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Originally published in 1985.
The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780691611723 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Princeton University Press |
| Publication date: | 07/14/2014 |
| Series: | Princeton Legacy Library , #42 |
| Pages: | 292 |
| Product dimensions: | 7.00(w) x 10.00(h) x (d) |
Read an Excerpt
The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy
By Michael Fleet
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
Copyright © 1985 Princeton University PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-691-07684-3
CHAPTER 1
UNDERSTANDING CHILEAN POLITICS
Recent studies of Chilean politics offer the reader a plethora of perspectives, sympathies, and assessments with which to analyze the breakdown of democratic politics. Some Marxist analysts (Altamirano 1977; Boorstein 1977; Castells 1974; Stallings 1978) stress structural processes, conflicting class interests, and the "bourgeois" character of forces opposing the ill-fated Allende government. Institutional and ideological considerations are either ignored or treated as matters of tactical calculation or manipulation. In contrast, pluralist and anti-Popular Unity analysts (Alexander 1978; Arriagada 1974; and Sigmund 1977) confine themselves to partisan maneuvering, institutional and policy conflicts, and largely ideological representations of reality. They blame the "totalitarian" designs of the left for upsetting the consensus on which Chilean politics rested prior to 1970.
Analysts falling between these poles (Garcés 1976; Garretón and Moulián 1979; Roxborough 1976 and 1979; Valenzuela 1978) offer a mixture of class and nonclass considerations, and I share many of their views and judgments. While they are correct in holding both sides responsible for the tragic turn of events, however, their eclecticism prevents them from clearly characterizing the experience or fully elucidating its implications.
With this thought in mind, I offer a modified class analytical perspective from which to look at Chilean Christian Democracy. My foundational assumption is that political phenomena are best understood in terms of class. Social experiences, relations, and understandings are all conditioned by class status and interests, and political events themselves are most meaningfully described in terms of the struggle for class hegemony. While the single most important determinant of social and political life, however, "class" is itself affected by contingent cultural, ideological, and political factors. These are part of the setting in which labor is performed and are thus constitutive features of one's objective class status. They also provide the terms, organizational dynamics, and institutional context in which that status is acquired and can facilitate or stifle the subjective process by which class is understood and acted on. The entire process is contingent, not determined. Human will and consciousness are free and decisive historical phenomena, not the predetermined externalizations of irresistible material forces.
This perspective differs from leading pluralist and Marxist analyses. For pluralists, power is variously rooted in economic, ideological, institutional, and other sources and is dispersed among forces that contain and dilute one another. No one aspect or combination of these forces, it is claimed, enjoys enduring control over the social or political process. In recent years pluralists have helped other social analysts to see the potentially cross-cutting impact of nonclass forces, the contestability of the state, and the largely contingent character of the struggle for it. In opposition I would argue 1) that power can but need not be widely dispersed or evenly balanced; 2) that power rooted in the production process is ultimately more decisive than that stemming from other sources; and 3) that economic and noneconomic power sources may reenforce one another, producing concentrations of power not always visible at the institutional political level.
Among Marxists, views as to how class should be related to and weighed against other experiences and relationships vary considerably. Following Marx's death, and with the rise of Bolshevism and Stalinism, economic and productive relations were viewed as determining all superstructural phenomena. Later, however, others (Korsch, Lukacs, Gramsci, and the Frankfurt theorists) began to argue that cultural and political factors might both reflect and affect class interests and consciousness. Although it has made fewer inroads among the leaders of ruling and nonruling Marxist parties, this "dialectical" perspective has been embraced by virtually all contemporary Marxist theorists.
The dialectics have been variously understood, however. For Marxist "structuralists," for example, the "mode of production" (a combination of forces and relations of production) is rooted in roles that are essentially material in nature. Nonetheless, it generates economic, ideological, and political "instances" (expressions) that serve to strengthen and preserve the prevailing relations of domination. These instances are relatively autonomous, i.e., in keeping with their own particular laws and dynamics. In this way ideology and politics are included as elements of the productive process and class struggle and yet seen as "determined" by them. As "instances" they (alone) are real and concrete but cannot be understood except as rooted in and linked together by underlying structures, i.e., the dominant mode of production. Class ties and relations are thus "objective" material features of that mode of production and its division of labor. They are independent of the wills and understandings of the people occupying them, informing those wills and understandings but in no sense depending on them.
