The "Other" Karen in Myanmar: Ethnic Minorities and the Struggle without Arms
232
The "Other" Karen in Myanmar: Ethnic Minorities and the Struggle without Arms
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Overview
Most previous studies have focused on violent aspects of ethnic relations and on ethnic armed organizations, such as the Karen National Union (KNU) in Burma, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MNLF) in the Philippines, and the LTTE in Sri Lanka. However, even among these minorities which are locked in armed conflicts, the majority of people have shunned armed resistance and sought to remain ‘quietly’ beyond the struggle and pursued non-violent approaches to promote their individual and collective interests in the face of authoritarian, governments.
This study, which sheds light on the lives and growing political significance of non-armed, non-insurgent members of ethnic minorities in Burma, draws heavily on opinion surveys and open-ended interviews among Karen diaspora (among individuals who lived a minimum of 20 years in Burma), “quiet Karens” who live inside Burma, KNU officials, personnel, and soldiers, and Karen refugees and IDPs who are currently living in Thai-Burma border areas. These interviews, which covered approximately two hundred respondents, have been conducted since 2002.
It is mainly directed toward social scientists, historians, humanitarian workers, policy makers, and practitioners, and non-specialist ordinary audience who are interested in Southeast Asian/Burmese politics and society, comparative politics, identity politics, ethnic conflict, social movements, conflict resolution, and political reform.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780739171073 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Lexington Books |
| Publication date: | 12/01/2011 |
| Series: | AsiaWorld |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 232 |
| File size: | 2 MB |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
The "Other" Karen in Myanmar
Ethnic Minorities and the Struggle without Arms
By Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.
Copyright © 2012 Lexington BooksAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-7391-7107-3
CHAPTER 1
Who are the "Other" or "Quiet" Minorities?
I define the "quiet" or "other" minorities as members of minority groups who decline to take part in armed resistance against the state. The analytical dividing line between the "rebels" and their "other" counterparts is that the former are active participants, either in civilian or military capacities, in armed rebellion against the government. Apart from this major difference, the level of support for the armed resistance movement and its degree of assimilation into the majority population varies widely among these "other" minorities.
The fact that in Burma some Karens live quietly and unobtrusively among their neighbors does not necessarily mean that they are loyal to, or provide support for, the Burmese military regime, and it certainly does not imply that they consider the KNU to be in any way illegitimate. In any minority population, there will always be some who can be depended upon to demonstrate their loyalty and support for the government in power. There will also be an element who are "apolitical," whose primary concern is to make ends meet on a daily basis. Then there are those who will question armed rebellion as a legitimate cause, but may utilize a variety of nonviolent means to preserve and promote their group's identity. In addition, there are those who believe in the legitimacy of armed rebellion, but who opt instead to pursue a course of "passive resistance" to provide indirect support to the armed resistance movement. Finally, a portion, perhaps even a small portion, of the minority population may actively participate in armed resistance to assist an eventual military victory. These categories, however, represent ideal scenarios and are neither fixed nor mutually exclusive. An individual may move from one position to another, or uphold a number of principles—even at times contradictory and inconsistent—and engage in a combination of actions depending on the nature of the political environment and the circumstances of the moment. In addition, there will always be a gap between individuals' convention (what people believe) and their actions (what people actually do). It is entirely possible and common for activists to not be completely convinced in the justice of their cause, and it is entirely possible for those who do not act as partisans to be completely committed in their convictions to the cause. All combinations are possible and one cannot assume an alignment of interior convictions and external acts.
The "other" minorities include those who are sympathetic to the cause of armed rebellion, but who pursue nonviolent options to promote nationalistic causes. They may provide financial contributions to the armed resistance movement—but in Burma this is sensitive information and difficult to obtain. At the other extreme of the "others" are those who directly support the military measures undertaken by the government to suppress the armed resistance movement. Members of these "other" or "quiet" minorities thus range from those who collaborate with state authorities, to former rebels who "re-enter the legal fold," to those attempting to maintain their identity—and their very existence—through institutionalized channels and/or various forms of passive resistance.
In this study, I use the terms "rebel," "insurgent," and "armed" (resistance) interchangeably to refer to members of minority ethnic groups who are active participants, either in civilian or military capacities, in armed rebellion against the agents of government. It should be noted, however, that these terms are not used to make any kind of political or ideological statement. In fact, in both popular and academic discourse, armed resistance fighters are generally associated with negative terms such as "extremists," "hard-liners," and "nonconformists," while those who collaborate with government are considered "moderates," "compromisers," "soft-liners," or "accommodators." These terms may be appropriate in some settings, but they cannot be readily applied in the context of a militarized state where the government itself has committed serious human rights violations, and where some groups have taken up arms either as a result of forcible recruitment, or because they had no other option but to defend themselves against aggression.
