Voting and Collective Decision-Making: Bargaining and Power

by Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano

Overview

Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees, parliaments, councils and boards by a 'yes-no' voting process. Sometimes a committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision. On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different-sized group? It seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521873871
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	09/11/2008
Pages:	204
Product dimensions:	6.20(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.80(d)

About the Author

Annick Laruelle is Associated Professor at the University of Caen Basse-Normandie.

Federico Valenciano is Professor of Mathematics and Game Theory at the University of the Basque Country, Bilbao.

Table of Contents

List of figures; Preface; 1. Preliminaries; 2. Seminal papers, seminal ambiguities; 3. Take-it-or-leave-it committees; 4. Bargaining committees; 5. Application to the European Union; Index.

Editorial Reviews

"[A]n important work."
Canadian Journal of Political Science, Peter John Loewen

From the Publisher