The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma
176
The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma
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Overview
Events in Russia since the late 1980s have created a rare opportunity to watch the birth of democratic institutions close at hand. Here Steven Smith and Thomas Remington provide the first intensive, theoretically grounded examination of the early development of the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian Federation's parliament created by the 1993 constitution. They offer an integrated account of the choices made by the newly elected members of the Duma in establishing basic operating arrangements: an agenda-setting governing body, a standing committee system, an electoral law, and a party system. Not only do these decisions promise to have lasting consequences for the post-communist Russian regime, but they also enable the authors to test assumptions about politicians' goals from the standpoint of institutional theory.
Smith and Remington challenge in particular the notion, derived from American contexts, that politicians pursue a single, overarching goal in the creation of institutions. They argue that politicians have multiple political goals--career, policy, and partisan--that drive their choices. Among Duma members, the authors detect many cross currents of interests, generated by the mixed electoral system, which combines both single-member districts and proportional representation, and by sharp policy divisions and an emerging party system. Elected officials may shift from concentrating on one goal to emphasizing another, but political contexts can help determine their behavior. This book brings a fresh perspective to numerous theories by incorporating first-hand accounts of major institutional choices and placing developments in their actual context.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781400823949 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 11/20/2000 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 176 |
| File size: | 3 MB |
About the Author
Steven S. Smith is a McKnight University Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Law at the University of Minnesota. He is the author of The American Congress and Call to Order: Floor Politics in the House and Senate. He has coauthored Committees in Congress, Managing Uncertainty in the House of Representatives, and Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States Senate.
Thomas F. Remington is Claus M. Halle Distinguished Professor for Global Learning at Emory University. His books include Politics in Russia, Parliaments in Transition, The Truth of Authority: Ideology and Communication in the Soviet Union, and Building Socialism in Bolshevik Russia.
Read an Excerpt
The Politics Of Institutional Choice
The Formation Of The Russian State Duma
By Steven S. Smith, Thomas F. Remington
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 2001 Princeton University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-4008-2394-9
CHAPTER 1
CHOOSING LEGISLATIVE INSTITUTIONS IN RUSSIA
The tumultuous developments in Russia since the late 1980s have offered a rare opportunity to observe the creation of new legislative institutions — not just once but through a sequence of changes in the Soviet Union to the creation of the Federal Assembly and its two houses. To be sure, Russia is not the only place where democratization is under way, but developments in Russia are well documented by press accounts, official documents, and scholarly studies. We exploit this opportunity to explain the emergence of key features of the new legislative process in the Russian Federation. In doing so, we test and qualify competing positive theories of legislative institutions. Specifically we examine the fit of electoral, policy, and partisan accounts of legislative behavior and institutions to the choice of an electoral system, a leadership structure, a committee system, and floor behavior in the State Duma. The choice of institutional arrangements within the Duma illustrates the contingent nature of rational action by Russian politicians, the importance of sequence in the emergence of institutional options and the relevance of politicians' goals, and the distinct contributions of several goals to the explanation of legislators' behavior. While we are sympathetic to the bias for parsimony reflected in current positive theories of legislative institutions, we are critical of approaches that attribute a single dominant goal to political actors. We demonstrate that over a very short period of time, Russian parliamentarians crafted a new legislature that did not represent a single logic but instead reflected their multiple political goals.
The challenge is to provide an explanation of institutional choices made in a context in which it is easy to demonstrate that electoral, policy, and partisan interests may be at work. In fact, as we move from feature to feature of the new Duma, potential electoral, policy, and partisan bases for the choices made are readily identified. We argue that the certainty of the relationship between a goal and the institutional choice varies widely but systematically. Plausible connections between, say, electoral interests and the formation of a parliamentary party system are complicated by the existence of other factors that interact with the party system to produce outcomes with implications for electoral interests. These factors are often unknown and their effects not understood. In other situations, however, the relationship between personal political interest and institutional choice is readily comprehended. When politicians can directly relate their personal political interests to proposed institutional features, and can do so with little uncertainty, these direct interests will trump other interests that are less directly and less predictably related to their goals. Politicians simplify choices, we posit, taking account of the relative clarity and relevance of alternatives to their goals. The core features of the Russian Duma, we show, are the product of the members' many separate choices, with each choice structured by the goal or goals most directly and clearly affected by it.
In this chapter we review the recent history of Russian legislative institutions, first outlining the theoretical problems involved in explanations of institutional change and then narrowing our focus to a specific set of events and the competing explanations for them. In chapters 2–6 we develop and test propositions representing different explanations for the behavior of Russian parliamentarians. In chapter 7 we return to the lessons that can be drawn about theories of institutional choice from the early stages of democratization in Russia.