I reserve the terms "extremist" and "hard-liner" to refer to those who support a strategy of ethnic purification (either through disseminating the propaganda of racial hatred or undertaking strong measures against those who promote interethnic harmony and coexistence), those who refuse to acknowledge the concerns of other cultural groups, and those who strongly oppose any compromise that would undermine their own position and ideology. Some armed resistance fighters fit these definitions, while others do not. The "moderates" or "soft-liners," on the other hand, are those who may be sympathetic to the rebel cause but understand the concerns and positions of the groups opposing them, those who believe in peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial compromise among different nationalities, and those who advocate nonviolent strategies to pursue these goals. "Moderates," in short, are those who can see the issues from both sides. Of course, not all the "other" minorities fall into this category. Some have voluntarily joined the government militia or paramilitary organizations to help the state crush the rebel movement. An expert on ethnic politics in Sri Lanka puts it this way: "These 'so-called' Tamil moderates in Sri Lanka in fact are members of paramilitary groups who engage in open violence against the Tamil armed resistance group!!!"
The Political Significance of the "Other" Minorities
Armed rebellion is a rare phenomenon, and it is a more common response for disaffected individuals to carry on normal life as best they can or resist in ways other than resorting to violence (Scott 1985). Social scientists have tended to focus on such uncharacteristic moments of opposition, often neglecting the unobtrusive presence of groups such as a majority segment of a minority population. These "quiet" minorities do not seem to provoke any immediate or pressing concerns for peace, stability or other social considerations. Nevertheless, because of their significant role in intra-ethnic as well as inter-ethnic conflict resolution and political reform, it is important to investigate these understudied minorities and incorporate them into the study of ethnic politics.
For a start, viewing particular cultural or religious groups as homogenous and monolithic overlooks tensions within groups, which can be just as hostile and violent as tension between groups. For instance, the Serb paramilitary units that swept into multiethnic Bosnian villages in 1992 first killed Serbian residents who were in favor of ethnic integration. Only later did they turn their attention to non-Serbs (Mojzes 1994, V. P. Gagnon Jr. 2004). In Rwanda, some 10,000 "moderate" Hutus (many of them intellectuals) were killed by "extremist" Hutus during the genocide of 1994 (Straus 2006, 51). In Northern Ireland where Protestant unionists and Catholic nationalists had engaged in a long drawn out conflict over almost 30 years, 22 percent of the killings committed by the Protestant "loyalists" between 1983 and 1994 were carried out against Protestants, either in political feuds or because they were informers. Among the Catholic nationalist communities, between 1969 and 1993, 65 deaths were attributed to Catholic activists killing Catholic informers (Kennedy-Pipe 1997). One famous case in 1972 is the abduction and killing of Jean McConville, a converted Catholic and widow with 10 children, by the Irish Republican Army's (IRA), an armed wing of Catholic nationalists. Although the reasons for her disappearance were never entirely clear, a frequently suggested explanation is that she "angered the IRA by comforting a (British) soldier who had been seriously injured outside her door" (Nagel 2003).
Likewise, members of the LTTE, the dominant Tamil separatist group in Sri Lanka, murdered leaders of rival Tamil groups, dissidents within their own ranks, and civilian Tamils suspected of aiding the Sinhalese (Pfaffenberger 1995). One researcher notes that the LTTE and militant armed organization, has "killed more Tamils than the Sri Lanka state security forces, particularly in internecine war among various Tamil militant groups since 1985" (Sarvananthan 2007, 1,193). Such actions are not essentially different from the Palestine Liberation Organization's execution of Palestinians alleged to have sold land to Israelis, and the killing of alleged "collaborators" in many other settings (Laitin 1995). During the Palestinian revolt against colonial British and the Jewish community in the 1930s, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip killed at least 800 of their own for allegedly supplying Israel with intelligence that helped the IDF combat the intifada (Schanzer 2008, 55).
In the same manner, the PKK, a Kurdish armed resistance group in Turkey, is believed to have been responsible for the indiscriminate killing of moderate Kurds in Turkey and in Europe. Within Turkey, it consistently targeted educational institutions in the Kurdish region, branding the public schools "instruments of Ankara's assimilation policy." Between 1983 and 1999, the PKK killed 200 teachers and destroyed 150 schools to stop assimilation. It also blew up bridges and hospitals and assassinated collaborators (Yavuz and Gunter 2001). Many members of the Karen diaspora expressed alarm over the spectacle of "Karens' killing Karens" as fighting between the KNU and Democratic Karen (Kayin) Buddhist Army (DKBA) (the KNU's splinter group) continued to claim more lives.
