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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9785002231362 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Alpina Non Fiction |
| Publication date: | 10/13/2023 |
| Sold by: | Bookwire |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 637 |
| Sales rank: | 294,670 |
| File size: | 11 MB |
| Note: | This product may take a few minutes to download. |
| Age Range: | 12 Years |
| Language: | Russian |
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INTRODUCTION
For almost three decades at the end of the fifth century b.c. the Athenian Empire fought the Spartan Alliance in a terrible war that changed the Greek world and its civilization forever. Only a half-century before its outbreak the united Greeks, led by Sparta and Athens, had fought off an assault by the mighty Persian Empire, preserving their independence by driving Persia's armies and navies out of Europe and recovering the Greek cities on the coasts of Asia Minor from its grasp.
This astonishing victory opened a proud era of growth, prosperity, and confidence in Greece. The Athenians, especially, flourished, increasing in population and establishing an empire that brought them wealth and glory. Their young democracy came to maturity, bringing political participation, opportunity, and political power even to the lowest class of citizens, and their novel constitution went on to take root in other Greek cities. It was a time of extraordinary cultural achievement, as well, probably unmatched in originality and richness in all of human history. Dramatic poets like Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes raised tragedy and comedy to a level never surpassed. The architects and sculptors who created the Parthenon and other buildings on the Acropolis in Athens, at Olympia, and all over the Greek world powerfully influenced the course of Western art and still do so today. Natural philosophers like Anaxagoras and Democritus used unaided human reason to seek an understanding of the physical world, and such pioneers of moral and political philosophy as Protagoras and Socrates did the same in the realm of human affairs. Hippocrates and his school made great advances in medical science, and Herodotus invented historiography as we understand it today.
The Peloponnesian War not only brought this remarkable period to an end, but was recognized as a critical turning point even by those who fought it. The great historian Thucydides tells us that he undertook his history as the war began,
in the belief that it would be great and noteworthy above all the wars that had gone before, inferring this from the fact that both powers were then at their best in preparedness for war in every way, and seeing the rest of the Hellenic people taking sides with one side or the other, some at once, others planning to do so. For this was the greatest upheaval that had ever shaken the Hellenes, extending also to some part of the barbarians, one might say even to a very large part of mankind. (1.1.2)1
From the perspective of the fifth-century Greeks the Peloponnesian War was legitimately perceived as a world war, causing enormous destruction of life and property, intensifying factional and class hostility, and dividing the Greek states internally and destabilizing their relationship to one another, which ultimately weakened their capacity to resist conquest from outside. It also reversed the tendency toward the growth of democracy. When Athens was powerful and successful, its democratic constitution had a magnetic effect on other states, but its defeat was decisive in the political development of Greece, sending it in the direction of oligarchy.
The Peloponnesian War was also a conflict of unprecedented brutality, violating even the harsh code that had previously governed Greek warfare and breaking through the thin line that separates civilization from savagery. Anger, frustration, and the desire for vengeance increased as the fighting dragged on, resulting in a progression of atrocities that included maiming and killing captured opponents; throwing them into pits to die of thirst, starvation, and exposure; and hurling them into the sea to drown. Bands of marauders murdered innocent children. Entire cities were destroyed, their men killed, their women and children sold as slaves. On the island of Corcyra, now called Corfu, the victorious faction in a civil war brought on by the larger struggle butchered their fellow citizens for a full week: "Sons were killed by their father, and suppliants dragged from the altar or slain upon it" (3.81.2-5).
As the violence spread it brought a collapse in the habits, institutions, beliefs, and restraints that are the foundations of civilized life. The meanings of words changed to suit the bellicosity: "Reckless audacity came to be considered the courage of a loyal ally; prudent hesitation, specious cowardice; moderation was held to be a cloak for unmanliness." Religion lost its restraining power, "but the use of fair phrases to arrive at guilty ends was in high reputation." Truth and honor disappeared, "and society became divided into camps in which no man trusted his fellow" (3.82.1, 8; 3.83.1). Such was the conflict that inspired Thucydides' mordant observations on the character of war as "a savage schoolmaster that brings the characters of most people down to the level of their current circumstances" (3.82.2).