Russian Parliamentary Institutions, 1989–1999
In 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev inaugurated competitive elections to the USSR's hierarchy of soviets. Under the Gorbachev reforms the process culminated in elections to a reformed Union-level parliamentary body, the Congress of People's Deputies. Although their fairness and competitiveness varied across the USSR, the elections produced a set of reformminded deputies who formed, for the first time in Soviet history, an independent political caucus in the national legislature. Under Gorbachev's plan the Congress elected a much smaller full-time working parliament, called the Supreme Soviet, which was assigned responsibility for deliberating on proposals for new legislation required by Gorbachev's political and economic reform program. Many of the newly elected USSR deputies took their duties seriously, some also helping to form political coalitions in the reformed parliaments elected in the national republics of the USSR in 1990. In the Russian Republic, which also adopted a two-tiered legislative structure consisting of a Congress of People's Deputies and a Supreme Soviet, a substantial body of reformminded deputies was elected in the Russia-wide elections of deputies held in March 1990. Many of these reformers, joined often by moderate bureaucratic nationalists eager to acquire greater power over Soviet assets on Russian Republic territory, fought the Union government for greater republican autonomy. Through 1990 and 1991 the Union-level and Russian-level parliaments fought over jurisdictional rights and policy direction for the country.
Gorbachev's parliamentary institutions allowed him to control parliamentary decisions. But Gorbachev needed to gain even greater power to overcome resistance to his policies in the Communist Party, the vast Soviet bureaucracy, and many republican governments, so he demanded that the parliament amend the constitution to create a presidency and that it elect him to fill the post. Gorbachev's effort to gain greater control over Union institutions provoked Boris Yeltsin and his supporters to create a parallel set of institutional arrangements in the Russian Republic that would give them the means to check the power of the central government over the republic. Gorbachev's parliamentary and presidential reforms therefore failed to contain the "war of laws" that undermined the Soviet state, and indeed tended to exacerbate it.
Gorbachev's hopes to revitalize Union-level institutions came to an end following the August 1991 coup attempt, when a group of hardliners in the Union government tried to seize control and restore central power. Although the coup collapsed within days, Gorbachev's power as USSR president declined rapidly after this, while Yeltsin's political star rose. Yeltsin, who had been elected chairman of the Russian parliament in June 1990 and subsequently president of Russia in June 1991, rallied deputies in the Russian Congress and Supreme Soviet in resistance to the coup leaders. In turn, Yeltsin demanded that the Russian Congress grant him emergency powers to enact radical reforms on Russian territory. This the Congress did at the end of October 1991.
Yeltsin's success was temporary. The Russian Congress refused to grant his demands for a new constitution that would grant him, the president, greater control over the government. Negotiations over the constitution were complicated by sharp differences regarding the balance of power between the central government in Moscow and the powers of the constituent units of the Russian Federation, themselves differing in constitutional status between privileged ethnic republics and ordinary administrative territories. These cross-cutting divisions, which would prove to be lasting, produced an impasse over a new constitution, with Yeltsin and Congress refusing to accept each other's constitutional proposals. The conflict between Yeltsin and Congress intensified as the effects of Egor Gaidar's economic stabilization program, initiated in January 1992, began to be felt.
The impasse was resolved in September 1993, when Yeltsin issued decrees dissolving the Congress and Supreme Soviet and declaring that elections were to be held in December to a new parliament that did not, constitutionally speaking, yet exist. He also ordered a referendum on a draft constitution that would establish the new institutions. The constitutional draft was similar to one hammered out by a large and broadly representative constitutional assembly, convened by Yeltsin in the summer of 1993 as a forum bypassing the Congress's own constitutional commission. The version of the constitution drafted by the assembly gave Yeltsin much but not all the power he demanded.
Yeltsin's decrees dissolving parliament met determined resistance from a portion of the deputies. Some blockaded themselves inside the parliament building — the White House — and refused to recognize Yeltsin's decrees as legally binding. The chairman of the parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov, once an ally of Yeltsin but later a bitter rival, led the resistance. Following a ten-day standoff a body of paramilitary forces, loosely allied with the parliamentary opposition, stormed the barricades and joined the opposition camp inside the White House. With the help of supporters on the streets, they attempted to overthrow the Yeltsin regime. But the White House was shelled by Yeltsin's forces, killing some inside, and the resistance leaders were arrested.
