The Great Call-Up: The Guard, the Border, and the Mexican Revolution
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The Great Call-Up: The Guard, the Border, and the Mexican Revolution
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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780806155920 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | University of Oklahoma Press |
| Publication date: | 11/17/2016 |
| Edition description: | First Edition |
| Pages: | 576 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.10(w) x 9.20(h) x 1.50(d) |
About the Author
Louis R. Sadler, professor emeritus of history at New Mexico State University, Las Cruces. He has coauthored half a dozen books, including The Texas Rangers and the Mexican Revolution: The Bloodiest Decade, 1910–1920, The Secret War in El Paso: Mexican Revolutionary Intrigue, 1906–1920, and The Plan de San Diego: Tejano Rebellion, Mexican Intrigue.
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The Great Call-Up
The Guard, the Border, and the Mexican Revolution
By Charles H. Harris III, Louis R. Sadler
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS
Copyright © 2015 University of Oklahoma PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8061-4953-0
CHAPTER 1
The Mexican Problem
Mexico was arguably the principal foreign policy problem for the United States from 1911 to 1916. Because of geographical proximity, developments in Mexico were automatically of concern to the United States, but from November 1910 to May 1920, Mexico was convulsed by revolution. Washington, D.C., was concerned not only with protecting American citizens and properties in Mexico but also with defending the border and controlling Mexican exile activity in the United States.
Having achieved independence in 1821, Mexico plunged into political instability for the next sixty years, lurching between monarchy, federal republic, and centralized republic, mainly through revolutions. Contributing to political instability were foreign invasions—notably by Spain in 1828, France in 1838–39, the United States in 1846–48, and France again in 1861–67. Political turmoil naturally had a devastating impact on the economy, and Mexican regimes were usually bankrupt.
All this began to change in 1876 with the seizure of power by General Porfirio Díaz, a hero of the 1861–67 war against the French. Díaz performed the seemingly impossible, transforming the country from instability and backwardness into a model for developing nations. First he imposed order, crushing banditry and insurrection while either eliminating or reaching accommodations with regional strongmen. Basically Díaz constructed a dictatorship behind a constitutional facade. Elections were held, but the government dictated the outcome. By imposing order and stability, he created a climate favorable to investment, and foreigners began to risk their money in Mexico. Since Díaz was careful to favor foreigners, their home governments had few complaints about him. Foreign investment fueled an economic boom that seemingly transformed the nation. Historically the axis of power in the country had been west to east, from Guadalajara through Mexico City to the gulf port of Veracruz. Thus from colonial times Mexico had been oriented toward Europe. Díaz, however, changed the axis to north–south, from Mexico City to the American border. He sponsored the building of three trunk rail lines linking the capital with Laredo, El Paso, and Nogales, tying the economy to that of the United States. The northern tier of states, sparsely populated and long wracked by Indian raids and drought, now developed rapidly, with American investment playing a key role. Reflecting these fundamental changes, the United States began deactivating the chain of forts built along the border in the nineteenth century.
Díaz had apparently found the key to governing. But as the decades passed and he was periodically reelected as president, his countrymen increasingly resented the preferential treatment of foreigners and foreign capital's domination of the economy. A growing feeling of nationalism was encapsulated in the slogan "Mexico for the Mexicans." Moreover, the younger generation was often frozen out of power, for Díaz usually relied on men of his own generation whose loyalty had been amply proven.
Beginning in 1900, an opposition movement emerged, led by a young intellectual, Ricardo Flores Magón, who became an anarchist dedicated to overthrowing the dictator and eliminating the capitalist system. Flores Magón and his followers, called magonistas, tried to launch a nationwide uprising in 1906 and 1908 but failed miserably. While urging his supporters to take up arms, Flores Magón himself remained safely at his headquarters in Los Angeles. (He was a thinker not a fighter.) Although the magonistas failed militarily they did have considerably greater success as propagandists, exposing the corruption and oppression of the regime and calling for social justice, thus helping to prepare the way for the Mexican Revolution. Another factor in this regard was Díaz's surprising announcement in 1908 that he did not plan to seek reelection in 1910.