Although the Peloponnesian War ended more than twenty-four hundred years ago it has continued to fascinate readers of every subsequent age. Writers have used it to illuminate the First World War, most frequently to help explain its causes, but its greatest influence as an analytical tool may have come during the Cold War, which dominated the second half of the twentieth century, and which likewise witnessed a world divided into two great power blocs, each under a powerful leader. Generals, diplomats, statesmen, and scholars alike have compared the conditions that led to the Greek war with the rivalry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
But the story of what actually took place two and a half millennia in the past, and its deeper meaning, are ultimately not easy to grasp. By far the most important source of our knowledge is the history written by the war's contemporary and participant Thucydides. His work is justly admired as a masterpiece of historical writing and hailed for its wisdom about the nature of war, international relations, and mass psychology. It has also come to be regarded as a foundation stone of historical method and political philosophy. It is not, however, completely satisfactory as a chronicle of the war and all that the war can teach us. Its most obvious shortcoming is that it is incomplete, stopping in midsentence seven years before the war's end. For an account of the final part of the conflict we must rely on writers of much less talent and with little or no direct knowledge of events. At the very least, a modern treatment of accessible scope is needed to make sense of the conclusion of the war.
But even the period treated by Thucydides requires illumination if the modern reader is to have the fullest understanding of its military, political, and social complexities. The works of other ancient writers and contemporary inscriptions discovered and studied in the last two centuries have filled gaps and have sometimes raised questions about the story as Thucydides tells it. Finally, any satisfactory history of the war also demands a critical look at Thucydides himself. His was an extraordinary and original mind, and more than any other historian in antiquity he placed the highest value on accuracy and objectivity. We must not forget, however, that he was also a human being with human emotions and foibles. In the original Greek his style is often very compressed and difficult to understand, so that any translation is by necessity an interpretation. The very fact that he was a participant in the events, moreover, influenced his judgments in ways that must be prudently evaluated. Simply accepting his interpretations uncritically would be as limiting as accepting without question Winston Churchill's histories and his understanding of the two world wars in which he played so important a role.
In this book I attempt a new history of the Peloponnesian War designed to meet the needs of readers in the twenty-first century. It is based on the scholarship employed in my four volumes on the war aimed chiefly at a scholarly audience,2 but my goal here is a readable narrative in a single volume to be read by the general reader for pleasure and to gain the wisdom that so many have sought in studying this war. I have avoided making comparisons between events in it and those in later history, although many leap to mind, in the hope that an uninterrupted account will better allow readers to draw their own conclusions.
I undertake this project after so many years because I believe, more than ever, that the story of the Peloponnesian War is a powerful tale that may be read as an extraordinary human tragedy, recounting the rise and fall of a great empire, the clash between two very different societies and ways of life, the interplay of intelligence and chance in human affairs, and the role of brilliantly gifted individuals, as well as masses of people in determining the course of events while subject to the limitations imposed upon them by nature, by fortune, and by one another. I hope to demonstrate, also, that a study of the Peloponnesian War is a source of wisdom about the behavior of human beings under the enormous pressures imposed by war, plague, and civil strife, and about the potentialities of leadership and the limits within which it must inevitably operate.
1Adapted from the translation of Richard Crawley (Modern Library, New York, 1951). Throughout, references are to Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War unless otherwise indicated. The numbers refer to the traditional divisions by book, chapter, and section.
2These have been published by the Cornell University Press. Their titles are The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (1969), The Archidamian War (1974), The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition (1981), and The Fall of the Athenian Empire (1987).
Table of Contents
CONTENTS
Introduction xxiii
Part One
THE ROAD TO WAR 1
chapter one: The Great Rivalry (479-439*) 3
sparta and its alliance 3
athens and its empire 7
athens against sparta 13
the thirty years' peace 18
threats to peace: thurii 20
the samian rebellion 22
chapter two: "A Quarrel in a Far-away Country" (436-433) 25
epidamnus 25
corinth 28
chapter three: Enter Athens (433-432) 30
the battle of sybota 34
potidaea 36
the megarian decree 39
chapter four: The Decisions for War (432) 41
sparta chooses war 41
the athenian decision for war 47
*All dates are b.c.
