Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives / Edition 1

Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives / Edition 1

by Elmar Wolfstetter
ISBN-10:
0521645344
ISBN-13:
9780521645348
Pub. Date:
10/28/1999
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
ISBN-10:
0521645344
ISBN-13:
9780521645348
Pub. Date:
10/28/1999
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives / Edition 1

Topics in Microeconomics: Industrial Organization, Auctions, and Incentives / Edition 1

by Elmar Wolfstetter

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Overview

This book in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780521645348
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 10/28/1999
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 392
Product dimensions: 7.44(w) x 9.69(h) x 0.83(d)

Table of Contents

Part I. Imperfect Competition: 1. Monopoly; 2. Regulation of monopoly; 3. Oligopoly and industrial organization; Part II. Risk, Stochastic Dominance and Risk Aversion: 4. Stochastic dominance: theory; 5. Stochastic dominance: applications; 6. Risk aversion; Part III. Incomplete Information and Incentives: 7. Matching: the marriage problem; 8. Auctions; 9. Hidden information and adverse selection; 10. Hidden information and signaling; 11. Hidden action and moral hazard; 12. Rank-order tournaments; Part IV. Technical Supplements: A. Nonlinear optimization: the classical approach; B. Inequality Constrained optimization; C. Convexity and generalizations; D. From expected values to order statistics.
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