Understanding the Volatile and Dangerous Middle East: A Comprehensive Analysis
470
Understanding the Volatile and Dangerous Middle East: A Comprehensive Analysis
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| ISBN-13: | 9781532084119 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | iUniverse, Incorporated |
| Publication date: | 09/26/2019 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 470 |
| File size: | 20 MB |
| Note: | This product may take a few minutes to download. |
About the Author
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Understanding the Volatile and Dangerous Middle East
A comprehensive analysis
By Steven Carol
iUniverse
Copyright © 2015 Steven CarolAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-1-4917-6657-6
CHAPTER 1
CRITICAL GEOGRAPHIC FEATURES
A society without knowledge of geography is like a sailor without a compass and a sextant.
Anonymous
The Middle East, isn't that somewhere near the Midwest?
Anonymous
The region known as the greater Middle East encompasses a strategic section of the world. There is daily news coverage of events in the region, yet, its geographic importance and dimensions are not well known. Even the geographic extent of the area has been debated. Additionally, geographic controversies and disputes affect many of the states in the region.
1. Throughout history, the Middle East has held a place of importance greater than that of any other region of the world.
The Middle East is the cradle of Western civilization. Some of the earliest recorded societies began and grew in the Nile River Valley and in the Tigris–Euphrates River Valley. Many ancient civilizations, including the Akkadians, Sumerians, Phoenicians, Hebrews, Babylonians, and Egyptians had their origins there, and the region is the birthplace of three monotheistic faiths: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. However, as noted Catholic theologian, George P. Weigel, accurately reflected, "To speak of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as the 'three Abrahamic faiths,' the 'three religions of the Book,' or the three monotheisms, obscures rather than illuminates. These familiar tropes ought to be retired."
The Middle East has the immense geographic importance of being the land bridge between three continents — Europe, Asia and Africa. Throughout history, invasion routes have passed through this region. It also contains water routes of enormous geographic, economic, historic, and political importance. Of economic consequence are the vast reserves of petroleum located in the region (see "Major Oilfields of the Persian Gulf" map). The Middle East became a major source of oil beginning with commercial production by Iran (1908). This was followed by Iraq (1930), Saudi Arabia and Kuwait (1938), Bahrain (1940), Algeria (1956), Abu Dhabi (1962), Libya (1962), Oman (1967), Dubai (1969), Sharjah (1972), and Sudan (1999).
2. Many strategic and vital waterways are concentrated in the Middle East.
The Nile River, the Tigris River and Euphrates River, as well as the Shatt al-Arab, the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates that flows into the Persian Gulf, are all in the region. Five of the most important straits in the world are situated in the Middle East including the Dardanelles, Bosporus, Tiran, Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz. Also located in the area is one of the great maritime highways, the Suez Canal. For a better understanding of the importance of these waterways, a closer examination is needed.
The Turkish Straits
The Turkish Straits refer to two narrow straits that link the Black Sea to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean beyond. The Bosporus measures 16 miles long, 1 mile wide, and in some places less than 700 yards wide. The Sea of Marmara is 130 miles long and 40 miles wide. Within that sea, Turkey maintains the prison island of Imrali. The Dardanelles (the Hellespont of antiquity) is 25 miles long, 4.5 miles wide in the south and 2.5 miles wide in the north. The Persians invaded ancient Greece by crossing the Straits. During World War I, the famous Gallipoli campaign occurred on its shores in 1915 (see the Turkish Straits map). The treaty that governs the use of the Straits is:
The Montreux Convention
July 20, 1936
• The treaty restored Turkish sovereignty over the Straits, the Bosporus and Dardanelles, allowing Turkey to remilitarize the zone along the Straits.
• It provided for the free navigation of the Straits by all nations' commercial vessels in peacetime.
• It permitted Turkey to close the Straits to all enemy ships in wartime.
• The pact specified that Turkey be notified eight days in advance (or fifteen days for ships of non-Black Sea nations) of any ship passing through the Straits.
• It required that ships pass through the Straits singly, unsubmerged, and only in the daytime.
• Warships from non-Black Sea nations can only stay in the basin for up to 21 days consecutively.
The Suez Canal
The Suez Canal, a sea-level canal, is one of the world's great man-made waterways. It connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea measuring 101 miles in length. Its northern outlet is at the city of Port Sa'id. Its southern exit is at the city of Suez. Use of the canal shortens shipping times as reflected in the chart below.
The most pivotal event in the history of the Suez Canal occurred when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Suez (Suez Canal Company) on July 26, 1956. It is important to explain who Nasser was, what his goals were, and how that impacted the Suez Canal and the entire Middle East.
* * *
On July 23, 1952, the Free Officers Movement within the Egyptian army staged a bloodless coup that toppled the Egyptian monarchy of King Farouk. The leaders of the coup were Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser. A year later on June 18, 1953, the monarchy was officially abolished and a republic proclaimed. By April 17, 1954, Naguib had been pushed aside and Nasser became Premier of Egypt. His goals were outlined in his book Philosophy of the Revolution. He wanted to promote Arab socialism, i.e. public ownership of industry, and Pan-Arabism, the concept of unifying the Arab world, from the Atlantic to the Arabian Sea, into one nation-state with himself at its head.
