal had at least three major selling points: his prominent participation in the Arab Revolt endowed him with natural authority in the Arab world; he enjoyed generally good relations with the British; and, from 1920 onward, he was available, following his unceremonious eviction from the abortive Syrian Kingdom by the French.
Iraq's first great exercise in fake democracy did not occur under the leadership of Saddam Hussein. In July 1921, the British staged a rigged referendum to impart legitimacy to Faisal's rule. The resulting vote indicated that a highly implausible 96 percent of the population favored Faisal's accession to the newly created throne. Hence, in August 1921 a man who had never even visited Iraq previously, was duly installed as the new nation's first leader. During a somewhat surreal investiture ceremony on August 27, 1921, the new Iraqi flag was proudly raised, but the military band, in the absence of an Iraqi national anthem, played "God Save the King"—an apt indication as to who really controlled the levers of power in the nascent Iraqi state.
Appending the Kurds
The precise territorial configuration of the new state had yet to be determined. There was no dispute that the provinces of Baghdad and Basra were components in the fledgling Iraqi state. However, the northernmost of the three former Ottoman provinces—Mosul—raised a number of important strategic concerns. Most notably, initial assessments by the British suggested that large reserves of oil were located in Mosul. Access to oil reserves was almost certainly the primary motivating factor behind the British decision to incorporate Mosul into the new state of Iraq—yet this decision was to have tragic repercussions for the unity and coherence of Iraq for decades to come.
The problem was simple. Unlike the vast majority of the populations of Baghdad and Basra, who were ethnically Arab (though divided along sectarian Sunni/Shi'a lines), the province of Mosul included a significant population of ethnic Kurds. In the aftermath of World War I, it was generally assumed that the Kurds, as a significant ethnic presence in the Middle East, would be awarded their own state. A treaty to this effect—the Treaty of Sèvres, concluded in August 1920 between the victorious allies and the defeated Ottoman Empire—had indeed envisaged a separate Kurdish state. The state was to combine the Kurds of what is now Turkey with those of northern Iraq, and the resulting entity, an independent Kurdistan, would be allowed to apply for admission to the League of Nations within a year of the signing of the Treaty.
Tragically for the Kurds, their dream of an independent existence was thwarted almost immediately by geopolitical realities. A successful nationalist movement in Turkey led by Mustafa Kamal Atatürk swept away the remnants of Ottoman rule in Turkey and reestablished Turkish control over Kurdish areas in the southeastern part of Turkey. Atatürk then laid claim to Mosul as Turkish territory, and backed up his claim by an invasion of the province. Faced with the prospect of losing control over oil-rich Mosul, the British successfully repelled the Turkish advance, driving the Turks back across what was subsequently to become the Iraqi–Turkish border. In 1925 a League of Nations commission officially recognized the legality of this border. Thus, Mosul was recognized (along with Baghdad and Basra) as part of the modern state of Iraq.
This decision divided the bulk of the Kurdish nation between Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq—thus shattering hopes of an independent Kurdish homeland. The Kurdish nation was not to have its own state, mainly because an independent Kurdistan was simply not in the strategic interests of the great powers.
Governing the New State
Negotiations over an Anglo–Iraq Treaty to govern relations between Britain and Iraq during the mandate began in late 1921 and were eventually approved by the Iraqi Parliament (Constituent Assembly) in 1924. Simultaneously, a new constitution and electoral law were devised and adopted. On paper at least, the political system possessed all the trappings of democracy. The electoral law established a two-stage system of elections to the parliament. All male taxpayers aged over 21 were eligible to vote for secondary electors in one of the three large electoral districts into which Iraq was divided. Secondary electors then elected parliamentary deputies. The king was granted the power to appoint cabinet members, to confirm all laws, to dismiss parliament, and to call for general elections.
Most important from the British perspective, the king could completely bypass parliament and issue executive orders to fulfill treaty obligations. British rule was exercised largely behind the scenes through a system of political "advisors" appointed to the major departments of government to ensure that British interests were adequately represented within the system. Critically, the British provided the military muscle to guarantee security within the nascent state. This was exercised through an indigenous army of Assyrians numbering over 5,000 and the firepower of the Royal Air Force (RAF). Economic control was ensured by requiring Iraq to pay half the costs of the British mandate, and, subsequently, through British dominance over the emerging Iraqi oil industry.