Thus the December 1993 vote for deputies to the new Federal Assembly and the vote on the proposed constitution were conducted in the shadow of the events of October 1993. Nonetheless the constitution was approved by a majority of those voting, and most major political forces agreed to abide by its provisions. The constitution provided for a strong presidency, but with elements of a parliamentary system as well. The president named the head of government, but parliament's confirmation of the appointment was required. Similarly parliament could deny the government its confidence, forcing the president to choose between naming a new government or calling new parliamentary elections. Parliament could initiate impeachment proceedings. The president lacked the power to call a referendum. However, the president had the constitutional authority to make policy in the form of decrees without seeking parliamentary approval, so long as these did not contradict either federal law or the constitution. It was a constitutional scheme with a decidedly presidential tilt, but by no means so one-sided as many observers believed.
The new Federal Assembly, created by the 1993 Constitution, is bicameral. Earlier parliamentary models — the Supreme Soviet structures in the past — had been nominally bicameral, but the high centralization of control over parliamentary agenda and voting exercised through the Presidium vitiated any meaningful separation of voting patterns in the two chambers. The Federal Assembly, however, provided for two chambers with different numbers of seats, different means of election, and without a common leadership or executive committee. The lower or popular chamber, the State Duma, consisted of 450 seats. Half of these were filled in territorial single-member district races by plurality vote. The other 225 were filled by proportional representation from candidates elected on party lists, subject to the requirement that to receive any seats a party must win at least 5 percent of the party-list vote. There is no compensatory seat rule; each set of 225 seats is filled independently.
The upper house is named the Federation Council. It is composed of two representatives from each of Russia's eighty-nine territorial constituents, called the "subjects of the federation," regardless of population or territorial status. The transitional provisions governing the 1994–95 parliament required that the members of the Federation Council be elected in at-large, two-winner races in each subject of the federation. However, a 1995 law provided that in the future the Federation Council would be comprised of the heads of the executive and legislative branches of each territorial unit. The terms of office for members of the Federation Council were therefore determined by their terms as elected officials in their home regions.
The Russian constitutional system adopted in 1993 is a hybrid in several respects. As in other semipresidential systems, it combines presidential with parliamentary forms of executive power. Shugart and Carey (1992) would treat the Russian case as a "president-parliamentary" system, which they consider inherently prone to stalemate and breakdown because the government must answer to both the president and the parliament. It is also a mixed system in its electoral law. Both the electoral system decreed into place by President Yeltsin in 1993 and the new law passed by the Duma in 1995 (see chapter 5 below) employed a mixed plurality-proportional method of electing deputies to the State Duma. Finally, the new constitution mixes unitary and federal elements. The leaders of the regions are automatically given seats in the upper house of parliament, yet the constitution fails to define any reserved sphere of rights for subcentral jurisdictions. Russia's case offers us an almost unparalleled laboratory setting, therefore, for testing the effects of institutional variation on the choice of new representative structures, since political and social context can be held constant in order to assess the impact of institutionally determined influences on actors' strategic choices.
Explaining Institutions
Explaining the evolution of institutions is a central problem of the social sciences. Institutions are sets of rules that guide behavior. They provide guidance by informing individuals and groups of the likely consequences of their behavior. Institutions lend order to interactions between individuals and groups, and interact with other institutions. They generate patterns in behavior by creating incentives of varying strength.
Institutional change is as complex as social life itself. Institutions are nested within other institutions. At times institutions change thoroughly and quickly, at other times incrementally, almost imperceptibly. And the layers of institutions can change at different times and rates. In the case of a legislative body, the institution is located within a larger institutional setting, a single chamber is located within a bicameral legislature, and a legislative party or committee is located within a chamber of that legislature. Change affecting that legislature may come in many degrees and sequences. A presidential system might be radically changed into a parliamentary system, a committee system might be reformed wholesale, or the rules and practices of individual committees might be changed in a piecemeal fashion.
To make matters more complex, institutions are grounded in both formal and informal rules. Most political institutions combine formal and informal rules to give some order to decision-making processes. For a legislature, constitutions and statutes, as well as chamber, committee, and party rules, combine with accepted practices to lend predictability to decision making. Informal rules are adapted to formal ones; formal rules emerge where informal ones are judged inadequate; and recognized precedents, sometimes recorded, serve to fill the gap between discretionary informal practices and more rigid formal rules. Processes described as steps outlined in formal rules may miss critical informal features that create biases. In a similar way, a mere description of informal norms probably will not capture features of important formal rules, which easily fade out of immediate view if they go unquestioned by the actors.