Nasser detested the "temporary" British occupation of Egypt that lasted from 1888 to 1954 as well as British colonial rule and influence elsewhere in the Arab world — namely in Sudan, Eritrea, Jordan, Iraq, the Trucial States, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Aden. He vowed to eliminate British influence, build up Egypt as the leader of the Arab world and eliminate Israel, which had militarily defeated Egypt in the 1948–49 war. His foreign policy was based purely on what was good for Egypt and what could further his goals. Nasser saw his influence over the principle sources of foreign aid — the United States and the Soviet Union as follows: speaking as the leader of Egypt he could get "x" results; speaking as the leader of the Arab world he could get "x2" results; speaking as the head of the Islamic world he could get "x3" results, and speaking as leader of the Non-Aligned world he could get "x4" results. Using this strategy, Nasser would free Egypt from British colonialism and influence, nationalize the Suez Canal, gain military power, confront Israel, and put the Non-Aligned countries on the diplomatic world stage.
Nasser from 1954 onwards played off the United States against the Soviet Union for both military equipment requests and for economic assistance, primarily for his major project, the construction of the Aswan High Dan across the Nile River. He began simultaneous negotiations with the two superpowers, openly with the United States and the West and covertly with the Soviet Union. By January 1955, Nasser had made a deal of "cotton for arms" with Czechoslovakia standing in as a surrogate for the Soviet Union. The first arm shipment was in Egypt by July 1955 in time of the July 26 Revolution anniversary parade. Nasser saw the arms deal in political (not military as he later claimed) terms. He needed the arms to survive domestic opposition (mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood, which attempted to assassinate him. The arms deal with the Soviets would break the Western arms monopoly (see Appendix 6) and reduce the Western sphere of influence. Furthermore, it would unfreeze the territorial and political status quo including his desire to push Pan-Arabism, his ongoing rivalry with pro-British Iraq, and his hoped for ultimate confrontation with Israel.
Openly Nasser negotiated with the United States, the United Kingdom and the World Bank for a loan to help finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam. To allay any Western doubts, on September 2, 1954, Nasser publicly proclaimed his support for the West in the Cold War. Thus, on October 19, 1954, the United Kingdom and Egypt concluded a treaty by which the British would remove its armed forces from the Suez Canal Zone within the next twenty months. An additional provision allowed the British to militarily reoccupy the Zone for the next seven years if Turkey or any Arab country were attacked. Egypt could now use the Suez Canal as a bargaining chip to obtain foreign aid for the construction of the Aswan High Dam. With this knowledge in mind, Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser prepared plans for the nationalization of the canal. The last British troops evacuated the Suez Canal Zone on June 12, 1956. There was now no roadblock to an Egyptian nationalization of the canal at any time of Nasser's choosing.
The West however wanted Egypt to be the focal point of a new Western (anti-Soviet) alliance in the Middle East to link the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Nasser, despite the offers of Western aid, refused. The United States and the United Kingdom began to have second thoughts about Nasser's policies and withdrew their aid offer to finance the construction of the Aswan High Dam, on July 19, 1956. That move provided Nasser with the pretext needed to proceed with the nationalization of the canal. As the fates would have it, Egypt's seizure of the canal was obscured by a major maritime crisis, as a collision at sea between the SS Andrea Doria and the MS Stockholm, riveted the attention of much of the world, but did not deter Nasser from moving swiftly to seize the canal (see "Causes of the Sinai-Suez War map).
In a speech on July 26, 1956, delivered at Mansheyya Square, in Alexandria, Nasser listed the humiliations Egypt suffered over 200 years at the hands of the Western powers, primarily the United Kingdom, France and the United States.
The speech was the vehicle for delivering the signal for the canal's takeover. Nasser criticized the political conditions attached to Western aid, declaring Egypt could not be bought with aid. Turning to the matter of Egypt's quest for military equipment, he stated emphatically "I do not know whether they are 'communist arms', or 'non-communist arms.' In Egypt these arms are Egyptian arms." Nasser thus admitted that he had received Soviet-supplied arms. Characterizing the High Dam negotiations as long and bitter, Nasser said the West's terms constituted "imperialism without soldiers. They are punishing Egypt because she refused to side with military blocs." Nasser related that during the negotiations, Mr. Black (head of the World Bank), made him feel as if he was sitting "in front of Ferdinand de Lesseps" the chief engineer in the construction of the canal. The name "Ferdinand de Lesseps" was the secret signal for Egyptian forces to seize the canal. It was repeated fourteen times in the space of 10 minutes! With that signal Egyptian personnel seized the company headquarters at Ismailia on the canal as well as the two other control points of the canal, Port Sa'id at the northern end of the waterway, and Port Tewfik (now Suez Port) at the southern end. Nasser declared that Egypt "shall build the High Dam" with the revenues from the Suez Canal. Egypt also seized the account of the Suez Canal Company in the Ottoman Bank in Cairo, amounting to E£ 5 million. The British government held 44 percent of the shares in the company as did France.