Part Two
PERICLES' WAR 55
chapter five: War Aims and Resources (432-431) 57
sparta 57
athens 60
chapter six: The Theban Attack on Plataea (431) 64
the spartan invasion of attica 66
attacks on pericles 68
the athenian response 70
pericles' funeral oration 73
the war's first year: an accounting 74
chapter seven: The Plague (430-429) 76
epidaurus 76
the plague in athens 78
pericles under fire 79
peace negotiations 80
pericles condemned 83
the spartans go to sea 84
potidaea recaptured 85
chapter eight: Pericles' Last Days (429) 87
sparta attacks plataea 87
spartan action in the northwest 90
enter phormio 91
the spartans attack piraeus 96
the death of pericles 97
chapter nine: Rebellion in the Empire (428-427) 99
the "new politicians" in athens 99
conspiracy on lesbos 100
athens reacts 101
mytilene appeals to the peloponnesians 102
the siege of mytilene 104
sparta acts on land and sea 105
the fate of mytilene 107
the mytilene debate: cleon versus diodotus 109
chapter ten: Terror and Adventure (427) 113
the fate of plataea 113
civil war at corcyra 114
first athenian expedition to sicily 118
Part Three
NEW STRATEGIES 123
chapter eleven: Demosthenes and the New Strategy (426) 125
the spartans in central greece 125
athenian initiatives 128
demosthenes' aetolian campaign 129
the spartans attack the northwest 132
chapter twelve: Pylos and Sphacteria (425) 137
athens' western commitments 137
demosthenes' plan: the fort at pylos 138
the spartans on sphacteria 140
the athenian naval victory 142
sparta's peace offer 144
cleon against nicias 147
the spartan surrender on sphacteria 150
chapter thirteen: Athens on the Offensive:
Megara and Delium (424) 157
cythera and thyrea 157
disappointment in sicily 159
the assault on megara 162
athens' boeotian invasion 165
delium 167
chapter fourteen: Brasidas' Thracian Campaign (424-423) 171
the capture of amphipolis 173
thucydides at amphipolis 176
truce 178
nicias' expedition to thrace 180
chapter fifteen: The Coming of Peace (422-421) 182
cleon in command 182
the battle of amphipolis 185
the death of brasidas and cleon 187
the coming of peace 187
the peace of nicias 191
Part Four
THE FALSE PEACE 195
chapter sixteen: The Peace Unravels (421-420) 197
a troubled peace 197
the spartan-athenian alliance 198
the argive league 200
sparta's problems 203
the corinthians' mysterious policy 206
the boeotians 207
chapter seventeen: The Alliance of Athens and Argos (420-418) 210
the athenian breach with sparta 210
spartan humiliations 215
alcibiades in the peloponnesus 217
the spartans against argos 218
confrontation in the argive plain 221
chapter eighteen: The Battle of Mantinea (418) 228
agis' march to tegea 228
to force a battle 230
the allied army moves 234
the battle 235
politics intervene 239
the meaning of mantinea 241
chapter nineteen: After Mantinea: Politics and Policy at Sparta and Athens (418-416) 244
democracy restored to argos 244
politics at athens 245
ostracism of hyperbolus 245
the athenian conquest of melos 247
nicias against alcibiades 249
Part Five
THE DISASTER IN SICILY 251
chapter twenty: The Decision (416-415) 253
athens' sicilian connections 253
the debate in athens 254
the debate to reconsider 256
chapter twenty-one: The Home Front and the First Campaigns (415) 262
sacrilege 262
witch hunt 264
athenian strategy 267
the summer campaign of 415 270
the flight of alcibiades 273
chapter twenty-two: The First Attack on Syracuse (415) 275
the athenians at syracuse 275
syracusan resistance 279
alcibiades at sparta 280
chapter twenty-three: The Siege of Syracuse (414) 284
the illness of nicias and the death of lamachus 286
athens breaks the treaty 289
help arrives at syracuse 289
nicias moves to plemmyrium 291
nicias' letter to athens 293
