The Red and the Green: The Rise and Fall of Collectivized Agriculture in Marxist Regimes

The Red and the Green: The Rise and Fall of Collectivized Agriculture in Marxist Regimes

by Frederic L. Pryor
The Red and the Green: The Rise and Fall of Collectivized Agriculture in Marxist Regimes

The Red and the Green: The Rise and Fall of Collectivized Agriculture in Marxist Regimes

by Frederic L. Pryor

Hardcover

$255.00 
  • SHIP THIS ITEM
    Qualifies for Free Shipping
  • PICK UP IN STORE
    Check Availability at Nearby Stores

Related collections and offers


Overview

Reorganizing the agricultural sector into large-scale state and collective farms was the most radical transformation of economic institutions implemented by Marxist governments. Frederic Pryor provides perspective on this unique experiment by comparing in a systematic and original fashion the changes in the organization of agriculture in all of the world's Marxist nations. This approach allows not only a clearer understanding of the major lines of agricultural policy and organization in these nations but also a keener insight into the reasons underlying the variations among them. What have been the doctrinal elements that have led to collectivization? Why has the process of collectivization been so different in various nations? How have the farms been organized, both internally and within the larger economy? How has the performance of agriculture differed between the various Marxist nations and comparable capitalist nations? And what are the difficulties in reversing collectivization and moving back toward private agriculture? In answering these questions, The Red and the Green draws on a vast number of primary and secondary sources from many nations, as well as from extensive interviews with farmers, agricultural officials, and specialists in more than a dozen Marxist nations. Among books dealing with problems of communist economy, this study is unrivaled in its broad scope, combined with careful institutional and statistical analysis.

Originally published in 1992.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780691632001
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Publication date: 04/19/2016
Series: Princeton Legacy Library , #205
Pages: 566
Product dimensions: 6.30(w) x 9.10(h) x 1.70(d)

Read an Excerpt

The Red and the Green

The Rise and Fall of Collectivized Agriculture in Marxist Regimes


By Frederic L. Pryor

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 1992 Frederic L. Pryor
All rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-04299-2



CHAPTER 1

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS AND THEMES


The reorganization of agricultural production units into large-scale state and collective farms has been the most radical change of economic institutions implemented by Marxist governments. In contrast to the nationalization of industry and the replacement of the market by central planning and administration, this institutional change has transformed not only ownership and the way in which production units have functioned, but also the way in which laborers have gone about their work and have related to each other. The forced collectivization of agriculture has also been a searing historical experience in Marxist regimes, during which tens of millions died from starvation and mistreatment, while countless others suffered greatly as a result of the coercion.

History has not unfolded as nineteenth-century Marxists expected. Socialist revolutions arising from domestic political forces have not occurred first in industrialized nations, but rather, for the most part, in predominantly agricultural countries with relatively low levels of economic development. Furthermore, despite commonplace notions about "peasant conservatism" and the difficulty in reorganizing and reforming agricultural production, Marxist regimes have paid particular attention to transforming the institutions of the rural sector, even while agriculture was the largest sector in the economy and when such changes were most difficult to implement. Furthermore, this institutional change occurred in many countries without extensive agricultural mechanization or high levels of rural education and where administration of large-scale agriculture was probably neither cost effective nor necessary. In Marxist terminology, the relations of production were probably too advanced in comparison to the forces of production. Finally, although Marx emphasized the relatively similar paths of development of industry and agriculture and laid great moral stress on the value of all types of physical labor, most of these Marxist governments have organized the two sectors in dissimilar ways and have treated urban and rural workers quite differently, often to the disadvantage of the latter.

Contemporary Marxists, particularly those influenced by the ideas of Stalin, have ready explanations for each of these apparent deviations from classical Marxist doctrines. But in analyzing such issues, Marxists of any stripe have greater difficulty in answering a more basic question: What is the best way for a government professing to follow the ideas of Marx and Lenin to organize agriculture so as to enhance the economic development of an entire nation? Although Marxist-Leninist doctrines about the organization of agriculture may leave much to be desired, discussion in the West about the optimal organization of agriculture is certainly not much more advanced. Enormous attention has been focused on "saving the family farm," but many more organizational issues need to be discussed. Indeed, relatively little data are available to study many critical problems—for example, the horizontal linkages between farms or vertical linkages between farms and either upstream or downstream enterprises in the chain of production. In contrast to the analysis of the organization of industry, no formal academic field studying the organization of agriculture exists; no scholarly journals devoted to the topic fill the shelves of libraries; and no standard analytic methods are available to resolve disputes on policy questions.

First and foremost, this is a study about the organization of Marxist economies, both in theory and practice. I have chosen agriculture because it allows a series of analytic issues to be examined in an easier fashion than other sectors would allow. This book is an examination of ideas and their influence, and how, given the heterogeneity of agriculture, these ideas can be stretched to their furthest limits. But this is also an empirical investigation of the origins, organization, and development of agriculture in thirty-three identified Marxist regimes shown on the maps here. In order to provide some perspective, I also investigate certain aspects of the organization of agriculture in market economies, both to test various Marxist propositions about the development of agriculture and to illuminate the differences and similarities of agricultural organization in various economic systems.