Taking him at his word, political liberals began organizing for the 1910 presidential election. Among these liberals was a wealthy and idealistic young landowner from the border state of Coahuila, Francisco I. Madero. Although his family was closely connected to the regime and had benefited enormously by that connection, Madero felt that the nation's pressing The Mexican Problem social and economic problems, such as the concentration of land ownership, could not be resolved until there had first been political reform. When he announced his candidacy for the presidency in 1910, Madero's campaign slogan was "effective suffrage, no reelection."
Díaz had given the politically ambitious the opportunity to reveal themselves; he then announced that he planned to run for reelection in 1910 after all. But by 1910, Díaz was eighty years old and although still vigorous was using tactics that had worked in the past but were no longer as effective. For example, prior to the election he had Madero, the only opposition figure with the moral courage to challenge him for the presidency, arrested and jailed on a trumped-up charge of fomenting unrest. When the election was held, the government announced that Díaz had won overwhelmingly. This produced widespread outrage.
Meanwhile Madero, under arrest in the city of San Luis Potosí, faced a dilemma. He could either accept Díaz's reelection, make his peace with the dictator, and return to a life of luxury in Coahuila or he could try to lead a rebellion. Most reluctantly, Madero chose the latter course. One of the great ironies of the Mexican Revolution is that it was started by a man who was not a revolutionist and who took up arms only as a last resort. The movement he set on foot plunged Mexico into a decade of revolution, during which more than a million Mexicans died, out of a population of some fifteen million.
Madero escaped from San Luis Potosí in October 1910 and fled to the United States, where, like Flores Magón, he organized an opposition movement in exile. Establishing his headquarters in San Antonio, Texas, Madero set about fomenting a nationwide uprising against the dictator. Any self-respecting Mexican rebellion was accompanied by a "plan," a manifesto denouncing the incumbent and promising a glorious revolutionary future. Madero's movement was no exception, but, because of the neutrality laws of the United States prohibiting the use of American territory for attempting to overthrow a friendly government, such as that of Díaz, the manifesto could not be called the "Plan de San Antonio." Therefore it was backdated to October 19, the last day Madero had physically been in San Luis Potosí and was entitled the "Plan de San Luis Potosí." It was essentially political in nature, calling for a national uprising on November 20, 1910, naming Madero as provisional president, and promising effective suffrage and no reelection. (Mexico has achieved "no reelection" but the "effective suffrage" part is still a work in progress.)
Trying to organize a nationwide revolution in the space of six weeks was manifestly impossible, and, when November 20 came, nothing much happened. Madero's insurrection seemed even more futile than Flores Magón's attempts. Flores Magón, incidentally, denounced Madero as not being a real revolutionary and prohibited his followers from having anything to do with the Coahuilan rebel. Yet revolutionary spirit was stirring, especially in the border state of Chihuahua, where talented amateur guerrilla chieftains such as Pascual Orozco and Francisco "Pancho" Villa began defeating units of Díaz's army. With each victory more and more people became maderistas. By early 1911, Díaz was losing control of the largest state in the country. And by March 1911, in a related but independent movement, Emiliano Zapata emerged as the leader of agrarian revolutionists in the state of Morelos, which adjoined the Federal District. Adding to the dictator's troubles, the United States was losing confidence in his ability to retain power. As a precaution, in March 1911, the U.S. Army assembled a thirteen-thousand-man Maneuver Division at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio to deal with any contingency. The troop concentration also sent a powerful message—the United States now doubted Díaz's ability to contain the revolution.
Revolutionary momentum culminated on May 10, 1911, when Madero's forces unexpectedly captured the largest border town, Ciudad Juárez, across the Rio Grande from El Paso, Texas. The psychological impact was enormous—Díaz, the seemingly invulnerable strongman, was shown to be a paper tiger. Within two weeks his regime collapsed and he fled into exile in Paris, where he died in 1915. Improbably, the revolution had succeeded, but it succeeded too easily—Díaz was gone, but most of the Díaz structure remained in place.
