Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
178
Urban Combat Service Support Operations: The Shoulders of Atlas
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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780833034663 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | RAND Corporation |
| Publication date: | 12/18/2003 |
| Pages: | 178 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.22(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.47(d) |
| Lexile: | 1530L (what's this?) |
Read an Excerpt
Urban Combat Service Support Operations
The Shoulders of AtlasBy Russell W. Glenn Steven Hartman Scott Gerwehr
RAND Corporation
Copyright © 2004 RAND CorporationAll right reserved.
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
The soldier cannot be a fighter and a pack animal at one and the same time, any more than a field piece can be a gun and a supply vehicle combined. J.F.C. Fuller, c. 1948
Today's men and women serving in combat service support (CSS) units are akin to the ancient warrior Atlas. The mythological Greek was a god of tremendous strength tasked with the burden of bearing the heavens and sky, much as it is the duty of today's CSS soldiers to support military operations worldwide. The similarity to the warrior Atlas is heightened when these men and women are committed to urban operations. Their skills as fighters are likely to be tested no less than their ability to shoulder their martial loads, burdens that will at times include supporting not only a U.S. force but also coalition members, noncombatant civilians, and possibly even members of private volunteer and nongovernmental organizations (PVOs and NGOs). It is conceivable, perhaps even desirable, that a CSS officer will be tasked to lead an American force if its primary mission is to support a local civilian population.
Urban CSS operations are in many ways business as usual, relying on the same fundamentals of doctrine and training as for virtually any othermission. But there is also a considerable likelihood that these operations will present transporters, quartermasters, medics, and their brethren with challenges greater in scope and magnitude than are confronted elsewhere. It is the purpose of this report to identify the nature of these challenges and propose approaches for overcoming them.
The authors' primary chronological focus is the next ten years, the decade encompassing the period from the present to the pending fielding of the U.S. Army's Objective Force. The need to confront the problems associated with urban CSS operations during this period is an essential one. America's soldiers already find themselves in urban areas during virtually every operation they undertake. Their tools-doctrine, training, technology, and force structure-are not always up to the demands those undertakings make on them. Like their comrades manning combat and combat support units, those who provide combat service support during an urban operation have yet to fully prepare for its many and varied formidable tasks.
What follows is an initial identification and consideration of these challenges. The opening chapters take a macro perspective that encompasses CSS responsibilities writ large. Thereafter, the many functional areas that together comprise the U.S. Army's combat service support force structure receive individual attention. Together the general and specific considerations provide an introduction to the challenges inherent in supporting military operations in built-up areas and ways to overcome these challenges. This is a first look at a topic overdue for analysis, and our objective is to establish a foundation for building urban operations readiness in the immediate and longer terms.
The reader will find passages that employ a particular system or force structure as exemplars. The specific vehicle or unit type is less important than the general vulnerabilities or capabilities it represents. The objective is to abet understanding in the service of finding solutions, regardless of the organization to which a soldier, sailor, marine, or airman belongs.
Chapter Two
THE NATURE OF THE BURDEN: THE CHALLENGES URBAN OPERATIONS BRING TO BEAR
Focus attacks on service support and unprotected soldiers.... Urban operations are characterized by the isolation of small groups and navigational challenges; the separation it creates enables the enemy to inflict maximum casualties even when there is no other direct military benefit from this action. Fighting in Built-Up Areas
Villages, towns, and cities present a greater density of challenges for military men and women than any other battlefield or any other area of operations. There are more friendly forces in smaller volumes of terrain-and volume is the appropriate measure, for urban operations by nature include surface, below-ground, and above-ground components. There are greater numbers of noncombatants in less space. There are larger numbers of buildings, roads, potential barriers, and possible enemy firing positions in the built-up area. And there may be more enemies packed into those spaces, waiting behind those barriers, and occupying those weapon positions. The consequences are considerable for both defender and attacker. Instead of deploying soldiers in one defensive position to cover several square kilometers of terrain, a defender finds that a city street offers oversight only along its own narrow corridor. Many other possible enemy approaches exist within a few city blocks, each possibly needing its own defensive position if it is to be monitored. The result is that a maneuver commander requires more positions, closer to each other, either to defend against attacks or to attack along the many mobility corridors or through buildings. The distances between his and other friendly units are less than on other ground. He is likely to find that the offset separating those units and the enemy is similarly less.
The result is an unfortunate dichotomy for the CSS warrior. Greater friendly force density would appear to make the providers' tasks easier. Logic would seem to dictate that more supported units in less space would translate to less distance between a similar number of nodes than would be found on more open terrain. But the service supporter frequently finds the opposite to be the case. There may be more units in a given volume, but one position is often not directly accessible from another because of enemy fires or physical barriers. Members even of such lower-echelon units as squads and platoons are dispersed and not within sight of each other. Instead of a squad's members lying together within a tree line, two men peer from a basement window, three others from a second-floor balcony, and another pair from a pile of rubble down the street. A machine gun team observes its field of fire through a rooftop hole. In open farmland, a tank platoon assigned to support a light infantry company tends to maintain its unit integrity, all vehicles working together. In a city, those systems are likely to be allocated singly or in pairs, the better to support the squads or platoons that are typically the echelon conducting tactical urban operations. Thus the dichotomy: elements requiring support are consolidated in a smaller space, while the nodes to which the CSS warrior must provide support are greater in number and take longer to move between than on other terrain. The straight-line distances between them might be less than in a desert or pasture, but the convoluted route necessary to reach each safely without compromising those who seek to avoid enemy eyes makes the actual distance far greater. Providing timely support will thus be harder and CSS resources will be stretched thinner.