My second major point is that ignoring the role, significance, and activities of the "other" minorities—whose voices and concerns may not reflect the goals and aspirations of the armed resistance groups—may harden the feelings of "moderates" who feel that they have been subsumed under a broad negative category. Life can be precarious for otherwise well-integrated minorities who are perceived to be associated with armed resistance groups through "blood ties" or their "shared faith." For instance, some Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand—as in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere—express frustration that in the wake of September 11, 2001, they have been branded as religious fundamentalists and potential terrorists because of their faith. A similar mechanism can be seen at work in the U.S. government's initial policy of denying asylum to Karen refugees because of their alleged support for the KNU, which is listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist organization. Gutoc, a Muslim intellectual from Mindanao, vents her frustration with this form of prejudice: "Several Muslim anti-state groups are sometimes treated as one, under the label 'Muslim,' absorbing the majority who are apolitical among them." She concludes: "The articulate, rational voices of Islamism are therefore systematically ignored," and the "multiplicity of voices within Muslim communities overlooked." Charles King cautions that "it is important to avoid applying such ethnic labels to individuals who may have had no real conception of themselves as belonging to such a group" (King 2007, 38). He adds, "when analysts interpret 'ethnic conflicts' in terms of the alleged groups involved, they play immediately into the hands of those who have 'ethnicized' the conflict in the first place—casting it as a war between entire groups, rather than between mobilized individuals claiming to act on those groups' behalf."
Third, investigating the lives and activities of those who shun armed resistance will reveal many alternative voices, ideas, attitudes, and situations, including harmonious communal relationships and attempts to promote peace and stability and create an environment for normal activities in conflict zones as well as nonconflict areas. Some of these locally initiated survival strategies and nonviolent measures for dealing with ongoing conflict and entrenched poverty are worthy of study and emulation in a wider context.
Fourth, ethnic armed resistance groups commonly issue demands to national governments for separate autonomous regions or independent states. However such proposals, which would ideally allocate particular ethnic nationalities to clearly demarcated territorial regions, ignore not only the presence of the other minorities, but also of other nonmember minorities who may or may not share the goals and aspirations of the resistance movement. Given the ethnically mixed communities that already exist among various cultural groups and their varying personal and political stances, the creation of ethnically designated areas may exacerbate rather than eliminate existing problems. Michael Gunter, a leading expert on the Kurds, contends that "the fact that as many as 60 percent of Turkey's Kurds now live west of Ankara, that is, outside of their historic homeland in the southeast of Turkey, makes Kurdish independence from Turkey even more impractical. Why would these ethnic Kurds, many of whom are at least partially assimilated anyway, want to give up their more prosperous lives in the west to return to a problematic future in the east?" (Gunter 2004, 106). In Sudan, many of the two million southerners (mostly Afro-Sudanese) who lived in the north and were in the process of adapting to northern Islamic-Arabian culture, and who sent their children to the Arabic language schools, have refrained from joining the southern autonomy movement (Deng 1995). When the Basque Statute of Autonomy in Spain was approved in 1978, the majority of constituents in Navarre, one of the four provinces within the Basque territory, voted not to be a part of the Basque region (Castells and Jauregui 1996, 220). A young Karen man from a well-off family in Mandalay, Upper Burma, asked in some bewilderment, "What would happen to people like us who live in Upper Burma? Are we supposed to move to the Karen state if the KNU gets the territories it wants?" (Author's conversation, Singapore, 2006). One researcher also remarks that "the de facto regime of the LTTE in the North and East is even more racist than the Sri Lanka state. The treatment of ethnic minorities, particularly the Mulsim community, in the North and East by the LTTE lends credence to our view. It is important to recall at this moment, with shame, how Muslims were evicted from their historical habitats in the North in 1990 and massacred at mosques in the East by the LTTE" (Sarvananthan 2007, 1,194). Interestingly, while some Muslims who lived in the eastern island of Sri Lanka favored autonomous Muslim regions, those who lived in the South "seem mainly unbothered by the plight of their fellows in the west and east. Largely because they are dispersed geographically, there is little sense of a common Sri Lankan Muslim identity."
