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| ISBN-13: | 9780226231815 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | University of Chicago Press |
| Publication date: | 12/10/2014 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 192 |
| File size: | 511 KB |
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The Political Philosophy of Hobbes
Its Basis and Its Genesis
By Leo Strauss, Elsa M. Sinclair
The University of Chicago Press
Copyright © 1936 The Clarendon PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-226-77696-5
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
HOBBES'S political philosophy is the first peculiarly modern attempt to give a coherent and exhaustive answer to the question of man's right life, which is at the same time the question of the right order of society. There is perhaps no element of Hobbes's teaching which cannot be traced back to one or other of his predecessors; and it may be that one or other of them was in some respects less bound by tradition than was Hobbes. But such elements as had emerged separately before his time find their specifically modern unity only in Hobbes; and none of Hobbes's forerunners attempted that definite break with tradition in its entirety which the modern answer to the question of man's right life implies. Hobbes was the first who felt the necessity of seeking, and succeeded in finding, a nuova scienza of man and State. On this new doctrine all later moral and political thought is expressly or tacitly based. To indicate its political importance one might stress the fact that the ideal of civilization in its modern form, the ideal both of the bourgeois-capitalist development and of the socialist movement, was founded and expounded by Hobbes with a depth, clarity, and sincerity never rivalled before or since. To give an indication of its philosophical bearing one might point out that the moral philosophy, not merely of eighteenth-century rationalism, but also of Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel, would not have been possible without Hobbes's work. But above all, as a fundamental answer to the question of man's right life, Hobbes's political philosophy is of supreme importance not only for political philosophy as such, i.e. for one branch of knowledge among others, but for modern philosophy altogether, if the discussion and elucidation of the ideal of life is indeed the primary and decisive task of philosophy.
It is almost universally admitted that Hobbes marks an epoch in the history of natural law and of the theory of the State. That the importance of his achievement is far greater, that it is truly universal, is usually not even considered. This lack of recognition is partly due—paradoxical as it may sound —to the influence of Hobbes himself. According to his own statements, his achievement in political philosophy was made possible by the application of a new method, the method by which Galileo raised physics to the rank of a science. In conformity with this method, which is called the 'resolutive-compositive', the given political facts (the disputable justice or injustice of any particular action, or the current conception of justice in general, or the State itself, which as the primary condition of justice is the political fact par excellence) are analysed, reduced to their elements (the 'individual wills'), and then, converso itinere, starting from those elements, the necessity and possibility of a 'collective will' is developed evidentissimâ connexione, by a completely lucid deduction, and what was at first an 'irrational' whole is 'rationalised'. It would thus seem that the characteristic contents of Hobbes's political philosophy—the absolute priority of the individual to the State, the conceptions of the individual as asocial, of the relation between the state of nature and the State as an absolute antithesis, and finally of the State itself as Leviathan—is determined by and, as it were, implied in the method. As this method, however, was applied only subsequently, only in imitation of Galileo's founding of the new physics, Hobbes's achievement, from this point of view, however great it may be, is nevertheless of the second order—secondary in comparison with the founding of modern science by Galileo and Descartes.
The universal importance of Hobbes's political philosophy cannot but remain unrecognized so long as, in accordance with Hobbes's own statements, the method is considered to be the decisive feature of his politics. Now it is obvious that the method is not its only and even not its most important characteristic. Precisely on the assumptions of the 'resolutive-compositive' method—and by no means on the assumptions of Aristotle's 'genetic' method—the question of the aim and quality of the individual will, of man's will in the state of nature, becomes decisive for the concrete development of the idea of the State. And the answer to this decisive question is not unequivocally traced out in advance by the method. As Rousseau's polemic against Hobbes sufficiently proves, there remains the antithesis between the assertions that man is by nature good (more accurately, innocent) and that he is by nature evil (rapacious). Hobbes's adoption of the latter view, without which his political philosophy would lose all its character, must therefore have an origin other than the method, and as a result his political philosophy must have a more immediate and concrete origin than the method. Where is this origin—the origin not of the method, of the form, but of the material of Hobbes's political philosophy—to be sought?