Finally, this book is an attempt to synthesize a vast and straggly scholarly literature in both East and West on a number of theoretical and empirical issues about agricultural organization. In order to keep the discussion manageable, many issues cannot be discussed in depth and the reader is referred to the appropriate references for further analysis. I must also leave to others the task of carrying out detailed case studies to advance our knowledge of agriculture in individual countries. Nevertheless, I hope that the analytical framework and the comparative perspective provided herein enriches the case-study approach by allowing a separation of key causal factors. For instance, which aspects of agricultural organization and policy can be attributed to Marxist-Leninist doctrines? Or to the type of agriculture practiced in various countries? Or to the particular historical circumstances of the different nations? Or to the decisions arising from the unique political mechanisms of particular nations? I also try to show why, despite the deficiencies in performance of collectivized agriculture, it is highly doubtful that state and collective farms will disappear quickly, even in some nations where Marxist parties have been voted out of power.

But first it is necessary to delimit the topic, especially by defining two crucial terms, socialist agriculture and Marxist regimes, so that the subject matter and the sample can be specified. Then I briefly summarize the role of agriculture in the sample countries in order to provide an overview of the economic context within which agriculture is organized. Finally, I indicate briefly the major questions investigated and the path along which they are approached.


Socialist Agriculture

For purposes of this study I define socialist agriculture in terms of institutions of production rather than particular types of governmental intervention. Collectivization is the process including nationalization or expropriation of private farms and the creation of large-scale cooperative and state farms. For most of recorded history, governments have interceded in the agricultural sector in order to reinforce or suppress market forces and channels of distribution, to encourage production, or to influence rural incomes. For this reason governmental intervention per se provides little indication about the economic system of agriculture. The definition of socialist agriculture as represented by institutions of production gives rise, however, to a number of complications.


General Considerations

Marx and Engels told us little about institutions of agricultural production functioning in socialist economies. They made only scattered comments from which emerges a murky picture of what agriculture would be like when full communism arrives. They foresaw an economy of high productivity and disciplined workers, but with no markets or money, so that exchange of products between urban and rural areas would, in some manner, be "direct." Such an arrangement would be facilitated by the fact that the ideas and outlooks of those living in the two areas would be similar.

Up to now, Kampuchea between 1975 and 1978 has been the only Marxist nation to attempt to realize such a communist agricultural system. The Pol Pot regime expropriated all land, formed relatively large-scale, self-sufficient production units, and effectively eliminated both trade and money. Party or government cadre—often soldiers in their teens—directed the labor force, providing workers with agricultural inputs received from the central government, and distributing food rations, housing, and clothing according to norms unrelated to an individual's work. Food was also communally consumed. The farms, in turn, supplied the central government with deliveries of particular goods. The scholarly community has focused little attention on this unique attempt to realize Marx's vision, in part because the mass murders accompanying this Kampuchean transformation have been more important to study, and in part because high productivity, a crucial aspect of full communism, was not achieved in this nation.

More usual production institutions of socialist agriculture are state farms, collective farms, and communes, all of which are forms of large-scale agriculture. It is, of course, possible to have a socialized urban sector without a socialist agricultural sector, a situation arising in Poland and Yugoslavia from the mid-1950s to the present, as well as in a number of Marxist African nations. It is also possible to conceive of a socialist agricultural sector that produces a plantation crop exhibiting economies of scale, combined with a predominantly private urban sector that provides complementary products and services. This latter system does not appear to be stable in the long run and is not exemplified in any of the nations of the sample. Socialist agricultural institutions are usually accompanied by certain other features that are neither necessary nor sufficient for the system to function, for instance, rules against firing workers on state farms or removing members from collective farms.

It is important to emphasize that communal agricultural systems found in some developing nations, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, have little in common with socialist agriculture. In the former systems, the community can place restrictions on what a farmer can do with the land, on the date when certain agricultural activities can begin or end, and even on the farming techniques that are employed. In some cases land is also distributed by traditional political leaders, but nevertheless, families farm the land individually and individual wealth is not merged. Of course, cooperative work efforts occur and may be of considerable significance, but they are both informal and voluntary; these arrangements include trading labor or participating in work gangs that spend a certain amount of time on the farms of each member (Pryor 1977). In contrast to the beliefs of African political leaders such as Julius Nyerere of Tanzania or Leopold Senghor of Senegal, experience in Africa has shown that communal agriculture has little in common with collectivized farming and, indeed, these systems do not lead easily to socialist agriculture.


State Farms

A state farm is simply a factory-in-the-field that is owned by the government. In most cases the government or a government board appoints a director, who hires workers and manages the farm in the same manner as the hired manager of a capitalist plantation. Although the workers may receive bonuses based on production, their primary source of income is a wage, and the government thus absorbs most risks of production.

