The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked / Edition 1

by Leslie H. Gelb, Richard K. Betts Arnold A. Saltzman Profes

Overview

"

Few analysts of U.S. involvement in Vietnam would agree with the provocative conclusion of this book. The thesis of most postmortems is that the United States lost the war because of the failure of its foreign policy decisionmaking system. According to Gelb and Betts, however, the foreign policy failed, but the decisionmaking system worked. They attribute this paradox to the efficiency of the system in sustaining an increasingly heavy commitment based on the shared conviction of six administrations that the United States must prevent the loss of Vietnam to communism. However questionable the conviction, and thus the commitment, may have been, the authors stress that the latter ""was made and kept for twenty-five years. That is what the system—the shared values, the political and bureaucratic pressures—was designed to do, and it did it."" The comprehensive analysis that supports this contention reflects the widest use thus fare of available sources, including recently declassified portions of negotiations documents and files in presidential libraries. The frequently quoted statement of the principals themselves contradict the commonly held view that U.S. leaders were unaware of the consequences of their decisions and deluded by false expectations of easy victory. With few exceptions, the record reveals that these leaders were both realistic and pessimistic about the chances for success in Vietnam. Whey they persisted nonetheless is explained in this thorough account of their decisionmaking from 1946 to 1968, and how their mistakes might be avoided by policymakers in the future is considered in the final chapter.

"

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780815730712
Publisher:	Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Publication date:	03/01/1979
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	400
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x (d)
Lexile:	1440L (what's this?)

About the Author

"Leslie H. Gelb is President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former columnist at The New York Times, where he was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for Explanatory Journalism. Gelb has worked as a senior official in the State and Defense departments. Richard K. Betts is a professor of political science at Columbia University. He was a Senior Fellow and Research Associate at the Brookings Institution and has taught at Harvard and the Johns Hopkins University's Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. Professor Betts has also served on the staff of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and as a consultant to the National Security Council and Central Intelligence Agency. Professor Betts is a member of the National Commission on Terrorism."

Table of Contents

Foreword Fareed Zakaria ix

Preface to the Classic Edition xiii

Abbreviations xxi

Introduction 1

Part 1 Decisions: Getting into Vietnam

1 Patterns, Dilemmas, and Explanations 9

Patterns

Dilemmas

A Range of Explanations

Stereotypes Fail

Summary: Three Propositions

2 Recurrent Patterns and Dilemmas from Roosevelt to Eisenhower 26

"Hot Potato" Briefings

The "Asian Berlin"

The Roosevelt Administration

The Truman Administration

The Eisenhower Administration

3 Picking up the Torch: The Kennedy Administration 66

Fastening the Commitment: 1961

Buildup and Breakdown

Taking the Reins: 1963

4 Intervention in Force: The Johnson Administration, I 89

Preparing for Pressure: 1964

Crossing the Rubicon: Early 1965

Setting the Pattern of Perseverance: Fate 1965

5 Coming Home to Roost: The Johnson Administration, II 130

On the Tiger's Back: 1966-67

Debate, Diplomacy, and Disillusionment

Off the Tiger's Back: The Reckoning of 1968

Part 2 Goals: The Imperative Not to Lose

6 National Security Goals and Stakes 163

The Cautious Route to Commitment

Exploring the Security Issue

The Domino Theory

7 Domestic Political Stakes 182

The Two Phases of American Policy on Vietnam

Practical Political Considerations

8 The Bureaucracy and the Inner Circle 207

Career Services and U.S. Stakes in Vietnam

Pressure from the Top and from the Bottom

Concluding Observations about the Imperative not to Lose

Part 3 Means: The Minimum Necessary and the Maximum Feasible

9 Constraints 229

Four Strategies for Winning

The Fate of the "Winning" Strategies

Building and Breaching "Firebreaks"

10 Pressures and the President 252

Pressures to Do Both More and Less

Presidential Responses

Presidential Management of the Political System

How the System Helped the President

Strategy and Polities: The Presidents' Dilemmas

Part 4 Perceptions: Realism, Hope, and Compromise

11 Optimism, Pessimism, and Credibility 279

Contradictions and Hedging

The Roots of Internal Estimates

The Cycle of Highs and Lows

Estimates and Escalation

12 The Strategy of Perseverance 302

The Stalemated War

Elements of the Strategy

Part 5 Conclusions

13 The Lessons of Vietnam 325

Nixon's and Ford's Policies

How the System Worked

Two Schools of Thought on the Lessons of Vietnam

Recommendations

Documentary Appendix 349

Bibliographical Note 355

Notes 357

Index 399

Table and Figures

Table 1 Proportion of the Public Favoring Various U.S. Vietnam Policies, 1966, 1967 146

Figure 1 Trends in Support for the War in Vietnam, 1965-71 145

Figure 2 Trends in Support for the War in Vietnam, by Partisanship, 1965-71 147