The density of structures on urban terrain will challenge CSS leaders in other ways as well. Some support units, maintenance companies for example, require very large areas to perform their missions. Such units can easily occupy a square kilometer of open ground even without other units' vehicles present for repair or servicing. As buildings occupy much of what would be open space, organizations like this will most likely have to spread themselves over a much larger area than would otherwise be the norm (with consequent costs for command, control, and security). Alternatively, the unit can compress itself into an available space, thereby increasing congestion and making itself a more densely packed and lucrative target.
The phenomenon of increased densities further directly influences the following additional factors of particular importance during CSS operations in urban areas, each of which is discussed in greater detail below:
Force security and noncombatant safety
Scope of CSS operational responsibilities
Number and type of civil authority echelons that can affect military operations
Increased difficulty of navigation
Higher consumption rates
Greater reliance on human intelligence
FORCE SECURITY AND NONCOMBATANT SAFETY
Heavily populated built-up areas pose dramatic force protection challenges for the CSS soldier. The aforementioned higher density of potential approach routes-whether streets, alleys, subterranean passageways, or building floors above ground-means that enemy infiltration behind friendly forward units can be virtually impossible to detect much less interdict. Every CSS headquarters, convoy, and other node (mobile or static) therefore needs to maintain constant alertness and a capability to defend itself. Vehicles such as fuel tankers and ammunition trucks are particularly lucrative, as they give an urban attack more "bang for the buck" than many other targets due to their lack of armor protection, impact on actions at the line of contact, and explosive contents. Bulking up convoy security with engineers, military police, aviation support, and other means may be called for. Nevertheless, convoy security is complicated by the considerable number of potential weapon positions and ubiquitous presence of individuals in civilian clothing (most of whom are civilians, though some are enemy attired as if they were). The challenge is particularly acute for combat service providers because of the duration and frequency of their exposure. They have to traverse miles of urban streets and can be committed to providing support to the indigenous population at locations far from the relative safety of base camps. The oft-times complicated nature of urban politics makes even humanitarian missions risky if the support being rendered threatens the preeminence of one or more factions. Combat service support leaders will have to exercise care as they seek to select locations that both serve the primary task and allow those executing it to protect themselves. Again, every deployment should be capable of self-defense. It should also incorporate well-planned, coordinated, and rehearsed plans for reinforcement and withdrawal, each of which has multiple contingency plans that address routes to be used and types of fire support available, and are flexible enough to cope with situations that could range from civilian riots to all-out enemy assault.
Site selection, the choice of convoy routes, and other decisions should also take into account the possibility of an enemy attack with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), should the foe have such a capability. The precautions taken will depend on the nature of those capabilities. For example, alternatives to locating medical aid facilities in basements or other low-lying areas might be desirable if a chemical threat is a major concern, since some hazardous agents are heavier than air and thus tend to settle in low-lying areas. Potential decontamination sites should likewise be identified and prepared for use even if the requisite equipment is not prepositioned.
Leaders should designate alternative routes during convoy planning in case obstacles, demonstrations, a change in the enemy situation, or contamination block original routes. Such contamination could be the result of WMD use or an accident involving industrial, medical, or other hazardous wastes frequently found in built-up areas. It may fall to CSS units to assist in the cleanup or removal of such hazardous wastes (or WMD munitions) upon their discovery and to provide aid to those suffering exposure.
It would seem that a typical town or city would have a large number of routes available for CSS use. In reality the actual number is significantly reduced by myriad operational considerations. These include:
Obstacles along some traveled ways
The dangers posed to indigenous personnel by military vehicles and the consequent desire to use routes through less populated areas
The condition of road surfaces
Height and width restrictions
The volume of civilian or other military traffic
Threats from armed personnel or mobs
Indigenous residents may covet even such waste as discarded mess hall food or scrap metal, making it necessary to vary procedures, routes, and times of operation so as to minimize threats to friendly force personnel and reduce the chances of inadvertently injuring civilians. Aircraft may be the preferable means of transport to minimize such risks if surface-to-air threat levels, the nature of the task at hand, and other demands on aviation assets make their use feasible.
Urban noncombatant density spawns several additional security issues. Unlike in most open areas, large numbers of noncombatants will be in virtually constant contact with friendly forces. Theft from stationary storage locations, distribution points, and even moving vehicles will be a consistent threat. Rules of engagement (ROE) and guidance on the use of available weapons (perhaps including non-lethal capabilities) should be clearly articulated and rehearsed to preclude unfortunate overreactions or unnecessary endangerment of U.S. lives.
The ceaseless proximity of noncombatants further ordains that a military force's actions will be under perpetual observation. The ubiquity of civilian eyes means that interested parties will have access to constant updates on friendly force dispositions and, potentially, the intentions of that force. Locals will quickly discern patterns of behavior, habits, and an organization's vulnerabilities. Deception and rigorous operations security (OPSEC) procedures will both have roles to play. The greatest threat to force security can be a complacency born of routine. CSS elements will repeatedly deploy throughout an operational area during virtually any operation. Units may go weeks or months without significant threat contact. Such cases will cause security standards to slip in all but the most disciplined of units. Even otherwise disciplined soldiers will adopt shortcuts as routine (e.g., repeatedly using the quickest travel routes or failing to wear helmet and protective armor) rather than consciously and continuously varying their procedures unless leaders enforce stringent standards.
SCOPE OF CSS OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
CSS operations conducted within urban environs are unlikely to relieve a commander and his soldiers of any of the responsibilities they would have on other terrain. They are, however, quite likely to entail additional duties and an expansion of traditional taskings, both of which are directly attributable to the greater density of individuals found in villages, towns, or cities as compared to other environments.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from Urban Combat Service Support Operations by Russell W. Glenn Steven Hartman Scott Gerwehr Copyright © 2004 by RAND Corporation. Excerpted by permission.
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