The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Religion, Identity and Otherness in the Analysis of War and Conflict
288
The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Religion, Identity and Otherness in the Analysis of War and Conflict
288Paperback(First Edition)
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Overview
Hassan examines how Saddam Hussein assessed and responded to American and Israeli intentions after the invasion, the reaction of other Arab states, and the unprecedented grassroots support for the Iraqi leadership. In this context, the author examines the social structure of Iraqi society – families, clans and regional alliances – and the importance of Ba’athism. Hassan also examines the political structure of the country, relating the identity of Arabism – the religion and language which is associated closely with the Pan Arabist ideals – to Iraqi foreign policy.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780745314112 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Pluto Press |
| Publication date: | 11/20/1999 |
| Series: | Critical Studies on Islam Series |
| Edition description: | First Edition |
| Pages: | 288 |
| Product dimensions: | 5.32(w) x 8.46(h) x (d) |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT
INTRODUCTION
At the time of writing, the latest figures indicate that since 1991 4,500 children have died in Iraq every month as a result of UN sanctions. Each time yet another debacle between the UNSCOM team, led by Richard Butler, and the Iraqi regime (primarily portrayed as Saddam Hussein) takes place, we all hold our breath in trepidation. The US and the UK carry out air bombing missions almost every day and, in the Western world, the media reports the 'safety' of the American and British pilots and the 'minimum casualties' suffered by Iraqi civilians. This news has become so commonplace that we do not even pause to think it through. Even other Arab regimes, who once stood divided over the 1991 Gulf War, seem now to distance themselves from events in the Gulf, preferring instead to focus either on their borders or pledge consistent support for 'the other' Middle East (Israeli) peace process. But in many respects, what is taking place in the Middle East today is simply a replay of the complex web of events that unfolded prior to and in the immediate aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
The unprecedented Arab support for Iraq and for the leadership of Saddam Hussein during the 1990 – 91 Gulf crisis should be viewed within the framework of Middle Eastern political discourse and the regional state of affairs during June and July 1990. At that time all the agitated and volatile forces of discontent throughout the Arab world waited for a leader to deliver. The Middle East was in turmoil, immersed in a status quo of economic misery and frustration with the political stalemate – the 'seamless web of significance' was so thick that something dramatic had to happen. The situation was further aggravated by the growing prominence of Israel following the huge Soviet-Jewish immigration. The indignation of Arab intellectuals and activists at the United States, Zionism and the Gulf rulers, also manifested in grass-roots demonstrations on the streets of Arab cities, should be understood within the context of the unique discursive formation of Arabism. This discursive formation, involving a holistic self-image on the one hand and prejudice and bias about 'others' on the other, can be seen as setting the context for the decisive moments that led to the invasion of Kuwait, the crisis that followed and the devastating outcome for the Iraqi people and state. The political manoeuvrability of the Iraqi regime became very limited as a consequence of its decision to invade Kuwait. The Iraqi state's infrastructure was extinguished. It was likened by a United Nations report to conditions in premodern societies. Even worse, since 1991 the Iraqi people have objected to the severe punishment received both from their own regime and as a result of the United States and other Western powers' over-militarization in the Gulf region. The public discourse about Iraq in the West sees it as 'thirsty for wars against lesser, dehumanized enemies'. The media coverage is so obsessed with the homo Arabicus, Saddam Hussein, that one gets the impression that Saddam is the only inhabitant of Iraq. The terrorized women and children of Iraq all appear as 'blank spaces' characterized by ontological emptiness (see the Appendix).
The aim of this book is to discuss and understand the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The point of departure is that: in order to account fully for the invasion of Kuwait, it is of fundamental importance not only to discuss the motivations of Iraq, but also to understand the conditions that accelerated and facilitated this decision, namely the Arabic political discourse. The focus will be on the events that brought about this decision, as well as on the discourse (Foucault, 1972: 7, 21–30) through which the actors involved understood their world and acted accordingly.
