The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security / Edition 1 available in Hardcover, eBook
The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security / Edition 1
- ISBN-10:
- 0804784175
- ISBN-13:
- 9780804784177
- Pub. Date:
- 01/23/2013
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
- ISBN-10:
- 0804784175
- ISBN-13:
- 9780804784177
- Pub. Date:
- 01/23/2013
- Publisher:
- Stanford University Press
The Nuclear Renaissance and International Security / Edition 1
Buy New
$75.00Buy Used
$47.00-
-
SHIP THIS ITEM
Temporarily Out of Stock Online
Please check back later for updated availability.
-
Overview
They probe critical issues relating to the nuclear renaissance, including if and how peaceful nuclear programs contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation, whether the diffusion of nuclear technologies lead to an increase in the trafficking of nuclear materials, and under what circumstances the diffusion of nuclear technologies and latent nuclear weapons capabilities can influence international stability and conflict. The book will help scholars and policymakers understand why countries are pursuing nuclear energy and evaluate whether this is a trend we should welcome or fear.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780804784177 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Stanford University Press |
| Publication date: | 01/23/2013 |
| Edition description: | New Edition |
| Pages: | 376 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.10(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d) |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Stanford University Press
Copyright © 2013 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior UniversityAll right reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-8047-8417-7
Chapter One
Correlates of Nuclear EnergyBack to the Future or Back to Basics?
Bernard Gourley and Adam N. Stulberg
On March 11, 2011, WAVES AS HIGH AS 14 METERS HIT the nuclear power plants (NPPs) of Fukushima Daiichi in Japan, knocking out backup power and resulting in a loss-of-coolant accident when pumps went off line and temperatures rose high enough to damage fuel elements. The aftermath of the crisis left the utility operator of the ill-fated NPPs, Tokyo Electric Power Company or TEPCo, contemplating bankruptcy after suffering the largest loss ever for a Japanese firm outside the financial sector. Japan's Prime Minister, then Naoto Kan, subsequently called for upgrading safety and security inspections and announced that the country would not build new nuclear plants—a strict volte-face from pre-tsunami plans of a 30 percent growth in nuclear capacity over the coming decade (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011). The shutdown of almost two-thirds of the country's reactors (in response to both the accident and accelerated schedules of inspections) saddled utilities across the country with short- and long-term electricity shortages. Coupled with the formal scathing indictment of "human error" and poor safety planning, this stirred national debate over the costs and risks associated with future expansion of nuclear energy (FNAIIC 2012). Similarly, global public reflection on the costs and possible consequences of nuclear energy led many states to reexamine their nuclear industries, with divergent conclusions. For example, while the Germans committed to phasing out nuclear power and Italy scrapped plans to reconstitute nuclear capacity, other nuclear energy states (e.g., Russia and China), as well as aspirants (e.g., Vietnam and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]), elected to press ahead with existing plans for nuclear power development. As discussed below, Tokyo faces a confluence of factors that render nuclear a particularly appealing power source, and which resulted in the Japanese building nuclear plants when almost no other country was doing so. If Japan—given the powerful drivers motivating its pursuit of nuclear that include geographic isolation, resource scarcity, and status as a proponent of climate change mitigation—follows suit with Germany in abandoning this energy source, what can be expected of states with far less pressing motivations?
The issue takes on added significance in light of the mixed bag of nuclear energy states. As of 2012, thirty-one countries possess an operational commercial-scale nuclear energy infrastructure; and they are a diverse set of states, including Armenia, Belgium, China, Finland, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Mexico, and Argentina. These states, as well as more than fifty others that have expressed interest in joining them, run the gamut in terms of standard of living, governance, location, population size, security environments, resource allocation, and levels of industrial development.
This raises the following questions: Are there characteristics shared by nuclear power–generating states that distinguish them from non-nuclear energy states? Do historical commonalities hold for contemporary nuclear energy aspirants? What are the implications for projecting the scope and scale of alternative nuclear energy futures? In short, how much do we know (or not know) about the correlates of nuclear power generation?
