Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power / Edition 1

by Charles M. Cameron

Overview

With one party controlling the presidency and the opposing party controlling Congress, the veto has inevitably become a critical tool of presidential power. Combining sophisticated game theory with unprecedented data, this book analyzes how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of the most important vetoes in recent history add texture to the analysis, detailing how President Clinton altered the course of Newt Gingrich's Republican Revolution. Offering the first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency, Veto Bargaining is a major contribution to our understanding of American politics in an age of divided party government.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521625500
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	06/19/2000
Series:	Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	312
Product dimensions:	5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.71(d)

Table of Contents

1. Divided government and interbranch bargaining; 2. A natural history of veto bargaining, 1945–1992; 3. Rational choice and the presidency; 4. Models of veto bargaining; 5. Explaining the patterns; 6. Testing the models; 7. Veto threats; 8. Interpreting history; 9. Conclusions.

Editorial Reviews

"This pathbreaking study should be in the library of every serious student of US national politics." Choice

From the Publisher