The nationalization of the Suez Canal symbolized the modern Arab world's declaration of independence. Nasser correctly calculated that the British had to intervene immediately, if at all, remarking, "It must appear as a direct reaction. If [British Prime Minister Anthony] Eden delays, the pressure against him will increase." Nasser considered that the peak period of danger for Egypt would be 80 percent at the beginning of August 1956, one week after the nationalization, "decreasing each week through political activities." By the end of September, the danger of British military intervention would be reduced to 20 percent. Since Nasser estimated that the British could not intervene for at least two months, the chance for Egyptian success in keeping the canal was, to say the least, encouraging.
The British and French did intervene militarily, but their intervention only began on October 31, and was stopped before they could achieve their objectives (see "Sinai-Suez War "map). This case was a classic example of an opponent, (the British and French) which possessed the potential to retaliate against a fait accompli(Nasser's seizure of the canal) being unable to do so, since they required an excessive length of time for their military preparations in order to go back to status quo ante. Similar circumstances befell the United States, at the time of the November 1979 seizure of US diplomatic hostages and its embassy in Tehran, Iran.
* * *
From 1948, Egypt, illegally barred Israeli ships and cargoes bound to or from Israel on third party vessels. This was in violation of the Constantinople Convention (see Appendix 1). On October 31, 1952, a cargo of meat from Incode, on the Norwegian vessel MV Rimfrost, proceeding from Massawa to Haifa through the Suez Canal, was confiscated. Under international pressure, the cargo was returned in useless condition three months later.
On two occasions, Egypt's closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli ships and cargo to and from Israel on third party vessels was raised in the United Nations Security Council. On September 1, 1951, there was a lengthy debate in the Security Council on this subject. In the resolution that followed (S/2322), Egyptian interference with navigation to Israel and the maintenance of the blockade were denounced as being "inconsistent with the objective of a peaceful settlement between the parties and the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine set forth in the armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel." Furthermore, the Security Council:
called upon Egypt to terminate the restrictions on the passage of international commercial shipping and goods through the Suez Canal wherever bound and to cease all interference with such shipping beyond that essential to the safety of shipping in the Canal itself and to the observance of the international conventions in force.
The resolution was adopted by a vote of eight in favor, none against, and three abstentions (China, India, and the Soviet Union). Nevertheless, there was no Security Council enforcement of the resolution and Egypt continued its blockade of both the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran (for the latter, see below). The Security Council discussed the matter again in February and March 1954, with special reference to Egyptian interference with shipping proceeding to Eilat. On that occasion the representative of New Zealand, introduced a draft resolution (which was supported also by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Colombia, Turkey and Denmark) which noted "with grave concern" Egyptian noncompliance and called for the implementation of the 1951 resolution adding:
The final paragraph of the draft resolution, Para. 6, refers only to the complaint of interference with shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba. In the view of my delegation, the arguments advanced by the representative of Egypt in justification of that interference cannot be sustained and, in fact, have already been rejected by the Council.
Any impartial survey of events since the resolution of September 1, 1951, must record that the Egyptian Government has, with every appearance of deliberation, ignored the injunctions of this Council. This course of conduct, persisted in for over two years, has resulted in many ships, which would otherwise have gone on their lawful occasions through the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Aqaba, being deterred from trading with Israel, or diverted at great cost over other routes to their destination. No government interested in the preservation of the rule of law in international affairs and least of all any government depending for the livelihood of its people on maritime trade, can contemplate this unhappy state of affairs without an earnest desire to bring it to an end.
(Continues...)
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Table of Contents
Contents
List of Maps (in conjunction with the applicable text), ix,List of Maps (in chronological order), xi,
List of Tables, xiii,
List of Basic Principles, xv,
About the Author, xxi,
Acknowledgements, xxiii,
Note on Calendars, xxiii,
Foreword, xxv,
Introduction, xxvii,
Critical Geographic Features, 1,
Demographics of the Region, 35,
Traditions and the Historic Record, 65,
Influence of Islam on the Region, 265,
Political Processes, 355,
Ever Shifting Alliances, 443,
Aspects of War, 465,
Perpetual Negotiations, 671,
Attempts at Security, 719,
Role of the Media, 753,
Conclusion, 775,
Appendix 1–The Constantinople Convention on Free Navigation of the Suez Canal of 1888, 779,
Appendix 2–Annotated Balfour Declaration of 1917, 781,
Appendix 3–Annotated Feisal-Weizmann Agreement of 1919, 783,
Appendix 4–The Lebanese National Pact of 1943, 787,
Appendix 5–Annotated United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (Second) Partition Plan of 1947, 789,
Appendix 6–The Tripartite Declaration, May 25, 1950, 793,
Appendix 7–Annotated Eisenhower Doctrine, March 9, 1957, 795,
Appendix 8–Annotated Palestinian National Charter, Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), and the Fatah Constitution, 797,
Appendix 9–The PLO Phased Plan, 815,
Appendix 10–Annotated UN "Zionism is Racism" Resolution and its Repeal, 817,
Glossary, 821,
Endnotes, 831,
Bibliography, 925,
Index, 949,