Madero was the man of the hour. He made a triumphant entry into Mexico City to the wild acclaim of enormous crowds, whose expectations he had raised to unrealistic levels. Then in a laudable but politically naive move he resigned as provisional president to avoid the charge that he had shot his way into office. He planned to run for constitutional president in an election to be held in the fall of 1911. But until then he was just a private citizen who could only suggest and complain to the pro-Díaz provisional government he had agreed to. That regime, headed by Francisco León de la Barra, who had been Díaz's ambassador to the United States, did everything it could to undercut Madero and impede any revolutionary reform. So by the time Madero was duly elected president in October 1911, in the cleanest election yet, he was considerably weaker than in May at the height of his popularity.
His presidential tenure was brief and unhappy. A succession of generals—Bernardo Reyes, Pascual Orozco, and Félix Díaz, the dictator's nephew—challenged him by leading rebellions. And in Morelos, Emiliano Zapata fought Madero as he had fought Díaz because Madero refused to implement immediate and widespread land reform. Madero favored land reform by due—and lengthy—legal process, something for which Zapata and his campesino followers had no patience. Although Madero managed to defeat the rebellious generals and to contain Zapata's forces, in the end he was overthrown in February 1913 by a military coup in Mexico City itself. On February 22, the plotters had Madero and the vice president shot as they were being transferred to prison.
Mexico's new strongman, General Victoriano Huerta, immediately began consolidating his power. While many officials promptly acknowledged him as provisional president, Venustiano Carranza, governor of Coahuila, did not. Carranza, who would dominate the Mexican Revolution from 1913 to 1920, soon emerged as leader of a coalition of northerners fighting Huerta (Zapata fought Huerta independently). A career politician, Carranza organized the Constitutionalist Army, whose very name reassured people that he was not some wild-eyed radical. And in a particularly shrewd move, Carranza did not proclaim himself provisional president since the powers of that office were constrained by the constitution. Rather, he proclaimed himself First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, and his powers were whatever Carranza wanted them to be.
Huerta, popularly perceived as "the Usurper," relied on support from the regular army and traditionally conservative elements but was unable to stamp out rebellion. Under Carranza's leadership the Constitutionalist movement flourished, in large measure because of its strength in the border states. The Constitutionalists could secure weaponry, raise money, recruit manpower, market loot, and find refuge in the United States. As Carranza's subordinates, such as General Francisco "Pancho" Villa, won a string of impressive victories against the dispirited Huerta army, Zapata was threatening the Federal District, and by the spring of 1914, the Huerta regime was tottering. The United States gave it a final push. This country influenced the course of the Mexican Revolution in several important ways. First, the United States refused to accord diplomatic recognition to Huerta as the legitimate president of Mexico, which of course greatly encouraged his enemies. Second, the United States lifted the arms embargo on Mexico, enabling the Constitutionalists to acquire weaponry on a par with Huerta's forces. Third, the United States applied the neutrality laws selectively, harshly against Huerta's partisans while turning a blind eye to the activities of the Constitutionalists. And finally, the United States severed Huerta's crucial lifeline to Europe. Using the pretext of an alleged insult to the American flag, the United States bombarded and occupied the key port of Veracruz on April 21, 1914. General Frederick Funston was appointed military governor, and the United States did not withdraw its troops from the seaport until November. By then, Huerta was no longer in the picture. Admitting defeat, he had fled into European exile.
The revolution had again triumphed, and during the struggle against Huerta much of the Díaz legacy had been destroyed. But now the victorious revolutionaries turned on each other in a ferocious power struggle. The revolution entered its bloodiest phase. Carranza retained his title of First Chief and demanded obedience from all Constitutionalists. But Pancho Villa had emerged as the most powerful general in Mexico and was becoming increasingly insubordinate. The two were on a collision course. Carranza and his subordinate General Alvaro Obregón outmaneuvered Villa and Zapata, who had been blocked from occupying Mexico City as Huerta fell. Villa and Zapata became allies and rallied an anti-Carranza coalition, the Convention, whose military muscle Villa provided. In a period of desperate fighting in 1915, Obregón smashed Villa's hitherto invincible Division of the North, and Carranza prevailed. But he desperately needed U.S. diplomatic recognition; otherwise the United States retained the option of supporting Carranza's enemies.