Some cases are, however, hard to classify. For instance, in Yugoslavia the public sector has certain residual rights in the nonprivate farms (for example, the members cannot sell the assets and pocket the receipts), so that these enterprises might be considered state farms. Nevertheless, these "socially owned" farms operate essentially as producer cooperatives and are run by worker councils, which set the basic policy guidelines and hire the farm managers. Thus these farms combine features of both systems. In other East European nations, as I will indicate, the difference between state and collective farms has eroded.

State farms can be formal production units ultimately administered by a central authority such as a ministry of agriculture. Other types of state farms, sometimes called "institutional farms," include those farms attached to state-owned industrial plants such as the podkhozi in the USSR, farms operated by special development agencies (for instance, in Seychelles), farms operated by the army, local governments, primary schools, or universities (for example, experimental stations) or farms operated by the Marxist party (for instance, in the Congo). In most of the countries these institutional farms hold only a small percentage of the land in the state farm sector; a notable exception is Bénin, however, where they constitute 95 percent of the state farm sector. In other countries, these institutional farms, although relatively small in total area, increased in importance. Most notably, during the 1980s the government of the Soviet Union encouraged factories to administer farms in order to supply food for factory canteens. As Hedlund has emphasized (1989), these attempts to increase total farm output often divert specialized managerial resources in industry from where they can best be employed.

According to Stalinist dogma, the state farm is a "higher form of socialism" than the collective farm, and until the late 1980s some Marxist regimes such as Albania, Mongolia, Romania, and the USSR were slowly converting their collective farms to state farms. By no means is this dogma universally accepted: during the mid- and late-1980s Nicaragua converted a number of its original state farms into cooperatives (or even divided them up into private farms). The government of Seychelles has also announced its intention to transform its state farms into cooperatives once the state farms are operating on a profitable basis; this does not, however, seem likely to occur in the near future.

State farms are, of course, not unique to socialism, and they also exist in almost all capitalist nations, serving either as experimental farms or in some cases a source of revenue when they are leased out to private farmers. These farms represent either remnants of the original "crown land," or of past land reforms, or of deliberate attempts by the government to set up a limited number of government farms. Indeed, some instances can also be cited in which nominally capitalist nations such as Malawi have more extensive and more successful state farm systems than nominally Marxist regimes such as Madagascar (Pryor 1990c).


Collective Farms

I use the term collective farm to designate a farm where production is carried out jointly (a group of people work together under a single management) and where the net receipts or income of the farm (receipts after taxes have been paid and agricultural inputs have been purchased) are divided among the members according to a formula that takes into partial account the amount of work the members contributed to the common effort. The government contract with the farm usually has two parts: a fixed rent (that is, compulsory deliveries of certain crops at a specified price) and an agreement to buy all produce above this limit, usually at a higher price. The collective farm members bear all risks of production shortfalls. In some cases the government has modified this residual-income principle by providing a floor income for members of the cooperative; in these cases the farms receive a government subsidy or loan if net receipts are not sufficient to cover expenses and payments to members. In some countries (e.g., Cuba, Hungary, and Bulgaria until 1959) these farms paid rent to the farmers who brought land into the collective; in other countries no compensation was paid. In some countries the land belonged to the collective as a whole; in other countries, to the government (a matter discussed in greater detail in chapter 3); and in still other countries (e.g., most of the nations of East Europe) to the people who brought the land into the collective, or their heirs. In some countries (e.g., Yugoslavia and, to a lesser degree, Bulgaria and Cuba in the late 1980s) the farms had certain elements of self-management with elected representatives on the administrative council of the farm; in other countries, the farm was administered in a highly centralized fashion.


(Continues...)

Excerpted from The Red and the Green by Frederic L. Pryor. Copyright © 1992 Frederic L. Pryor. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
All rights reserved. No part of this excerpt may be reproduced or reprinted without permission in writing from the publisher.
Excerpts are provided by Dial-A-Book Inc. solely for the personal use of visitors to this web site.

Table of Contents

  • FrontMatter, pg. i
  • CONTENTS, pg. vii
  • List of Maps, Tables, and Diagrams, pg. ix
  • Acknowledgments, pg. xi
  • Abbreviations, pg. xiii
  • Chapter 1. An Overview of the Major Problems and Themes, pg. 3
  • Chapter 2. The Marxist Theory of Agricultural Development and Collectivization, pg. 33
  • Chapter 3. Agrarian Reforms, pg. 65
  • Chapter 4. The Establishment of State and Collective Farms, pg. 97
  • Chapter 5. Horizontal and Vertical Integration of Agriculture, pg. 135
  • Chapter 6. The Internal Organization of the Farms, pg. 163
  • Chapter 7. Selected Agricultural Policies, pg. 195
  • Chapter 8. Agricultural Performance, pg. 232
  • Chapter 9. When Is Collectivization Reversible?, pg. 265
  • Chapter 10. Reforms of Agriculture: Sectoral Issues, pg. 296
  • Chapter 11. Some Broad Issues of Agricultural Reform, pg. 335
  • RESEARCH NOTES, pg. 361
  • STATISTICAL NOTES, pg. 447
  • Bibliography, pg. 489
  • Name Index, pg. 531
  • Country and Subject Index, pg. 539



From the B&N Reads Blog

Customer Reviews