"Cultural" or "political" Marxists, on the other hand, see political and cultural factors as constitutive, not epiphenomenal, and as contingent, not determined, aspects of the productive process. In their view productive relations are defined by both material and social factors. At any given moment, property laws, labor codes, corporate statutes, and the balance of political and class forces will condition, if not alter, strictly material relations of production and thereby help to define productive relations generally (Brenner 1976, 52). But they are also features of historical conjunctures in which subjective consciousness and contingent political dynamics have played decisive roles. They are not simply passive or secondary "specifications" of some underlying process but rather constitutive and determining factors within it.
The perspective from which I have approached the Chilean Christian Democrats draws from these cultural or political Marxists. I too view class status as both an objective and a subjective condition. Roles and claims vis-à-vis the productive process are initially and essentially material, i.e., based on the power to extract surplus labor, separate workers from the means of production, and subject them to a disciplined and rationalized labor process (Meiksins Wood 1983, 259). While these material relations imply certain social experiences, concrete interests, and historical potential, however, they can be compounded, mitigated, cut across, and even redefined by other, nonmaterial relations such as labor codes, property laws, the balance of political forces, cultural and political relations among workers, and other contingent phenomena. One's relationship to the means of production thus constitutes the material dimension of a productive role that is also defined nonmaterially; and although this broader class "situation" carries a potential for consciousness and development, its tapping and fulfillment require the mediation of nonmaterial and largely contingent forces and processes (Roxborough 1979, 71).
Political forces thus condition one's class situation and what is made of it. Similarly, classes exist as operative social forces to the extent that they become conscious of themselves as a class and undertake action against their antagonists. Class consciousness thus entails a new understanding of one's interests, allies, and enemies and is the product of a process in which competing cultural, ideological, and political influences have played a part. These influences, in turn, are reflections and constitutive elements of the productive process and the structures through which its social significance is mediated.
This conception of class obliges one to take a closer look at a society's political institutions and relationships, ideological tendencies, and cultural traditions. By political institutions I refer to governmental institutions, the size and strength of social and class forces, property laws and labor relations codes, the appeal of dominant political personalities, and time-honored political practices and behavioral patterns. Each of these factors helps to define productive relations and the process by which class consciousness and forces arise. In effect, a class's sense of itself and its mission depends in part on the institutional structures and organizational options available to it. Although pushed and pulled by materially rooted experiences, sentiments, and energies, political institutions and dynamics are the channels into which these various forces flow and take form.
In turn, institutions and dynamics are affected by both structural and contingent forces and processes. Politics involves efforts to create, sustain, and channel support for positions and courses of action with which not all are initially in agreement. Such efforts are invariably uncertain as to outcome. Particular forces may be more or less likely to respond given their class situations, their material circumstances, and other factors, but the end result is never "predetermined." Conscious human agents assess their circumstances in light of their relations and expectations and these, in turn, in light of their circumstances. Such dynamics cannot be predetermined on either an individual or social level. People with similar class situations embrace different visions, priorities, and strategic perspectives with respect to their interests; those with quite different class situations and interests (e.g., independent as opposed to industrial blue collar workers) are even more likely to do so.
Relations between class situations and political forces are thus problematic. They are all the more so in social formations in which several modes of production coexist, or where the capitalist labor process is not fully extended. In such cases forces in similar class "situations" are less likely to identify or act as a single class. They are rather inclined to think and act in terms of political ties and concerns and are likely to view multiclass political parties as more useful in the promotion or defense of their interests than strictly class formations.
In identifying with a particular party, classes and class fractions enter into coalitions in which they play dominant, allied, and/or supporting roles (Poulantzas 1973, 229-252). Classes and class fractions that divide along ideological lines often remain subordinate partners in the blocs and parties of which they are a part. The political dynamics and power relationships in such cases are complex and difficult to identify, much less predict in advance.
At another level the state itself becomes a "contestable" object of class struggle, although its individual branches or agencies may be controlled by particular classes or class fractions. The nature and functions of the state have been hotly debated by Marxists in recent years. So-called "instrumentalists" view it as an instrument of ruling-class domination, one controlled by ruling-class elites or those sharing their inclinations (Miliband 1969, 146). Structuralists, on the other hand, see no need for direct or overt class control, emphasizing rather the imperatives of the structures in which the state is "embedded." These imply systemic constraints and functions that the political apparatus must respect and/or perform, whatever the preferences of its personnel or political constituency. In fact, Poulantzas (1973, 190) specifically provides for the state's carrying out of policies contrary to the short-term interests of the dominant class(es) but compatible with its (their) political interests and continued hegemony.