the athenian response 295
chapter twenty-four: The Besiegers Besieged (414-413) 298
sparta takes the offensive 298
the fort at decelea 299
reinforcements for both sides 300
the capture of plemmyrium 301
the battle in the great harbor 303
the second athenian armada: demosthenes' plan 306
the night attack on epipolae 307
retreat or remain? 308
eclipse 310
chapter twenty-five: Defeat and Destruction (413) 313
the final naval battle 313
the final retreat 316
the fate of the athenians 319
a judgment on nicias 321
Part Six
REVOLUTIONS IN THE EMPIRE AND IN ATHENS 325
chapter twenty-six: After the Disaster (413-412) 327
the probouloi 328
spartan ambitions 330
agis in command 333
persian initiatives 333
the spartans choose chios 335
alcibiades intervenes 337
tissaphernes' draft treaty 339
chapter twenty-seven: War in the Aegean (412-411) 341
athens fights back 341
decision at miletus 344
alcibiades joins the persians 346
a new spartan agreement with persia 349
a new spartan strategy 351
rebellion at rhodes 354
the importance of euboea 356
a new treaty with persia 357
the spartans in the hellespont 358
chapter twenty-eight: The Revolutionary Movement (411) 361
the aristocratic tradition 362
democracy and the war 364
thrasybulus and the moderates 365
the real oligarchs 367
phrynichus against alcibiades 368
chapter twenty-nine: The Coup (411) 371
peisander's mission to athens 371
the oligarchs' breach with alcibiades 373
divisions among the plotters 375
the democracy overthrown 376
the oligarchic leaders 379
chapter thirty: The Four Hundred in Power (411) 381
the democracy at samos 384
pharnabazus and the hellespont 387
alcibiades recalled 388
chapter thirty-one: The Five Thousand (411) 392
dissent within the four hundred 392
the oligarchic plot to betray athens 393
the threat to euboea 396
the fall of the four hundred 398
the constitution of the five thousand 398
the five thousand in action 400
chapter thirty-two: War in the Hellespont (411-410) 402
the phantom phoenician fleet 402
the battle of cynossema 403
the battle of abydos 408
the battle of cyzicus 410
Part Seven
THE FALL OF ATHENS 415
chapter thirty-three: The Restoration (410-409) 417
sparta's peace offer 417
democracy restored 420
the war resumed 424
chapter thirty-four: The Return of Alcibiades (409-408) 427
athens attempts to clear the straits 427
athenian negotiations with persia 431
alcibiades returns 432
chapter thirty-five: Cyrus, Lysander, and the Fall of Alcibiades (408-406) 437
prince cyrus replaces tissaphernes 437
the emergence of lysander 438
the collaboration of cyrus and lysander 441
the battle of notium 442
the fall of alcibiades 446
chapter thirty-six: Arginusae (406) 448
the new navarch 448
conon trapped at mytilene 451
athens rebuilds a navy 452
the battle of arginusae 454
rescue and recovery 459
the trial of the generals 461
chapter thirty-seven: The Fall of Athens (405-404) 467
another spartan peace offer 467
the return of lysander 469
the battle of aegospotami 471
the results of the battle 476
the fate of athens 478
theramenes negotiates a peace 480
Conclusion 485
Sources for the History of the Peloponnesian War 491
Index 495
What People are Saying About This
"The best account [of the Peloponnesian War] now available." —Los Angeles Times Book Review
"A fresh, clear and fast-moving account... for general readers." —The New York Times Book Review
"Drawing on incomparable knowledge as a classicist, international relations theorist and military historian, Donald Kagan... has devoted a single volume to guiding us through that epic of miscalculation, hubris and strategic overreach, supplying supplemental observations and correctives to Thucydides’ classic History of the Peloponnesian War." —The Washington Post