During the spring and summer of 1990, so it seemed, Saddam Hussein understood that in order to realize his aim of reviving a charismatic pan-Arab role for himself he had to concentrate, primarily, on demonizing Zionism and the American attitude of indifference towards the Arabs. The language used by Saddam was carefully chosen, seeming to convey metaphoric pan-Arab and Islamic sentiments. The target in focus was the West, and in particular the United States and Zionism which had been blamed for a long and abominable history with disastrous implications for the Arabs. By the same token, Kuwait, the main target of dispute and conflict, was almost invisible. This always resonates with the mainstream Arabs who held the view that the United States was being manipulated by international Zionism, partly in favour of Israel and definitely against Arab interests. There is also a firm belief that United States' policy in the Middle East is influenced by the biased pro-Israeli lobby and, therefore, completely manipulated by Israel. Indeed, US officials and policy-makers throughout the history of American involvement in the region have never missed the opportunity to confirm this widely held perception. The situation was aggravated by the Israeli election in June 1990, which resulted in the first, most extreme right-wing coalition in the history of the Jewish state, headed by Prime Minister Shamir. Moreover, on 4 February 1990, the Israeli cabinet accepted as a new member of the government Rehavi Zeevi, leader of the right-wing Moledet Party which advocates the mass expulsion of Palestinians from the occupied territories. For the first time, the Palestinians were depicted by Israeli government officials as animals devoid of any human traits. Israeli polls in 1990 found that 52 per cent ofJewish citizens of Israel supported the expulsion of Palestinians from the occupied territories in order to preserve the Jewishness and democratic character of the state after the annexation of the occupied territories (Mattar, 1994: 39). Moreover, three years of Intifada (uprising against political oppression) and almost two years of intensive diplomatic efforts by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) were to no avail, despite the PLO's recognition of Israel, its acceptance of UN Resolution 424, and its renunciation of terrorism. It was the Iraqi president who could offer them hope, however illusive, by using stern and self-confident language that could intimidate Israel, and by promising to challenge and destroy Israeli hegemony (Muslih, 1992). It is in this sense that the invasion of Kuwait is more closely, and indeed vividly, linked, on the one hand, to the United States' indifference toward the Arabs and its staunch support for Israel and, on the other, to the Jewish state's existence and behaviour in the region as such.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 unleashed the Gulf crisis, in which the Middle East witnessed an unprecedented projection of power by the United States. What was considered as a purely internal 'Arab affair' became a global concern involving the United Nations, almost all the major world powers and world public opinion, in a rare moment of Western consensus. The Iraqi leadership seriously underrated this fundamental transformation of the international system, which was to prove a major miscalculation. It was not, however, the fatal one. Judging by the analysis of how the Iraqi leadership reasoned when it decided to invade Kuwait, the American response was thus far the most significant development. First, the US was able to rally the United Nations and world opinion against Iraq. Second, against all odds and against the history of repeated failures by US policymakers to comprehend inter-Arab politics, the United States persuaded Saudi Arabia to allow a massive American-Western army onto its territory, something the Iraqi leadership failed to foresee (Viorst, 1991; Al-Gosaibi, 1992). By this shrewd strategic move, which proved decisive in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait, the US breached a covenant in Arab politics (Brown, 1992; Telhami, 1994). It was widely believed that such an action would be impossible and would trigger and provoke a powerful anti-Western reaction in the Arab and Muslim world. It was feared, too, that such an action would be seen as an intervention by Western forces in the Holy land of Islam. As such, it would unify the Arabs and Muslims against the West and in particular the United States. Saddam Hussein did in fact attempt to exploit this situation, but to no avail.
The Iraqi strategy to keep the crisis 'an Arab affair' totally failed. Thus, Iraq was exposed to world opinion and to the military might of the most powerful nations in history. Iraq, it seemed, had never considered that the Saudi government or any other Arab state would collaborate with the United States and the West. Whereas it took a few weeks in September 1980 for the Iraqi leadership to discover that the 'Blitzkrieg' it was waging against Iran had turned into a devastating and prolonged 'Sietzkrieg', it took only few days for them to find out that the invasion of Kuwait was a major miscalculation, and that the situation was much more complicated than they had assumed it would be. To be sure, all these developments are landmarks in modern Middle Eastern history, and even more in the way world politics had been hitherto conceived by analysts and practitioners alike.
The personality of the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein has attracted much attention, generating an impressive amount of media coverage as well as academic research (see the Appendix). The assumption of several analysts that his enigmatic personality and leadership style is, among many other considerations, essential for understanding the crisis in the Gulf has certain grounds and appeal. However, it would be inadequate to treat the initiation of crises and waging war as if it were the making of 'isolated utility maximizers'. Rather, decision-makers are part and parcel of their society, and when dealing with foreign states they actually reflect their societal culture and values (Robinson, 1994: 417).
Having said that, the economic problems that faced Iraq after the war with Iran, the territorial disputes with Kuwait and even the Iraqi claims on the whole or part of Kuwait, and the conflict over oil quotas with OPEC and Iraq's accusation and Kuwait's counteraccusation over exploiting the Rumaillah oil field, all are critical factors in the crisis. Similarly, the endemic instability of the Iraqi state and its intensive culture of violence, as well as the regime's alienation from society and its lack of political and social legitimacy, are factors of definite relevance to the analysis. These features, however, are common traits to most authoritarian states and governments, and have to be put within the Arabic political discourse in order to comprehend Iraq's decision. The political and cultural identification of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi polity, and the way it is manifested, are far more appealing to our analysis. Arab leaders usually do seek backing for their policies and legitimize their state-centred actions by invoking transstate factors (i.e. Arabism). Moreover, political actions are designed to satisfy the expectations of the far-flung pan-Arab audience.