There is also considerable evidence to suggest that an overwhelming focus on the territorial solution to ethnic armed conflict has effectively silenced the concerns of nonmember minorities who reside in the areas controlled or claimed by an armed resistance organization. The marginalized role of the Lumad in the Moro resistance movement provides a good example. The Lumad are a non-Muslim indigenous group in the southern Philippines. Although they have never formed a revolutionary group of their own, they were recruited into the ranks of the MILF and the New People's Army (a Communist armed organization), as well as into government paramilitary organizations fighting the Moros and the NPA. The priority for Lumad, who have lost much of their land to multinational corporations, logging companies, and wealthy Filipino settlers in Mindanao, is to secure rights to their ancestral domain (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 1999). However, as the Lumad themselves have pointed out, the top-down negotiations between the government and the MNLF have left them out of any peace agreement, and they have been denied a say in the appointment of officials and the setting of conditions for an autonomous region in Mindanao. The MNLF and MILF claimed to speak on behalf of all the native inhabitants of Mindanao and Sulu, including Muslims, Christians, and Highlanders (Lumad) as a national grouping distinct from the Filipinos in Luson and Visayas, and in the process marginalized the voices and concerns of Lumad (Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam 1999; Magdalena 2001, 80).
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The "Other" Karen in Myanmar by Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung. Copyright © 2012 Lexington Books. Excerpted by permission of ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC..
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Table of Contents
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Growing up in Burma—a personal account
The international Phenomenon of the “Silent Majority”
Theme, Approach, and Method of the Book
Chapter 1: Who are the “Other” or “Quiet” Minorities?
Who are the “other” or “quiet” Minorities?
The Political Significance of the “Other” Minorities
Chapter 2: The Emergence of the Karen Ethno-National Movement
The Construction of Karen ethno-nationalist identities
Saw Ba U Gyi and the Insein Ceasefire talks
KNU in the 21st Century
Conclusion
Chapter 3: Kawthoolei Karen: A Fragmented Constituency
Government-Controlled zones
Rebel-controlled and Contested Zones
The “Refugees”
The Diaspora
Conclusion
Chapter 4: The “Rebel” and the “Accomomodator”
The Early Stages of the Armed Resistance Movement
The Later Stages of the Armed Rebellion
Conclusion
Chapter 5: The “Other” Ethnonationalities in Myanmar/Burma
A changing Political Landscape in SPDC and Post-SPDC Periods
The ‘other’ Nationalities in Burma/Myanmar
Three Patterns of civilian Politics among Ethnic minoirites
Conclusion
Chapter 6: The “other” Ethnonationalities in Comparative perspective
Competing Identities
Divide and Rule Strategies
The Role of the “other” Minorities in Ethnic Politics
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
About the Author
What People are Saying About This
This is a meticulously researched and compelling analysis of the politics of the many Burmese Karen who are not engaged in a violent struggle with the government, but have found ways to accommodate themselves to the challenging realities of their circumstances. The author combines the fruits of several years extensive fieldwork with a refreshingly broad theoretical and comparative perspective. The result is an extremely distinctive and original book that allows us to understand Burma in new and much more nuanced ways.
Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung’s brave new book is a worthy successor to her penetrating Behind the Teak Curtain. In this second volume, she does more than recount the complexities of the Karen communities of Myanmar, but demonstrates through her use of comparative studies, the massive difficulties involved in trying to understand the nature of ethnic politics in a country as complicated as Myanmar. Those who naively seek simplistic answers to Myanmar’s myriad problems will learn much from this important book. Students of comparative ethnic politics will, as well.
This richly detailed and closely argued study is a major contribution to the literature on Burmese politics and social issues. Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung addresses an important and sensitive subject in a rigorous, yet balanced and nuanced manner. The book will be particularly useful to scholars and activists because most previous studies of the Karen community in and from Burma have focused on a well-connected, highly researched - but not necessarily representative - minority, engaged in political activities or living as displaced people along the Thailand border. While not seeking to marginalize such voices, Thawnghmung provides a necessary corrective. She combines a state-of-the-art theoretical orientation with grounded insights into the relationship between the diverse Karen community and the state of Myanmar. Her analysis is relevant to the situation of many 'other' restive communities around the world, and should thus be of interest both to Burma-watchers and to the broader scholarly and policy-orientated communities.
This remarkable book portrays anti-government rebels and 'their' supporters; pro-government officials and 'their' supporters; pro-government people who become anti-government people; people just trying to stay out of the way; and people who go away, fleeing to hither and yon as refugees. Author Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung uses her extensive sources and her own experiences to reveal the complexities and predicaments of Karen people and others who live with and are caught up in ethnic conflicts spanning decades in Burma/Myanmar.