These complexities of institutions make a comprehensive theory about the choice of institutions an unrealistic objective but should not discourage the development of theory on more narrowly defined features of a set of institutional arrangements. That is our approach. Because the constitution was imposed in short order and before the convening of the new parliament, we consider the constitution as exogenous to the choices of parliamentary institutions that followed in 1994. We also limit our attention to four important features of the new Russian Duma — the electoral system by which its members are elected, the organization of a system of parliamentary parties, the new Council of the Duma through which the Duma sets its agenda, and the relationship between standing committees and parties. By nearly any measure, these are among the Duma's most important institutional features.
The four sets of institutional choices have several important characteristics. First, all four features were determined by members of the Duma at readily identified times and places. In two of the cases, the outcome represented clear discontinuous change; in the other cases, the party and committee systems, the Duma largely continued an inherited practice with important modifications. In all four cases, the members of the Duma ultimately voted to retain, modify, or reject inherited practices. Consequently an explanation of choices about these institutional features must place emphasis on the members themselves. We can more safely build a theory on the foundation of individual choices of legislators than we could for many other forms of institutional change.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Politics Of Institutional Choice by Steven S. Smith, Thomas F. Remington. Copyright © 2001 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
List of Illustrations viList of Tables vii
Preface ix
List of Abbreviations xi
ONE: Choosing legislative Institutions in Russia 3
TWO: Forming a Parliamentary Party System 27
THREE: Creating the Council of the Duma 54
FOUR: Setting a Framework for Party-Committee Relations 72
FIVE: Choosing an Electoral System 93
SIX: Party Discipline in the Russian Duma 116
SEVEN: Institutional Choice 137
Appendix on Data and Methods 161
References 169
Index 177
What People are Saying About This
"Smith and Remington use the case of the Russian Duma to address questions at the cutting edge of legislative research in political science. As many leading scholars have noted, we are only beginning to understand how institutions are chosen. These authors tell a convincing story about the key factors influencing institutional choices in the Russian context. In particular, their study provides new insights into the relative importance of electoral, policy, and partisan incentives on legislators' choices. Their findings regarding the ubiquitous impact of electoral rules and competition on legislators' behavior (most importantly their choice of institutional arrangements) represent a major contribution to political science."
Smith and Remington use the case of the Russian Duma to address questions at the cutting edge of legislative research in political science. As many leading scholars have noted, we are only beginning to understand how institutions are chosen. These authors tell a convincing story about the key factors influencing institutional choices in the Russian context. In particular, their study provides new insights into the relative importance of electoral, policy, and partisan incentives on legislators' choices. Their findings regarding the ubiquitous impact of electoral rules and competition on legislators' behavior (most importantly their choice of institutional arrangements) represent a major contribution to political science.
— Josephine T. Andrews, University of California, Davis
"Smith and Remington use the case of the Russian Duma to address questions at the cutting edge of legislative research in political science. As many leading scholars have noted, we are only beginning to understand how institutions are chosen. These authors tell a convincing story about the key factors influencing institutional choices in the Russian context. In particular, their study provides new insights into the relative importance of electoral, policy, and partisan incentives on legislators' choices. Their findings regarding the ubiquitous impact of electoral rules and competition on legislators' behavior (most importantly their choice of institutional arrangements) represent a major contribution to political science."—Josephine T. Andrews, University of California, Davis"Making sense of institutional choice, in any context, is an important task. Extending our knowledge about a major new democracy makes Smith and Remington's book especially worthwhile to read. The authors draw a number of reasonable hypotheses from the literature on institutional choice and put together a remarkable data set on the Russian Duma and its members. Combining votes on bills together with surveys of Duma candidates and members is an extraordinary achievement. The authors have crafted a valuable story about institutional and political evolution in Russia."—Mathew D. McCubbins, University of California, San Diego
"Making sense of institutional choice, in any context, is an important task. Extending our knowledge about a major new democracy makes Smith and Remington's book especially worthwhile to read. The authors draw a number of reasonable hypotheses from the literature on institutional choice and put together a remarkable data set on the Russian Duma and its members. Combining votes on bills together with surveys of Duma candidates and members is an extraordinary achievement. The authors have crafted a valuable story about institutional and political evolution in Russia."
Making sense of institutional choice, in any context, is an important task. Extending our knowledge about a major new democracy makes Smith and Remington's book especially worthwhile to read. The authors draw a number of reasonable hypotheses from the literature on institutional choice and put together a remarkable data set on the Russian Duma and its members. Combining votes on bills together with surveys of Duma candidates and members is an extraordinary achievement. The authors have crafted a valuable story about institutional and political evolution in Russia.
— Mathew D. McCubbins, University of California, San Diego