The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory

by Elisabeth A. Lloyd

Overview

Traditionally a scientific theory is viewed as based on universal laws of nature that serve as axioms for logical deduction. In analyzing the logical structure of evolutionary biology, Elisabeth Lloyd argues that the semantic account is more appropriate and powerful. This book will be of interest to biologists and philosophers alike.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780691223834
Publisher:	Princeton University Press
Publication date:	01/12/2021
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	250
File size:	647 KB

About the Author

Elisabeth A. Lloyd is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Berkeley. With Evelyn Fox Keller, she is the coeditor of Keywords in Evolutionary Biology (Harvard).

Table of Contents

Introduction: Other Descriptions of the Structure of Evolutionary Theory

The Semantic Approach and Evolutionary Theory

The Structure of Population Genetics

Structured Populations: Group, Kin and Organismic Selection Models

The Units of Selection

Species Selection

Genic Selection

Confirmation of Evolutionary Models

Editorial Reviews

Reviews recent debates concerning the existence or non-existence of evolutionary "laws" and the possibility of axiomizing evolutionary theory. Describes a wide variety of evolutionary subtheories and presents a view of confirmation appropriate to a model-oriented conception of theories. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Booknews

"An exemplar of philosophy of science at its best. . . . [The author] supports a particular interpretation of scientific theories, the semantic or model-theoretic interpretation, by showing how it clarifies the structure of evolutionary theory. The differences between the traditional axiomatic interpretation and the semantic view of theories are now apparent. General arguments for and against these interpretations are also familiar. The focus of attention is beginning to turn, as it should, to detailed applications of these competing interpretations. Do they facilitate or frustrate our understanding of actual scientific theories? The object of Lloyd's book is to show how many long-standing tangles in evolutionary biology can be set right on her account."—-David L. Hull, The Philosophical Review

From the Publisher

"An important contribution to the burgeoning field of the philosophy of Darwinism.... Lloyd's discussion of species selection is the best available on this topic."

The Quarterly Review of Biology

An exemplar of philosophy of science at its best. . . . [The author] supports a particular interpretation of scientific theories, the semantic or model-theoretic interpretation, by showing how it clarifies the structure of evolutionary theory. The differences between the traditional axiomatic interpretation and the semantic view of theories are now apparent. General arguments for and against these interpretations are also familiar. The focus of attention is beginning to turn, as it should, to detailed applications of these competing interpretations. Do they facilitate or frustrate our understanding of actual scientific theories? The object of Lloyd's book is to show how many long-standing tangles in evolutionary biology can be set right on her account.

The Philosophical Review - David L. Hull

An exemplar of philosophy of science at its best. . . . [The author] supports a particular interpretation of scientific theories, the semantic or model-theoretic interpretation, by showing how it clarifies the structure of evolutionary theory. The differences between the traditional axiomatic interpretation and the semantic view of theories are now apparent. General arguments for and against these interpretations are also familiar. The focus of attention is beginning to turn, as it should, to detailed applications of these competing interpretations. Do they facilitate or frustrate our understanding of actual scientific theories? The object of Lloyd's book is to show how many long-standing tangles in evolutionary biology can be set right on her account.
— David L. Hull

The Philosophical Review