Answers to these questions are important for illuminating the contours of a prospective global expansion of nuclear energy. First, identification of common attributes can assist with distinguishing rhetoric from reality surrounding a much-heralded nuclear energy renaissance. Notwithstanding both the widespread resuscitation of interest in nuclear power before the Fukushima Daiichi disaster and the public shock waves that ensued, the lion's share of new reactor construction has occurred, to date, in states already in possession of a nuclear energy infrastructure, especially China, India, and Russia. There are notable cases of states that have articulated a strong commitment to nuclear power for decades but have achieved, at best, modest success, such as Indonesia and Turkey. Do these trends represent a new era or a temporary waypoint in the development of nuclear energy? Exploration of shared traits among existing and aspirant nuclear energy states can shed light on similarities and distinctions between historical and contemporary trajectories of nuclear energy stagnation, resurgence, or renaissance.
Second, systematic inquiry into shared characteristics of nuclear energy states can advance the nascent scholarly debate over the drivers of nuclear energy acquisition. Little is known about what motivates states to acquire nuclear power generation capacity beyond disparate statements by national leaders and governing bodies. Indeed, scholars are only beginning to probe the drivers of nuclear energy development using quantitative empirical analysis (Nelson and Sprecher 2008; Jewel 2011; Fuhrmann 2012). The extant literature typically focuses on explanations for either weapons capabilities or access to weapons-related technologies, or whether there is a link between acquisition of nuclear energy and weapons programs (latent or otherwise) (e.g., Meyer 1984; Sagan 1996/97, 2010; Singh and Way 2004; Jo and Gartzke 2007; Barnaby 2009; Fuhrmann 2009a,b; Kroenig 2009a,b; Findlay 2011). Most studies that address the acquisition of nuclear energy programs tend to give priority to idiosyncratic political motivations and decision-making processes, or analyze the political interests, national aspirations, or strategic consequences associated with the empowerment of domestic nuclear energy lobbies, rather than offering systematic analyses of general patterns and trends of commercial energy acquisitions across time, states, or regions (e.g., Hymans 2006; Solingen 2007; Fitzpatrick 2009; Malley and Ogilvie-White 2009; Rublee 2009). Although correlation cannot be equated with causation, by filling methodological gaps and refining metrics to test rival claims, a large-N study of common attributes among states with civilian nuclear power industries can build on recent scholarly insight by exposing important and systematic inflection points for alternative nuclear scenarios, as well as by identifying critical case studies for the future and rich analysis of drivers and processes associated with the diffusion of nuclear energy (Jewell 2011).
Finally, the character of the expansion of nuclear power has implications for policy. Will nuclear energy optimists or pessimists carry the day (see Busby, Chapter 5 in this volume)? Some people have noted that the aspiring nuclear energy states, considered in the aggregate, are decidedly weaker in governance and political stability than existing nuclear energy states, which accentuates concerns about accidents, terrorism, and weapons proliferation of a global nuclear energy revival. Given the historical correlation of political instability with states that possess nuclear weapons, this observation also draws attention to additional levels of national commitment required by newcomers to realize their nuclear energy ambitions (Miller and Sagan 2009; Jewell 2011). Yet without a systematic assessment of the range of potential drivers or an understanding of how current possessor states compare both over time and to non-nuclear energy states, it is difficult to comprehend the ramifications of these observations for managing future nuclear safety and security. A refined appreciation of distinguishing traits can provide purchase on whether the future nuclear energy club will be characterized by pariahs, such as Iran, or by engagers, such as the UAE—the former being the newest nascent state and the latter expected to be the next—with attendant implications for balancing international commercial and security policy responses.
