Theories of Coalition Formation / Edition 1

Theories of Coalition Formation / Edition 1

ISBN-10:
0898592984
ISBN-13:
9780898592986
Pub. Date:
04/01/1984
Publisher:
Taylor & Francis
ISBN-10:
0898592984
ISBN-13:
9780898592986
Pub. Date:
04/01/1984
Publisher:
Taylor & Francis
Theories of Coalition Formation / Edition 1

Theories of Coalition Formation / Edition 1

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Overview

First published in 1984. In this book, the authors set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coalition forming behavior. These theories address situations of partial conflict of interest with the following aspects: (1) there are three or more players, (2) players may openly communicate with each other, and (3) players form coalitions by freely negotiating agreements on how to disburse the gains that result from the coalition members’ joint coordinated efforts. These models arise from the two disciplines of mathematics, in the theory of cooperative n-person games with side payments, and social psychology, in theories of small group behavior in mixed-motive situations. The goal is to explore the various solution concepts that make up this body of theory, and in particular to examine the psychological premises that underlie the various theoretical models.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780898592986
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Publication date: 04/01/1984
Series: Basic Studies in Human Behavior Series
Pages: 384
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x (d)
Lexile: 1450L (what's this?)

About the Author

James P. Kahan The Rand Corporation, Amnon Rapoport University of North Carolina and the University of Haifa.

Table of Contents

Preface, 1. PROLEGOMENA, 2. THE LANGUAGE OF COOPERATIVE n-PERSON GAMES, 3. TWO CLASSICAL THEORIES: THE CORE AND THE STABLE SET, 4. BARGAINING SETS, 5. POWER BARGAINING SETS, 6. EXCESS THEORIES, 7. THE SHAPLEY VALUE, 8. SIMPLE GAMES (I): INTERPERSONAL CONTROL THEORIES, 9. SIMPLE GAMES (II): EQUITY THEORIES, 10. BARGAINING PROCESS MODELS, 11. PARADIGMS FOR EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 12. EXPERIMENTAL GAMES: 3-PERSON QUOTA GAMES, 13. OTHER EXPERIMENTAL GAMES, 14. CONCLUDING REMARKS, REFERENCES, AUTHOR INDEX, SUBJECT INDEX
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