The Gulf crisis stemmed to a great extent from the internal dynamics of the Arab world. It was linked to state formation, the imperative of nation-building as well as the establishment of the state as a sovereign territorial unit, the regime's political legitimacy, and the lack of coherent sociopolitical institutions. The invasion of Kuwait and the crisis that ensued have asserted anew the centrality of Islam as a constructed cultural domain entwined with Arabism (the way Arabs collectively conceive of who they are) and, by implication, the societal and political crisis in the Arab world. There was unprecedented sympathy, even enthusiasm, from many Arabs – politicians, the grass roots, intellectual and Muslim activists – from Morocco to the Gulf, in support of Iraq's illegal (in any possible sense of the term) occupation of the state of Kuwait. This Arabism was manifest in people throughout the region expressing their rejection of the boundaries between states in the Arab world as artificial colonial arrangements. For many Arabs, the division of the Arab world into several political units is the exception not the rule. Moreover, there are social and economic divisions that separate the 'haves' of the Gulf royal families and their wealth from the 'have-nots' of the rest of the Arab world, and these divisions are the most unpopular of all. The entire course of the Gulf crisis should be seen within the context of Arab linguistic unity, political discourse, collective identity and the psychological union of sympathy – variables which mark the discursive formation of Arabs, and thus render their consideration significant. Using this approach, the book is organized into three different yet related perspectives: the realist, the institutional and the reflective. Each perspective is situated analytically and explained empirically. In fact, each one constitutes a different pair of lenses for the glasses through which one can perceive the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
THE REALIST PERSPECTIVE
The motivations behind Iraq's invasion of Kuwait could be analysed in the following manner. First, the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait could fit perfectly into a power preponderance framework, in the sense that Kuwait, as a much weaker and a vastly richer neighbour, seemed at one point to be attractive booty for its resentful, egoistic, power-maximizing neighbour. Thus, for the Iraqi leadership harsh economic problems are on the way towards being solved; a geostrategic outlet to the deep water of the Persian Gulf, and the achievement of the much-longed-for political hegemony in the Gulf region and the Arab world, seemed to be imminent and forthcoming.
At this juncture, let me discuss the issue of the role of the individual decision-maker. The individual as an actor having active or leading roles in the policy process (e.g. the rational actor model) has always been a problematic enterprise in explaining the outcome of decision-making. Allison (1971: 166) in rather assertive and tautological terms, wrote that:
[t]he hardcore of the bureaucratic politics mix is personality. How each man manages to stand the heat in his kitchen, each player's basic operating style, and the complementarity or contradiction among personalities and styles in the inner circle are irreducible pieces of policy blend.
The question for our purposes in explaining the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait concerns the freedom of choice that individuals are assumed to have in forming decisions and executing policies. Are individuals (i.e. Saddam Hussein) essentially products of their environment and historical context? Or do decision-makers control the circumstances in reference to which they formulate and execute decisions? As far as this book is concerned, the superstructural factor, i.e. the identity of Arabism emanating from Islam, is assumed to be a major theme, in the sense that Islam and Arabism engendered and facilitated the conditions and gave focus to the frame of reference that triggered the invasion of Kuwait and the crisis that followed. The support at grassroots level all over the Arab world for the Arab leaders' foreign policy decisions has always been instrumental in the motivations and outcomes of these decisions. One could say that certain types of claims and counter-claims, agitations, activities and events took place that render the theme of Islam/Arabism topical and meaningful in explaining and comprehending the political processes in the Arab world, as well as the particular Iraqi decision to invade Kuwait. Thus, the history and the political development of the personality of the Iraqi president are to be put in the wider framework of the Iraqi state and polity; and the environment with which they clearly identify themselves is Arabism. This is in line with the fact that political and military decisions, like other human actions, are common traits of the decision-makers and their external social, cultural and political conditions (Mathews, 1993: 4–5, 51).
THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In this chapter both the link between the Iraqi polity and its institutional impact, and the invasion of Kuwait will be accounted for by examining the implication of normative and material power. The link between domestic political conditions and the state's international behaviour – where authoritarian regimes usually exploit foreign adventure and aggression to divert attention away from home or simply to tighten their control of the internal political fronts – is a classical theme (Regan, 1994; Workman, 1994; Ayoob, 1995). Iraq is a case in point and provides qualified evidence for such an assumption as all the political and social ingredients have always been in place. Being politically illegitimate the regime has always been virtually isolated from the majority of the population. Ethnic and civil strife against the central government in the north with the Kurdish uprisings since the early 1960s, and in the south with the pro-Iranian Shi'ite fundamentalist groups, had grown more intense. Such endemic political instability generates economic hardship that becomes more severe for an overstretched state with an obligation to meet its population's basic needs for day-to-day living. In fact, the invasion of Kuwait (like the assault on Iran ten years earlier) must be seen against the background of the political and social turmoil of modern Iraqi society and the unusual atmosphere of political violence that the Ba'ath regime created.
(Continues…)
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Copyright © 1999 Hamdi A. Hassan.
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Table of Contents
1. Understanding the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait2. The Invasion of Kuwait: A Realist Perspective
3. The Invasion of Kuwait: An Institutional Perspective
4. The Invasion of Kuwait: A Reflective Perspective
6. Epilogue
Appendix
References
Index