To this question research has up to the present given two different answers. The obvious answer, forced upon us by the structure of Hobbes's political philosophy itself, is that Hobbes draws the concrete definition of the aim and quality of the individual will from the mechanistic psychology which precedes political philosophy in his system. This psychology provides as data on the negative side the denial of freedom of will, on the positive the assertion that man is under all conditions determined by his sense-impressions and by his automatic reactions to those impressions (his desires and passions) rather than by reason. Now it is not difficult to see that this psychology is by no means the necessary assumption for Hobbes's political philosophy. Hobbes's characteristic theories—the denial that 'altruism' is natural, the theses of man's rapacious nature, of the war of every one against every one as the natural condition of mankind, of the essential impotence of reason—can also be maintained on the indeterminist assumptions. In addition, this 'pessimistic' view of human nature is marked in Hobbes before he had or could have the least conception of a mechanistic psychology. These and kindred considerations led W. Dilthey to seek the origin of the material of Hobbes's political philosophy, not in modern scientific psychology but in tradition. According to Dilthey, modern science decided only 'the form which anthropology now took on (sc. for Hobbes among others), while as far as material was concerned it had its basis in the descriptions, classifications, and explanations of the previous age'. Dilthey then traced this material back to sources in classical antiquity. He attached particular importance to the proof that for the fundamental part of his political philosophy, the theory of the passions, Hobbes is greatly indebted to the Stoa. We cannot here discuss in detail Dilthey's analysis of the sources. One point must, however, be raised. Dilthey takes his bearings from the theory of the passions in De homine, which is, indeed, influenced by the Stoa. He makes no mention of the theory of the passions as developed in the Elements of Law, a theory which betrays no Stoic influence at all, and which in addition is worked out in much greater detail than the corresponding passage in De homine. As a matter of principle, it must be remarked that Dilthey never investigated whether the traditional theories which recur in Hobbes's writings are really integral elements of his political philosophy or whether they are not rather mere residues of a tradition which Hobbes had in the main rejected, but from which he could not always free himself and never completely cast off. Dilthey never asked himself this question because he did not take Hobbes's express and systematic opposition to the whole tradition—including the Stoa and Epicureanism—seriously enough. Had he compared the material of Hobbes's political philosophy with the material of traditional political philosophy—the investigation of sources which he began is the basis, but only the basis of such a comparison—he would have seen that the traditional theses and concepts take on an entirely untraditional meaning in Hobbes's work. To keep to the example already quoted—the Stoic conception of passion must be basically modified when it is taken over by a philosopher who systematically denies the possibility of beatitudo, and for whom the contrary of passion is no longer a state of repose.
If Hobbes's importance is to be duly recognized and understood, the necessary condition is thus that the fundamental difference between the 'material' of Hobbes's political philosophy, i.e. the characteristic moral attitude which determines Hobbes's way of thinking, on the one hand, and the classical as well as the Christian attitude on the other, should be grasped. The moral attitude which underlies Hobbes's political philosophy is independent of the foundation of modern science, and at least in that sense 'prescientific'. It is at the same time specifically modern. One is inclined to say that it is the deepest stratum of the modern mind. It found its fullest and sincerest expression in Hobbes's political philosophy. For, from the very beginning, it has been covered over by classical and Christian tradition, but, generally speaking, more completely before Hobbes than after him, and after him particularly by mechanistic psychology, to which Hobbes himself opened the door, and finally by sociology. Hobbes, however, philosophized in the fertile moment when the classical and theological tradition was already shaken, and a tradition of modern science not yet formed and established. At this time he and he only posed the fundamental question of man's right life and of the right ordering of society. This moment was decisive for the whole age to come; in it the foundation was laid, on which the modern development of political philosophy is wholly based, and it is the point from which every attempt at a thorough understanding of modern thought must start. This foundation has never again been visible as it was then. The structure which Hobbes, led by the inspiration of that moment, began to raise, hid the foundation as long as the structure stood, i.e. as long as its stability was believed in.
CHAPTER 2THE MORAL BASIS
POLITICAL philosophy, as that branch of knowledge which consists of moral philosophy on the one hand, and politics in the narrower sense on the other, was treated systematically and exhaustively by Hobbes three times: in the Elements of Law (1640), in the second and third parts of the Elementa philosophiae (Section II, De homine, 1658; Section III, De cive, 1642), and in the Leviathan (1651). In all three presentations this political philosophy is based in method and material on natural science. The method is Galileo's 'resolutive-compositive' method. The material is borrowed from the mechanistic explanation of the passions and previously of sense-perception. It is therefore understandable that almost every one who has written about Hobbes has interpreted his political philosophy as dependent on natural science, for either material or method or for both. This interpretation, which at a first glance seems to be merely the recognition of an obvious fact, proves on closer examination to be extremely questionable.