This chapter synthesizes what we know and do not know about common characteristics of nuclear energy states. The first section reviews the diversity of the nuclear energy club and the challenges posed by extant explanations for nuclear power generation. The next section discusses the results of a statistical model that tests rival hypotheses concerning shared attributes among nuclear power–generating states from 1950 to 2001. Our findings confirm that nuclear energy states typically have large national incomes. There also is empirical evidence that energy insecurity, defined as reliance on foreign sources of energy, is positively correlated with construction of nuclear energy capacity. Our results also tentatively support the notion of a conspicuous drop-off in the pursuit of nuclear energy in the wake of major nuclear safety accidents, most notably following the Chernobyl disaster. In contrast, many popular explanations such as those rooted in economic growth, regime type, and strategic considerations do not appear to influence nuclear power development in a systematic manner. While it is clear that some nuclear energy programs grew from weapons programs and that some nuclear energy aspirants have been primarily interested in nuclear weapons, given that other states pursued nuclear energy wholeheartedly without working toward the bomb, the question of whether there is a systematic connection remains relevant. The third part discusses the implications of these historical patterns for projecting the emerging nuclear energy landscape, highlighting both limitations of quantitative models and prospective inflection points for discerning alternative scenarios. The final section explores implications that will help determine whether contemporary nuclear energy aspirants are either doomed to stasis or poised to propel a global deepening and broadening of nuclear energy.
The Nuclear energy club: a Mixed Bag
What is the profile of a nuclear power–generating state? This question does not lend itself to straightforward answers, given the checkered nuclear landscape. A cursory review of the thirty-one states that operate commercial NPPs, as well as those that have shut-down NPPs (i.e., Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and Italy), reveals tremendous variation along basic parameters. For example, while wealthy states are prevalent in the realm of nuclear energy, there are possessor states with low per capita national incomes (often considered a defining indicator of economic development). Historical inertia also resonates among the majority of the nuclear energy states. Most of the early entrants into the nuclear power domain were either North Atlantic high-income democratic countries with market economies or former Warsaw Pact members. States that meet one of these criteria still comprise nearly two-thirds of the countries that operate NPPs. The history of nuclear energy development is marked by countries that pursued nuclear energy after launching a bomb-related program (e.g., the United States and China), as well as by countries that embarked on extensive civilian nuclear energy programs without undertaking significant efforts to develop nuclear weapons (e.g., Japan and the Netherlands). There also are states—such as India, Brazil, Sweden, South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Yugoslavia, and Iraq—that at one time or another displayed ambiguous motivations by pursuing parallel development of civilian and military nuclear programs (Bose 2005; Ollapally 2001). As well, NPP states have exhibited varying propensities to maintain a dedication to nuclear energy in the face of changing conditions, such as those concerning safety. As noted above, in the wake of the Fukushima Daiichi incident, Germany opted to scrap its plans to extend the life of its nuclear plants to 2036 in favor of phasing out domestic nuclear by 2022, while Italy and Switzerland canceled plans for new NPPs (Monitor's Editorial Board 2011). However, a recent report forecasted that of thirteen major nuclear energy states, only two (Japan and Germany) were not projected to increase nuclear installed capacity by 2020 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011).
At the same time, a heterogeneous group of more than fifty countries shows varying degrees of interest in developing national nuclear infrastructures— mostly power plants, but for a few this includes fuel cycle facilities downstream of existing mining or milling activities (WNA 2009; IAEA 2010b). Some of these aspirants have vacillated on the issue with changes in political administrations, economic conditions, or world events. Australia's varying policy stances offer prime examples of the effect of political change on nuclear power development (Coorey 2009). Egypt pursued nuclear power but changed course—allegedly in response to the Chernobyl accident—only to renew a favorable disposition toward nuclear energy (MIIS 2009). After protracted periods of disinterest, countries with large natural uranium reserves, such as Australia, Brazil, and Kazakhstan, now trumpet the advantages of moving up the value chain by constructing reactors and producing nuclear fuel (Falk, Green, and Mudd 2006; IAEA 2006; SCIR 2007). Some states, located in the Baltic, Persian Gulf, and Balkan regions, have been satisfied with arrangements that enable them to consume electricity from NPPs situated in other countries, such as the Slovenian/Croatian Krško power plant (WNA 2009). Nuclear power aspirants have ranged from Italy, a wealthy state that formerly generated nuclear power, to countries such as Ghana, Namibia, and Bangladesh that face acute limitations of resources and infrastructures. There have been a number of attempts in recent years to gauge which aspirant states are most likely to succeed. However, basing projections on the past may be problematic given that, until Iran's Bushehr NPP came on line, there had been no new entrants in decades (Jewell 2011).