Both views are deterministic. Instrumentalists assume that a ruling class actually controls the state, which cannot but reflect and serve its concerns and interests. Structuralists consider the state to be passive and in unavoidable conformity with underlying systemic urges or mandates. Neither regards institutional or contextual details as significant.
My sense of the state is of something that is at once an object, a product, and a determinant of class struggle. In each respect it is affected by contingent cultural, ideological, and political factors. Its institutional characteristics are the product of previous struggles and an important factor in those currently taking place. All states are subject to systemic pressures, and in any given instance these may coincide with the interests of sectors of capital that are not in control of any of its branches or agencies. They are the beneficiaries of a system whose maintenance and/ or expansion is in their interest, even though they may not be politically responsible for it. The state, in other words, may be "capitalist" even though government personnel may not be, and may not wish it to be either.
The divisions existing between the fractions and individual interests within capital provide a government with room for maneuver and initiative. These include divisions of ideological orientation, material interest, political strategy, and/or personality. Class fractions may or may not overcome their rivalries and conflicts to form a single class: contingent factors affecting levels of consciousness, organizational cohesion, and popular support will play decisive roles. Unless they do overcome these problems, however, capital interests may have to endure governments they cannot control and whose policies are detrimental to them. Similarly, governments themselves possess varying degrees of cohesion, administrative effectiveness, and broad public support. Those enjoying more of each are clearly better able to resist or endure the pressure of such interests and thus carry their efforts through to a successful conclusion.
Culture and ideology affect both the politics and class structure of a society. They are closely related phenomena. An ideology is that set of perspectives and judgments which define a person's social relationships and political options. Ideally, at least, it consists of explicit and systematically structured normative values, analytical judgments, and strategic orientations. However, such highly developed ideologies are normally confined to a movement's leaders or intellectual elite, whose education and political experience exceed those of their followers. Few of the latter are moved by such refined considerations. They are drawn instead by vague representations or distortions thereof, by slogans, symbols, and arguments that are supportive of their immediate concerns and/or interests. However crudely, such ideologies provide adherents with a political identity. They dispose them to embrace certain goals and to ally with or support certain forces while challenging or opposing others. They offer them a way of assessing social reality and choosing from among competing political options.
In these ways ideology is essential to the full tapping of class potential. Whether those sharing a common class situation see themselves as comrades or rivals in struggle, as having or not having a common historical project, depends on their ideological perspective. In this sense class is a product of ideological consciousness. But at the same time class also contributes to this consciousness, prompting it and setting the limits within which it operates. Ideological currents are not abstract or ahistorical phenomena. They are more likely to emerge and take hold at certain stages and in certain contexts than others. They are most likely to appear when and where there are interests at stake of the sort for which they can provide legitimation and support.
Ideologies are thus rooted in particular social contexts. They lend meaning, direction, and support to groups struggling for survival and advantage within these contexts. A given mode of production and set of social conditions can thus offer fertile ground, a constituency, and an accommodating environment for certain ideologies. In the case of revolutionary socialism, class potential is a function of the extent to which industrialization and the capitalist labor process have developed. Industrial workers must be brought together in large numbers and subjected to labor discipline if they are to perceive their class interests and potential class power. In addition, changes in the productive and distributive processes affecting labor relations, wage levels, profits, employment opportunities, etc., may further clarify the interests at stake, the nature of their conflict, and the means necessary for resolving such conflicts.
Not all ideologies are simply "instruments" of contending classes, however. Among those competing for hegemony at any moment will be forces attempting to advance the interests of particular classes or class fractions while seeking to obscure or discredit those of antagonistic groups. But they will be joined by independent and/or less immediately involved forces (multiclass parties, the Church, etc.) seeking to reconcile the interests of diverse classes and sectors. These groups can be "used" by one of the dominant or contending classes but can also force them to adjust their strategic objectives and alliances.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy by Michael Fleet. Copyright © 1985 Princeton University Press. Excerpted by permission of PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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Table of Contents
- FrontMatter, pg. i
- CONTENTS, pg. vii
- LIST OF TABLES, pg. ix
- LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, pg. xi
- PREFACE, pg. xiii
- INTRODUCTION, pg. 1
- 1. Understanding Chilean Politics, pg. 11
- 2. Christian Democracy Prior to 1964, pg. 43
- 3. In Power, pg. 80
- 4. Under Allende, pg. 128
- 5. Under the Junta, pg. 176
- 6. Christian Democracy in Comparative Context, pg. 211
- APPENDIX, pg. 247
- SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY, pg. 250
- INDEX, pg. 267