The United States and the Struggle for Southeast Asia: 1945-1975

by Alan Levine

Overview

This book puts American policy in Southeast Asia and the traumatic events of the second Indochina War into the larger perspective of the Cold War. Levine's wide-ranging work treats everything from the local appeals of Communist parties in the region and the peculiarities of Vietnamese Communism to the development of the domino theory and its consequences, from helicopter warfare to the antiwar movement. Treating harshly some of the orthodoxies that have developed about Vietnam and scathing in its treatment of the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, it will interest scholars, students, and veterans of the conflict.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780275951245
Publisher:	Bloomsbury Academic
Publication date:	08/15/1995
Pages:	200
Product dimensions:	6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.50(d)

About the Author

ALAN J. LEVINE is an historian specializing in Russian history, international relations, and World War II. He has published numerous articles about World War II and the Cold War and is author of The Soviet Union, The Communist Movement and the World: Prelude to the Cold War (Praeger, 1990), The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945 (Praeger, 1992), The Missile and Space Race (Praeger, 1994), and The Pacific War (Praeger, 1995).

Table of Contents

Southeast Asia and the Cold War
The First Indochina War 1945-1954
The Southeast Asian Revolts of 1948
The Struggle for Indonesia II
The United States and the Beginning of the Second Indochina War 1954-1960
The Kennedy Administration, Vietnam and Laos
Crisis and Massive American Intervention
Buildup and Decision 1965-1968
American Withdrawal
The End of the Second Indochina War

Editorial Reviews

Chronicles US involvement in Southeast Asia, with chapters on the First Indochina War (1945-1954), the revolts of 1948, the Second Indochina War (1954-1960), the Kennedy administration and Vietnam and Laos, intervention and military buildup during the 1960s, and American withdrawal. The author concludes that the Second Indochina War was neither inevitable nor unwinnable, nor was it necessary. Annotation c. Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)

Booknews