Why Safety Cultures Degenerate: And How To Revive Them
From Chernobyl to Fukushima, have we come full circle, where formalisation has replaced ambiguity and a decadent style of management, to the point where it is becoming counter-productive? Safety culture is a contested concept and a complex phenomenon, which has been much debated in recent years. In some high-risk activities, like the operating of nuclear power plants, transparency, traceability and standardisation have become synonymous with issues of quality. Meanwhile, the experience-based knowledge that forms the basis of manuals and instructions is liable to decline. In the long-term, arguably, it is the cultural changes and its adverse impacts on co-operation, skill and ability of judgement that will pose the greater risks to the safety of nuclear plants and other high-risk facilities. Johan Berglund examines the background leading up to the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011 and highlights the function of practical proficiency in the quality and safety of high-risk activities. The accumulation of skill represents a more indirect and long-term approach to quality, oriented not towards short-term gains but (towards) delayed gratification. Risk management and quality professionals and academics will be interested in the links between skill, quality and safety-critical work as well as those interested in a unique insight into Japanese culture and working life as well as fresh perspectives on safety culture.

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Why Safety Cultures Degenerate: And How To Revive Them
From Chernobyl to Fukushima, have we come full circle, where formalisation has replaced ambiguity and a decadent style of management, to the point where it is becoming counter-productive? Safety culture is a contested concept and a complex phenomenon, which has been much debated in recent years. In some high-risk activities, like the operating of nuclear power plants, transparency, traceability and standardisation have become synonymous with issues of quality. Meanwhile, the experience-based knowledge that forms the basis of manuals and instructions is liable to decline. In the long-term, arguably, it is the cultural changes and its adverse impacts on co-operation, skill and ability of judgement that will pose the greater risks to the safety of nuclear plants and other high-risk facilities. Johan Berglund examines the background leading up to the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011 and highlights the function of practical proficiency in the quality and safety of high-risk activities. The accumulation of skill represents a more indirect and long-term approach to quality, oriented not towards short-term gains but (towards) delayed gratification. Risk management and quality professionals and academics will be interested in the links between skill, quality and safety-critical work as well as those interested in a unique insight into Japanese culture and working life as well as fresh perspectives on safety culture.

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Why Safety Cultures Degenerate: And How To Revive Them

Why Safety Cultures Degenerate: And How To Revive Them

by Johan Berglund
Why Safety Cultures Degenerate: And How To Revive Them
Why Safety Cultures Degenerate: And How To Revive Them

Why Safety Cultures Degenerate: And How To Revive Them

by Johan Berglund

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$44.99 
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Overview

From Chernobyl to Fukushima, have we come full circle, where formalisation has replaced ambiguity and a decadent style of management, to the point where it is becoming counter-productive? Safety culture is a contested concept and a complex phenomenon, which has been much debated in recent years. In some high-risk activities, like the operating of nuclear power plants, transparency, traceability and standardisation have become synonymous with issues of quality. Meanwhile, the experience-based knowledge that forms the basis of manuals and instructions is liable to decline. In the long-term, arguably, it is the cultural changes and its adverse impacts on co-operation, skill and ability of judgement that will pose the greater risks to the safety of nuclear plants and other high-risk facilities. Johan Berglund examines the background leading up to the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011 and highlights the function of practical proficiency in the quality and safety of high-risk activities. The accumulation of skill represents a more indirect and long-term approach to quality, oriented not towards short-term gains but (towards) delayed gratification. Risk management and quality professionals and academics will be interested in the links between skill, quality and safety-critical work as well as those interested in a unique insight into Japanese culture and working life as well as fresh perspectives on safety culture.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780367606015
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Publication date: 06/30/2020
Pages: 106
Product dimensions: 6.12(w) x 9.19(h) x (d)

About the Author

Dr Johan Berglund of Linnaeus University holds a PhD in Industrial Economics and Management from KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. His thesis ’The New Taylorism’ addressed the safety culture of the Nuclear Power Industry, as well as cultural changes and imperatives of working life in general. As Visiting Scholar at Meiji University, Tokyo, he had the occasion to develop these perspectives further, exploring the background of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident of 2011. Prior to completing his dissertation Johan published a number of reports on the Nuclear Power Industry in Sweden, a collaboration between KTH and the Swedish Nuclear Safety and Training Centre (KSU).

Table of Contents

Preface vii

Acknowledgements viii

1 Introduction: Skill and Formalisation 1

2 The Separation of Knowing and Doing 6

2.1 The New Taylorism 6

2.2 Managing the Unexpected 13

3 The Shadows of Progress 21

3.1 Functional Autism 21

3.2 Technological Culture 25

4 The Projection of Quality 30

4.1 Complexity and Rational Design 30

4.2 The Measurement of Performance 34

5 The Skill Factor 46

5.1 Dynamic Safety Cultures 46

5.2 The Learning That Goes Into Skill 57

6 The Concept of Quality Revisited 65

6.1 Indirect Approaches to Quality 65

6.2 Seeing Different Worlds 73

7 Conclusions 85

References 90

Index 95

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