While fighting for its life against Villa, the Carranza faction co-opted a visionary anarchist "plan" and put it to brilliant use. The Plan de San Diego, as it was called, came to light in January 1915 with the arrest of one Basilio Ramos in the south Texas town of McAllen. The authorities were dumbfounded for the manifesto called for nothing less than a Hispanic insurrection, the independence of the Southwest, and its possible annexation by Mexico. Most explosively, the plan called for the killing of all Anglo males over sixteen years of age. The key figure in the plan was Agustín S. Garza, who was careful to remain in the background. Initially nothing happened, and the Anglo population not unnaturally regarded the plan as ludicrous. But in the summer of 1915, guerrilla warfare erupted, characterized by raids across the Rio Grande from Carranza-controlled territory into south Texas. The violence intensified, for the raids produced a massive Anglo backlash. The situation deteriorated to the point that a race war seemed imminent.
Although some have regarded the Plan de San Diego movement as a Hispanic liberation struggle, recent evidence indicates that the carrancistas were using the plan for their own purposes. The only times the plan was important was when it received support from Mexico, and the only times it received support from Mexico was when it suited Carranza, whose forces controlled the Mexican side of the lower Rio Grande. On various occasions the raiders included Carranza troops in civilian clothing. Carranza had devised a sophisticated strategy for securing U.S. diplomatic recognition: covertly sponsor raids into Texas, assure Washington, D.C., that, if it recognized him diplomatically, he would put an end to the deplorable border violence and shut down the Plan de San Diego movement.
A series of raids from July into October convulsed the lower Rio Grande border. The most spectacular clash occurred on August 8, when raiders attacked the Norias subheadquarters of the enormous King Ranch, some seventy miles north of Brownsville. As was the case in most of these engagements, this raid was a defeat for the marauders—a scratch force of eight cavalrymen and a handful of civilians fought off some sixty Mexicans. The clash also produced a marked escalation in the Anglo backlash; besides the army bringing in reinforcements and the Texas Ranger force being increased, home guards and vigilantes sprang up everywhere. Being denounced as a "bad Meskin" was tantamount to a death sentence. In a larger sense, the troubles heightened Anglo suspicion of Hispanics in general, the concern being that their real allegiance was to Mexico rather than the United States, and thus they constituted a fifth column.
Despite the frequency of the raids, they accomplished little as far as the Plan de San Diego's stated objectives went, but the crisis they produced worked greatly to Carranza's benefit. Washington, D.C., not only permitted him to transport thousands of troops on United States railroads from Texas to Arizona to repel an offensive by Pancho Villa in Sonora, but the Wilson administration recognized him as the de facto president of Mexico on October 19, 1915; within a week the raids ended. The Plan de San Diego leaders hid in Mexico at Carranza's pleasure.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Great Call-Up by Charles H. Harris III, Louis R. Sadler. Copyright © 2015 University of Oklahoma Press. Excerpted by permission of UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA PRESS.
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Table of Contents
Contents
List of Illustrations,Acknowledgments,
Introduction,
Part I: Border Problem,
1. The Mexican Problem,
2. The First Call-Up,
3. The War Crisis,
4. The Great Call-Up,
Part II: Border Service,
5. San Antonio,
6. Corpus Christi,
7. Brownsville and Llano Grande,
8. McAllen, Mission, Pharr,
9. More McAllen, Mission, Pharr,
10. Laredo,
11. Eagle Pass,
12. The Big Bend,
13. El Paso,
14. More El Paso,
15. Deming,
16. Columbus,
17. Douglas,
18. Naco,
19. Nogales,
20. California,
Conclusion,
Appendix: National Guard Order of Battle,
Notes,
Bibliography,
Index,