There are conspicuous differences between aspirants and existing nuclear energy states. Although many developing states are interested in nuclear energy, including several in Africa and the Middle East, these types of states are not well represented among those with nuclear power. Most aspirants considered credible contenders are either large emerging-market countries (e.g., Indonesia or Turkey) or small but fast-growing nations (e.g., Vietnam).
On the surface, it seems obvious why many aspirants would covet nuclear power. Some (e.g., Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Indonesia) stand out as having low rates of access to electricity and negligible consumption per capita. Vietnam must build considerable capacity to sustain its rapid economic growth, and a fifth of the population has no access to electricity (UNDP 2007). Adding capacity on a large scale to meet rising demand while sustaining economic growth appears to be especially attractive for nations with similar profiles.
Notwithstanding generic motivations, the variation across existing and aspiring nuclear energy states presents challenges for systematic analysis. Part of the problem stems from ambiguity about basic requirements for building a nuclear power plant. Although some infrastructural and financial elements are straightforward—such as adequate water for cooling, an electrical grid of sufficient installed capacity to absorb the addition of a large-wattage nuclear plant, a highly specialized workforce (or the resources to attract such a workforce from abroad), and the ability to raise or borrow billions of U.S. dollars—there are less tangible requirements, including the political will, public support, and institutional capacity to shoulder the risks necessary to promote and sustain nuclear power development (Busby, Chapter 5 in this volume; Zhou 2010; Jewell 2011). Some aspirants more consistently display these requirements than others; and some of the requirements (such as grid limitations or public anxiety about nuclear energy) may only preclude aspirants that are otherwise long shots for NPP acquisition.
The diverse nuclear energy landscape poses particular challenges to individual case analysis. Although comparative studies generate critical insight into historical motivations and processes of nuclear energy acquisition for select states, they reveal little about patterns that can be generalized across cases (Poneman 1982; Jasper 1990; Zhou 2010). Similarly, the general attributes of nuclear energy states can be obscured by the idiosyncrasies of decision makers that may be crucial to historical cases but less readily transferable to contemporary aspirants.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY Copyright © 2013 by Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. Excerpted by permission of Stanford University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments vii
Contributors ix
Introduction: Understanding the Nuclear Renaissance Adam N. Stulberg Matthew Fuhrmann 1
Part I Drivers and Patterns of the Nuclear Renaissance
1 Correlates of Nuclear Energy: Back to the Future or Back to Basics? Bernard Gourley Adam N. Stulberg 19
2 Where, How, and Why Will Nuclear Happen? Nuclear "Renaissance" Discourses from Buyers and Suppliers Allison Macfarlane 50
3 Nuclear Suppliers and the Renaissance in Nuclear Power Matthew Fuhrmann 73
4 Internationalization of the Fuel Cycle and the Nuclear Energy Renaissance: Confronting the Credible Commitment Problem Adam N. Stulberg 97
5 Vaunted Hopes: Climate Change and the Unlikely Nuclear Renaissance Joshua William Busby 124
6 The Politics of the Nuclear Renaissance: A Comment Christopher Way 154
Part II The Nuclear Renaissance and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
7 Stop Helping Me: When Nuclear Assistance Impedes Nuclear Programs Alexander H. Montgomery 177
8 The Nuclear Renaissance, Sensitive Nuclear Assistance, and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation Matthew Kroenig 203
9 Consequences of the Nuclear Renaissance for Nonstate Nuclear Trafficking Justin V. Hastings 223
10 The Logic of Nuclear Patronage: A Comment Erik Gartzke 250
Part III The Nuclear Renaissance, International Crises, and Violent Conflict
11 Nuclear Weapons Programs and the Security Dilemma Kyle Beardsley Victor Asal 265
12 Nuclear Power and Militarized Conflict: Is There a Link? Michael C. Horowitz 288
13 The Global Nuclear Renaissance and the Spread of Violent Conflict: A Comment Dan Reiter 313
Conclusion: What Future for Nuclear Energy? Matthew Fuhrmann Adam N. Stulberg 321
Index 345