The democratic facade did little to mask British colonial dominance and placed King Faisal in a deeply unenviable position. Deprived of real power, the king's major function was to serve as a symbol of unity for Iraq. But crafting a coherent national identity from a deeply divided and fractious society proved beyond even the politically experienced and, by all accounts, very able Faisal. The two forces that Faisal could potentially have harnessed to unify his people—a profound and widespread anti-British sentiment and a burgeoning sense of Arab nationalism—were both inimical to his status as a de facto British puppet. Faisal was caught between the aspirations of the Iraqi people to be free of British influence and the cold, hard reality of British power. Ultimately, his failure to provide the foundations for the emergence of a strong, stable, and united Iraq must be placed in the appropriate context. Faisal failed to accomplish an impossible task.
This was a failure that was explicitly recognized by the King himself in his later years. Shortly before his death in 1933, Faisal provided a perceptive and prescient analysis of the problems confronting his fragmented inheritance—
In Iraq ... there is still no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal ... connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatsoever. Out of these masses we want to fashion a people which we would train, educate, and refine ... The circumstances being what they are, the immenseness of the efforts needed for this cannot be imagined.
The year before Faisal's death, Iraq gained formal independence from Britain and was accepted as a member of the League of Nations. However, Iraq still owed certain obligations to the British as a consequence of a revised version of the Anglo–Iraq Treaty agreed to in 1930. Under its terms, British advisors already present in Iraq (by 1931 these totaled about 260) were to remain, Britain was permitted to lease two air bases in Iraq, and the two countries agreed to consult closely on Iraq's foreign policy and to provide mutual assistance in time of war.
While the Treaty effectively guaranteed Iraq's independence, it did little to assuage anti-British sentiment in Iraq, not least because it entailed the perpetuation of considerable British influence for the foreseeable future (the Treaty had a duration of 25 years).
Decline of Monarchical Rule
Following Faisal's death in 1933, his son Ghazi acceded to the throne. Lacking the talents of his father, Ghazi nonetheless enjoyed popularity, mainly because his thinly disguised contempt for the British played well among pan-Arabist politicians and average Iraqis alike. Much to the chagrin of the British, Ghazi disseminated pan-Arabist ideas and spread anti-British sentiment throughout the Middle East. To facilitate this process, Ghazi went as far as to establish his own radio station at the royal palace of Al Zuhour from which daily propaganda broadcasts were beamed out to the region. King Ghazi's unwillingness to play the role of pliant monarch enhanced his prestige among ordinary Arabs, but disturbed the delicate political balance that had prevailed in Iraq under his father's rule.
In the absence of the late Faisal's steadying influence, the political fabric of Iraq began to unravel with alarming rapidity. Between 1936 and 1941, there were seven political coups involving extra-constitutional transfers of power. The first of these—a military coup apparently instigated by Ghazi, but executed by General Bakr Sidqi and the Iraqi Army—marked a critical turning point in Iraq's history. The removal, at gunpoint, of Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashimi and his entire cabinet from office indicated with some clarity that the military was now a key power broker in Iraqi politics. The 1936 coup also signaled the beginning of the end of constitutional order in Iraq. Whatever the failings of King Faisal, elections had been held and changes in Prime Minister and Cabinet had been accomplished according to constitutional principles. After 1936, extra-constitutional, often violent transfers of power became the rule rather than the exception. Symptomatic of Iraq's descent into political disorder, General Sidqi's assassination in 1937 (by a disgruntled group of army officers) was followed in quick succession by the death of Ghazi in suspicious circumstances (1939), another military coup by Iraqi army officers (1941), a military invasion of Iraq by the British Army (May 1941), and a vicious pogrom conducted against Jews in Baghdad (June 1941) in which some 150 Jews were slaughtered by a rampaging mob in full view of occupying British forces.
Of these events, the most significant was probably Ghazi's death. The official British version of events was that Ghazi had died instantly (and in a drunker stupor) when his car crashed at high speed head-on into a telephone pole. Many remain unconvinced by the official version of events, and have concluded that Ghazi was, in all likelihood, assassinated by the British.