The attempt to work out political philosophy as a part or annexe of natural science by means of scientific method is constantly questioned in Hobbes's work, because he was aware of the fundamental differences between the two disciplines in material and method. On this awareness is based his conviction that political philosophy is essentially independent of natural science. He was therefore able to write and publish De cive, the third part of his system, many years before the two systematically earlier parts. In justification of the premature publication of this book, he expressly says in the preface '... factum est ut quae ordine ultima (pars) esset, tempore tamen prior prodierit; praesertim cum earn principiis propriis experientiâ cognitis innixam, praecedentibus indigere non viderem'. Political philosophy is independent of natural science because its principles are not borrowed from natural science, are not, indeed, borrowed from any science, but are provided by experience, by the experience which every one has of himself, or, to put it more accurately, are discovered by the efforts of self-knowledge and the self-examination of every one. As a result, evidence in political philosophy is of quite a different kind from evidence in natural science. On the one hand, it is much easier to understand: its subject and its concepts are not so remote from the average man as are the subject and concepts of mathematics which form the basis of natural science. On the other hand, 'the politiques are the harder study of the two'; by reason of their passions, men obscure the, in itself, clear and simple knowledge of the norms which political philosophy builds up. Moreover, man with his passions and his self-seeking is the particular subject of political philosophy, and man opposes by every kind of hypocrisy the self-knowledge on which the proof of these norms rests.
According to Hobbes, political philosophy is not only independent of natural science, but it is a main component of human knowledge, of which the other main component is natural science. The whole body of knowledge is divided into natural science on the one hand, and political philosophy on the other. Every classification of knowledge is based on a classification of the existent. Hobbes's classification of the sciences is based on a classification of existing things into natural and artificial. But this classification does not fully correspond to his intention, for most things which are produced by art, in particular all machines, are the subject of natural science. It is not so much the artificially produced things that are basically different from all natural things as the production, the human activity itself, i.e. man as an essentially productive being, especially as the being who by his art produces from his own nature the citizen or the State, who, by working on himself, makes himself into a citizen. In so far as man works on himself, influencing and changing his nature, so that he becomes a citizen, a part of that artificial being called the State, he is not a natural being: 'Homo ... non modo corpus naturale est, sed etiam civitatis, id est (ut ita loquar) corporis politici pars.' 'Manners of men' are something different from 'natural causes'. The basic classification of existing things which in truth underlies Hobbes's classification of the sciences is classification under nature on the one side, and under man as productive and active being on the other.
The question whether Hobbes understood political philosophy as a part or annexe of natural science or as a fully independent branch of knowledge, in other words, whether his political philosophy is intended to be naturalistic or anthropological, thus bears not only on the method but above all on the matter. The significance of the antithesis between naturalistic and anthropological political philosophy for the matter becomes fully apparent if one grasps that this antithesis is only the abstract form of a concrete antithesis in the interpretation of and judgement on human nature which extends throughout the whole of Hobbes's work. Hobbes eliminated the latter contradiction as little as the former.
Hobbes summed up his theory of human nature as it underlies his political philosophy in 'two most certain postulates of human nature'. The first postulate is that of 'natural appetite', 'qua quisque rerum communium usum postulat sibi proprium'. As a result of the scientific explanation, this appetite is taken as having its roots in man's sensuousness, in his animal nature. Man is an animal like all other animals, as a percipient being constantly exposed to manifold impressions which automatically call forth desires and aversions, so that his life, like that of all other animals, is constant movement. There is, however, one important difference: the specific difference between man and all other animals is reason. Thus man is much less at the mercy of momentary sense-impressions, he can envisage the future much better than can animals; for this very reason he is not like animals hungry only with the hunger of the moment, but also with future hunger, and thus he is the most predatory, the most cunning, the strongest, and most dangerous animal. Human appetite is thus not in itself different from animal appetite, but only by the fact that in the case of man appetite has reason at its service. This view of human appetite, which at first sight seems to be the specifically Hobbian view, is, however, contradicted in Hobbes's writings by his repeated and emphatic statement that human appetite is infinite in itself and not as a result of the infinite number of external impressions. But if this is the case, then human appetite is essentially distinguished from animal appetite in that the latter is nothing but reaction to external impressions, and, therefore, the animal desires only finite objects as such, while man spontaneously desires infinitely. There can be no doubt that only this latter view of human appetite corresponds to the intention of Hobbes's political philosophy.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Political Philosophy of Hobbes by Leo Strauss, Elsa M. Sinclair. Copyright © 1936 The Clarendon Press. Excerpted by permission of The University of Chicago Press.
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Table of Contents
I: IntroductionII: The Moral Basis
III: Aristotelianism
IV: Aristocratic Virtue
V: The State and Religion
VI: History
VII: The New Morality
VIII: The New Political Science
Index