Truth often matters less than perception, and most Iraqis simply assumed that Ghazi had been the victim of regicide. According to one observer, the true significance of Ghazi's death was that it
proved that the British would never accept anything except "their" king or regent. The people of Iraq wanted the opposite, a king who would be more than a figurehead symbol of unity and would unite their country through expressing their desires. They wanted a king who would close their divisions, heal their social wounds and become a magnet for all the Arabs of the Middle East
Although the monarchy survived to rule Iraq for another 18 years—first in the form of a regency (of Ghazi's cousin Abdul Ilah, from 1939 to 1953), then through the brief reign of Ghazi's only son, Faisal II, from 1953 to 1958—after the suspected complicity of the British in the death of Ghazi, the days of Hashemite rule in Iraq were numbered. Abdul Ilah was deeply unpopular in Iraq. Just how unpopular became evident in 1958 when the regent met his grisly end. A group of army officers (the so-called "Free Officers") overthrew the monarchy in a coup that wiped out almost the entire royal family. Whereas Faisal II's lifeless body was conveyed to a secret location for burial, Abdul Ilah's body was thrown to the mob. After being dragged through the streets, it was dismembered, and the remains hung on public display for two days outside the Ministry of Defense in Baghdad.
This gruesome termination of Hashemite rule in Iraq was probably inevitable. The Hashemite dynasty was an invention of British rule, and was always perceived as such by the majority of Iraqis. For 38 years, successive Hashemite rulers were unable to resolve the central contradiction embedded in the idea of monarchical rule in Iraq. The essential function of the monarchy was to serve as a symbol of unity for the Iraqi people—to rally Iraq's disparate and factious elements around a common project of nation-building. Ultimately, however, the sorts of political message that could successfully span both sectarian and ethic divides were limited; possibilities included an appeal for a more equitable distribution of power and privilege, or some form of pan-Arabist, anti-British theme. But the Hashemite monarchy could never credibly harness these appeals and channel them toward a common purpose. As a creation of the British, the monarchy presided over a system that relied for its stability on rewarding the few at the expense of the many. King Ghazi's efforts to arouse Arab sentiment against the British had, at least according to popular perception, been dealt with in short order by the British. It is ironic then that after 38 years of Hashemite rule, during which the monarchy struggled hard to create a coherent sense of national identity, the most potent source of Iraqi national identity was one forged around the idea of opposition to the continued monarchical rule.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Future of Iraq by Liam Anderson, Gareth Stansfield. Copyright © 2004 Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield. Excerpted by permission of Palgrave Macmillan.
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Table of Contents
Introduction * Iraq 1920-1958: The Hashemite Monarchy * Iraq 1958-1979: Revolution, Republic and Renaissance * Iraq 1968-1988: From One-Party to One-Man Rule * Iraq 1988-2003: Saddam's Survival * Kurdish Nationalism in the Arab Nationalist State * The Sunni Minority Rule * The Disenfranchised Majority Shi'a * Engineering a Future for Iraq * Conclusion
Recipe
"A well-organized primer....offering some refreshing takes on past events....An excellent volume for Iraq-bound civilians and soldiers seeking to bone up, and for the general reader trying to get a mental toehold in the region."--Publishers Weekly
"This is a provocative, readable and realistic examination of a country that never worked. Anderson and Stansfield provide an insightful history focused on the core dilemma of Iraq--no one wanted to be an Iraqi, preferring ethnic, sectarian, or tribal identities--and focus on exactly the right prescription for the future: voluntary union or partition. Far from transforming the Middle East, a democratic Iraq could well splinter into its Arab and Kurdish components. The Future of Iraq explains why this is far from the worst outcome. This book should reshape the debate about what to do in Iraq."--Peter W. Galbraith, Former Ambassador
"This is the book that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair--and everyone else vitally interested in the future of Iraq--should read. Anderson and Stansfield’s cogent account of Iraq's bloody history, its failure to create national identity or unity, and the erosion of its governmental institutions under Saddam, supports their skepticism that a democratic, unified Iraq will somehow emerge from the ashes. Given animosities among Kurds and Arabs, Shi’a and Sunnis, and a Hobbesian world of revived tribalism, the authors offer the sobering suggestion that a unified Iraq may be untenable and that the country might better be partitioned. This provocative perspective will surely generate a much needed debate."--Robert Springborg, MBI al Jaber Professor of Middle East Studies, School ofOriental and African Studies, University of London
"Moving at a cracking pace, with some trenchant indictments of scheming imperialists and a chilling analysis of Saddam's Baathist order, this account lays bare the faultlines that now threaten Iraq with disintegration. No one who played a role in the evolution of this fractured polity escapes unscathed, except possibly the beleagured Kurds and disaffected Shia. Anderson and Stansfield offer an important perspective on how we reached this point, and a thoughtful set of possible alternatives of the country's future."--Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Head of Middle East Programme, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London)